The President Who Cried 'Wolf': Trump's Threats Yield Diminishing Returns | Dan Perry

"If Oman gets in our way, we will bomb the shit out of them," President Trump said, according to Fox News. We have become accustomed to such language when directed at Iran — but Oman, even if it causes trouble from time to time, is an ally of the United States. Is such a thing effective? Is this the new way to conduct geopolitics? Has Trump lost it completely? It is time to speak more quietly — but also more clearly.

For decades, Oman has perfected a diplomatic ploy. It has been a close friend of the United States, a partner of the Gulf monarchies, and a useful mediator between them all, while simultaneously maintaining enough independence to speak with actors that Washington cannot speak with. It was the first country in the Gulf to openly receive an Israeli leader, Yitzhak Rabin, in 1994 — and yet it did not join the Abraham Accords.

This balancing act, as annoying as it may be to many outsiders, has served Oman well. It has kept the country stable and secure in one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world, while simultaneously providing successive American administrations with a diplomatic channel to Tehran. And Oman — both under Sultan Qaboos, who ruled it for many years, and under his successor Sultan Haitham — was ultimately a partner that could be relied upon.

This is exactly what makes Oman's current conduct so strange. Muscat is apparently discussing with the tyrants in Tehran a mechanism for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which is vital for global energy supplies, that may grant Iran a role in regulating maritime traffic and include, it seems, payments from commercial vessels. The details are not yet final, and Oman may describe the payments as service fees rather than transit tolls — a ploy that Iranian officials have already tried — but any version of such an arrangement would fundamentally undermine the existing order in global maritime trade.

The entire world will face concerns about inflation and disruptions in supply chains — perhaps especially Asia and Europe — but in the longer term, the concern relates to the principle of freedom of navigation, which the United States has guaranteed. Copycat actions will emerge at other choke points — not only in the Bab el-Mandeb, where Iran's Houthi proxies have already disrupted maritime traffic, but also in the Bosphorus, the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, the Strait of Gibraltar, and elsewhere.

It must be remembered that this war was intended to bring about the fall of the regime or cause it to stop pursuing nuclear weapons, arming terrorist militias throughout the region, building ballistic missiles capable of reaching Europe, and slaughtering protesters. One can criticize the war strategy and the failure to build alliances and prepare for the situation in Hormuz — as I have done myself. But the goals were just.

Instead, the regime will strengthen, the region will be destabilized, and the Iranian people will be betrayed — and in addition to all these, the Islamic Republic regime, tyrannical and hated as much as any government in the world, will win this victory in Hormuz. The democratic Iranian opposition will suffer a heavy blow.

It simply must not be allowed to happen. And it is reasonable to assume that it will not be allowed. If this madness continues, one can expect NATO countries to stand by the United States this time, even if they have to swallow their understandable aversion to Trump. The options range from a full and paralyzing blockade on Iran to renewed and even more destructive military action. I would choose the first option, even if the global economy suffers for a while.

The problem is that Trump chose to convey this message in the least helpful way imaginable. Once, Trump's bravado was shocking — his threat four months ago that a "whole civilization will die" in Iran sounded crazy, but there were those who believed he might be serious when it seemed he was signaling the possibility of a nuclear war. However, once such threats become routine and are established as mere bluster, they actually weaken America's position and make it look desperate. The rulers of Iran, who have stretched the limits so far, clearly believe this is the case.

This is the problem with the boy who cried wolf, even when the wolf is an American aircraft carrier. The United States does indeed have immense destructive capability, and everyone knows it. The question is whether the president is willing to use this power in circumstances where it involves political, economic, and strategic costs. It seems that usually the answer is no. Threatening to bomb Oman — an American security partner that allows the US military access to its territory and that for decades served as an American diplomatic channel to Tehran — sounds simply ridiculous. It makes you look unserious. In Trump's case, even less serious.

Theodore Roosevelt advised presidents, as is well known, to speak softly and carry a big stick. Trump has reversed the formula. He speaks loudly to the point of madness, and although he carries a very big stick, it is also clear that he is impulsive, bombastic, and driven by immediate tactical needs. What is called the "madman theory" can work when opponents believe that behind the apparent irrationality lies a real willingness to take risks. Here, Trump usually fails.

It shouldn't be this hard.

Oman has plenty of reasons of its own to keep Hormuz open, and plenty of reasons to preserve its relations with America. Its economy depends to a large extent on energy and international trade, and its security relationship with Washington is particularly significant. Oman was the first country in the Persian Gulf to grant the United States official military access to its facilities, and since then the two countries have developed extensive security cooperation. A 2019 agreement expanded American access to the ports of Salalah and Duqm, with Duqm capable of accommodating American aircraft carriers.

Oman also has oil and gas reserves that give its government considerable economic room for maneuver. Its population numbers about five million people, and its standard of living gives the sultanate a degree of independence that many countries can only dream of. This is therefore not a poor country desperately looking for a source of income.

If necessary, the United States has significant leverage over the sultanate, but much of its power stems precisely from the fact that America is not interested in using it destructively. Washington can re-examine military access, reconsider arms sales and maintenance arrangements, reduce intelligence and security cooperation, impose targeted sanctions on entities assisting an Iranian control mechanism, and use its considerable diplomatic and financial influence to make it clear that Oman's decisions have consequences. It can also coordinate moves with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other partners whose interests are directly affected by the future status of Hormuz.

These are real levers of pressure. And these are also levers that can be applied gradually. Washington can make the consequences increasingly painful, while leaving a clear path for Oman to back down. This is how a superpower should behave with a partner whose conduct it finds unacceptable. It must make the price of the policy unequivocally clear, while at the same time preserving the relationship that allows for the very application of pressure.

Bombing Oman would achieve almost exactly the opposite. It would destroy an important American relationship, jeopardize US military access, damage a valuable diplomatic channel to Iran, and potentially convince Muscat that its future security requires closer alignment with Tehran. It would turn a dispute over shipping arrangements into a much broader geopolitical rift. And it would make the United States look less like a self-confident superpower exercising leverage, and more like an angry power demonstrating that it has run out of better ideas.

Instead, Washington should speak to Oman as one speaks to a friend who has made a very serious mistake.

It must make it unequivocally clear — something Trump, strangely, has not done — that the international community will not allow an arrangement that grants Tehran a recognized ability to regulate international shipping in the strait or derive revenue from it.

The United States should tell Oman that it prefers to resolve the matter between friends. It should explain that continued cooperation provides Oman with enormous benefits, while continued assistance to an Iranian mechanism in Hormuz will necessarily change the relationship. Military access, arms sales, intelligence cooperation, financial ties, and diplomatic support — all these will become subjects for re-examination if Muscat chooses to cross this line.

This part of the message — the consequences for Oman — must be conveyed quietly, with absolute clarity, without leaving room for maneuver and without theatrical threats. This is what credible deterrence sounds like. Carry a really big stick. Try not to use it. And never cry "wolf."