Infantino’s Failed World Cup Sale: Saving Football and FIFA

In less than 72 hours, Gianni Infantino's ambitious plan to privatize FIFA's core assets collapsed into a major political crisis. Facing a united boycott threat from UEFA and other confederations, the FIFA president was forced to abandon the deal.

CalcalistAuthor: איתי גודר
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Infantino’s Failed World Cup Sale: Saving Football and FIFA
Photo: Calcalist / צילום: בלומברג

In less than 72 hours, the most ambitious economic takeover attempt in the history of world football turned into a severe political crisis and a personal failure for Gianni Infantino. The FIFA president, who began the week enjoying the success of a World Cup that generated record revenues of about $15 billion and established his status as one of the most powerful people in world sports, found himself under attack from all sides: an internal rebellion, international opposition, a threat of a European boycott, and the resignations of his close associates. On Friday, he was forced to publish a withdrawal statement, which effectively buried the project and turned his tenure into a battle for survival.

Anyone who thought that with the end of the World Cup FIFA would enter a calm period discovered that for Infantino, the tournament was only the beginning of a much larger move: the partial privatization of the core commercial assets of world football and their transfer into a partnership with private investors. The move received official status when FIFA announced the establishment of a commercial subsidiary, to which all of the organization's most profitable assets were planned to be transferred: broadcasting rights, sponsorship agreements, marketing activities, and the production of flagship events, led by the World Cup and the Club World Cup. According to the outline, FIFA was supposed to continue to hold control and the majority of shares, but to sell up to 21% of the company to private investors. The deal, which valued the commercial arm at about $20 billion, was supposed to inject about $4.2 billion in cash into the organization's coffers and allow it to become a more independent financial body, less dependent on the revenue cycles of World Cup tournaments.

However, it was not only the size of the deal that aroused interest, but also the identity of the investors. The investment group was led by the Thrive Eternal fund, owned by American businessman Joshua Kushner, brother of Jared Kushner, son-in-law and former advisor to Donald Trump. From Infantino's perspective, this was a direct continuation of a trend that has strengthened in recent years, in which private equity funds have invested in football leagues in Spain and France, in the PGA Tour, and in Formula 1. The idea is simple: to separate the management of competitions from commercial management, and to entrust the latter to bodies whose goal is to increase revenues, raise the value of broadcasting rights, and maximize the value of assets.

To carry out such a move, Infantino required the approval of the FIFA Council, which has 37 members, and subsequently the approval of a majority of the 211 associations that are members of the organization. To this end, he built a political mechanism designed to ensure broad support through the generous distribution of funds to the associations. FIFA committed to increasing the volume of grants to nearly $10 billion over the next four years and allocating 20% of the new company's shares to the associations themselves. The message was clear: an association that supports the plan will be eligible from January 1, 2027, for grants in the amount of about $40 million. Those who vote against it will settle for a basic budget of only about $20 million. For dozens of associations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania, which are almost completely dependent on FIFA money, this was an offer that was very difficult to refuse. Infantino argued that the move would strengthen world football and distribute wealth more equitably. His critics, on the other hand, saw it as a political mechanism designed to buy support and ensure an automatic majority in the General Assembly.

However, as the voting date approached, it turned out that Infantino had underestimated the strength of the opposition. What initially seemed like an ambitious financial initiative quickly turned into a severe political crisis, as the football powers lined up against it in a united front. At an emergency meeting of the 55 associations that are members of UEFA, an unprecedented decision was made: a threat of a boycott of all FIFA competitions, including the Women's World Cup in Brazil in 2027 and the Men's World Cup in 2030, as long as the privatization plan remains on the table and legal guarantees are not provided that FIFA will not sell ownership of its assets to private investors. "The World Cup is not an investment product," UEFA stated in an exceptionally sharp message. The organization accused FIFA's management of trying to force the move through economic pressure and warned that this was crossing a red line. UEFA Vice President Hans-Joachim Watzke called the plan a "direct attack on the future of football," while the president of the German Football Association, Bernd Neuendorf, warned against turning the most important tournament in the world into a "toy for investors."

