Six countries, six strategies: Iran has exposed the gaps within the Gulf
Although Gulf Cooperation Council states view Tehran as a major threat, the recent war has proven there is no unified Gulf position. From Oman, which sticks to dialogue, through Bahrain, which relies on military deterrence, to Saudi Arabia and the UAE — a comprehensive analysis of the countries' approaches and the critical significance for Israel's foreign and security policy.
The war with Iran has exposed a truth that is sometimes forgotten in Middle Eastern discourse: there is no single "Gulf position" regarding Tehran. Although all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states view Iran as their primary security threat, they have adopted completely different strategies for dealing with it during the fighting. Instead of a unified front, a complex mosaic of policies has been revealed — from mediation and dialogue to military deterrence, and from risk hedging to total reliance on external alliances. These differences, rooted in geography, demography, economics, and historical experience, have only sharpened following the recent campaign.
Examining the map of approaches in the Gulf presents a wide spectrum of strategies. At one end stands Oman, the country most identified with the line of dialogue and mediation. From Muscat's perspective, its traditional role is to serve as a bridge between the parties rather than being part of an anti-Iranian camp, and the war has only strengthened its belief that dialogue is the only way to reduce regional escalation. Alongside it operates Qatar, which manages a complex balancing policy: it shares the world's largest gas field with Iran and maintains open channels with it, but at the same time hosts the Al-Udeid base — the largest American base in the Middle East. Even after being affected during the war, Doha was careful not to cut off contact, based on the perception that discourse is essential for managing the conflict and curbing its spread.
In the center of the spectrum are the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which implement a clear hedging strategy. In Abu Dhabi, they understand well the Iranian threat to shipping and energy routes, but they maintain extensive trade ties with Tehran. The Emirati policy therefore adheres to a dual formula, combining the strengthening of deterrence and independent capabilities alongside the preservation of open communication channels and the prevention of escalation. Saudi Arabia is following a similar path: since the renewal of relations mediated by China in 2023, Riyadh has avoided direct confrontation. Based on the understanding that Iran is a neighbor that cannot be ignored, the Saudi leadership continues to strengthen air defense and the alliance with the USA, but at the same time keeps channels of dialogue with Tehran open.
The war has also become a complex test case for Kuwait and Bahrain. Kuwait, which for years adopted a moderate line in the hope that neutrality would prevent it from becoming a target, suffered severe damage to vital civilian infrastructure during the fighting. This experience undermined the assumption that one could remain outside the conflict, and clarified to its dismay that neutrality alone is not enough. It now seeks to strengthen air defense and security cooperation, while carefully maintaining communication channels. Conversely, Bahrain stands at the other end of the spectrum: for it, Iran constitutes both an external and internal threat due to fears of influence on the kingdom's Shiite population. As a host to the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet, Manama adheres to the most assertive approach and believes that there is no substitute for military deterrence and strong alliances against Tehran.
These gaps stem not only from the attitude toward Iran, but also from internal inter-Gulf competition. Qatar is fighting for the status of regional mediator, the UAE aspires to establish itself as a global financial and logistical hub, Saudi Arabia seeks to lead the new regional order within the framework of "Vision 2030," and Oman continues to cultivate its image as a neutral mediation state. Hence, even when the Iranian threat is shared, each of them has an almost completely different set of interests.
However, the war has also created a new common denominator. All Gulf states have reached the conclusion that Iran will continue to be a key factor in shaping their security environment, that one cannot rely exclusively on security guarantees from the USA, and that they must invest much more in independent defense capabilities and regional cooperation. However, the operational lessons are contradictory, and this difference explains why the Cooperation Council is not expected to develop into a cohesive NATO-style security alliance.
From Jerusalem's perspective, the analysis requires a deep conceptual change. The common tendency to sometimes treat the Gulf states as a monolith is a strategic error. Israel cannot formulate a uniform "Gulf policy"; a differentiated and personalized policy is required for each of the six states, based on an understanding of their unique threat perception, interests, and constraints. Understanding these differences — and not just the common denominator — will be a necessary condition for shaping effective Israeli policy in the Middle East in the coming years.
Dr. Yoel Guzansky is the head of the regional arena at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and a former senior official at the National Security Council.