The criticism did not remain within the borders of football. British Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy expressed public support for UEFA's position and declared that "football belongs to the fans, not to investors." Former FIFA President Sepp Blatter and US Congressman Jamie Raskin also joined the attack. Raskin even called the deal "oligarchic corruption that stains the game." Shortly thereafter, the CONCACAF confederation, which brings together the 35 associations of North and Central America and the Caribbean, also rejected the plan. The heads of the confederation wondered how a body that had just recorded the most profitable tournament in its history suddenly needed capital from private equity funds, and sharply criticized the lack of transparency with which the move was conducted. The decisive blow came when the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) also announced that it was siding with UEFA and CONCACAF. Within days, a bloc of opponents of 137 out of the 211 associations that are members of FIFA was created — far beyond the number needed to torpedo the proposal. At that moment, the vote became meaningless. Infantino needed 106 votes to approve the move, but even before the polls opened, it was clear that he did not have a majority.

Parallel to the collapse of support from the outside, Infantino's circle of close associates also began to crumble. The first was Carlos Cordeiro, former president of the US Soccer Federation, a senior executive at Goldman Sachs, and one of the people most identified with the FIFA president. Cordeiro announced his resignation and published a sharp statement in which he attacked the deal. "As someone who served as a senior advisor to the FIFA president, as a former banker, and as a lifelong football fan, I cannot stand by while FIFA considers selling part of the World Cup," he wrote. "This is a bad deal for the associations, bad for football, and bad for the future of the game. FIFA has billions of dollars in the bank and has no debts. There is no logic in selling a permanent part of its most expensive asset to raise $4.2 billion. This is mortgaging the future without justification."

Shortly thereafter, FIFA's Chief Operating Officer, Kevin Lamour, gave an interview to the AP and revealed that the organization's management was not a full partner in planning the move. According to him, employees and senior officials at FIFA were "misled," and the whole idea was actually a "one-man project" — a clear hint at Infantino. This was one of the sharpest public criticisms ever heard from within the organization's management against an incumbent president. When it became clear to him that Europe was threatening a boycott, most of the associations were opposed, and even his close associates were losing faith in him, Infantino was left with no way out. On Friday, FIFA published a short but significant message: the organization's president announced that after "carefully listening to all stakeholders," it was decided not to promote the privatization plan. It was also written that although the initiative was intended to strengthen world football, it created disputes that no longer serve its original purpose. Thus, the plan to raise $4.2 billion from private investors was officially buried — less than three days after it was revealed.

The battle for control of football has only just begun. The collapse of the move does not end Infantino's crisis — it only moves it to the political arena. The failure may become a turning point ahead of the FIFA presidential elections, which will be held in March 2027. Until recently, the prevailing assessment was that Infantino would run without a significant opponent and easily secure another term, after many associations had already expressed public support for him. However, ahead of the deadline for submitting candidacies this coming November, the picture has changed. The affair exposed the limits of his power, and now senior officials in UEFA and other confederations are seriously considering the possibility of fielding a candidate against him with weight that will threaten the continuation of his rule.

Nevertheless, it is too early to write off Infantino. Throughout his career, he has proven that he is a shrewd politician with an exceptional ability to generate new financial growth engines. The failure of the plan is not expected to change his economic worldview. Even if the idea of introducing private equity funds into the core of FIFA's activities has been blocked, it is likely that Infantino will look for other routes to increase the organization's revenues — through expanding tournaments, maximizing broadcasting rights, developing global sponsorships, and changes in the structure of international competitions. The privatization plan was indeed blocked at the last moment, but the question it raised has not disappeared: how much can the core assets of football be commercialized without damaging its identity. This battle ended with Infantino's retreat, but the struggle for control over the economic future of the game has only just begun.

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