Changing the rules of the game: Israel's message intended for Erdogan's ears | Prof. Moshe Cohen-Eliya

The Israeli strike this week at the Abu al-Duhur base in northwestern Syria is an event of significant geo-strategic importance, not just another tactical incident in the skies over Syria. According to reports, the regime in Damascus was about to allow the deployment of Turkish forces at the base. As expected, Turkey condemned the act, and Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Ankara and the American envoy to Syria, called the strike an "unnecessary escalation." Barrack often represents Turkey's interests within the American administration.

To understand the significance of the strike, it is necessary to recall that the collapse of the Assad regime dramatically weakened Iranian and Russian influence in Syria, but a geopolitical vacuum never remains empty, and Turkey seeks to fill it.

For years, Ankara has cultivated a concept of "strategic depth" across the spaces of the former Ottoman Empire, and now, in post-Assad Syria, an opportunity has opened for it to turn influence into real power: to train the new Syrian army while rehabilitating its bases, to expand intelligence presence, to prevent Kurdish autonomy, and to make Damascus a partner dependent on Ankara.

In the current war, Israel has become a regional power that has dramatically weakened the Shiite axis led by Iran. And now, a vacuum has been created again, which Turkey is trying to fill. Turkey is certainly not Iran, and Israel does not need to seek a war with a strong NATO state. But there is no doubt that Turkish bases, radar systems, and air defense in Syria could gradually reduce the freedom of action of the IDF and change the balance of power in the northern arena. Therefore, the strike at Abu al-Duhur was the correct strategic message: Syria will not become a forward base for Turkey.

It was recently reported that one Arab country recommended to another to sign an agreement with Israel as a tactical step, to "lull" it, to build up strength, and then choose the time for a confrontation. That is, to plan for us another October 7th of the kind Yahya Sinwar carried out. The identity of the countries is not for publication, and we do not know if it concerns Syria, but there is a basis to suspect it is Syria.

Ahmad al-Shara, it should be remembered, grew out of Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda branch in Syria. Later, he did sever ties with al-Qaeda, rebranded himself, and today seeks international recognition. Additionally, the media reported that the Trump administration is pressuring Israel to sign a security peace agreement with Syria.

Among Israelis, there has always been enthusiasm for peace agreements that do not carry a territorial price. But an agreement with al-Shara is dangerous if its price is the abandonment of Israeli freedom of action or the belief that the signature itself has changed the nature of the region. The peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan proved that an agreement can survive difficult crises when it rests on state interests, oversight mechanisms, and guarantees. Alliance theory in political science teaches that states connect not only against power but against a threat.

In this sense, Israel has the potential for an alliance of interests with groups fearing the concentration of Islamist power in Damascus and Turkish patronage: the Druze in the south, the Kurds in the northeast, and on another level, the Alawites on the coast — what is sometimes called the "alliance of minorities." This is, in a sense, an update of Ben-Gurion's old "periphery alliance." Back then, Israel sought non-Arab partners around the Arab world; today, it can build a network of partnerships with local groups that do not want to live under a centralized Islamist hegemony.

But even in such a move, there is potential for a trap, because overly overt Israeli patronage could turn them into "agents of Israel" in the eyes of their environment and harm them specifically. Therefore, the alliance must be flexible: protection of the Druze, support for the Kurds, humanitarian and intelligence assistance, and support for the decentralization of Syria. And this is not necessarily about occupying territories or creating proxy states, but about a strategic alliance with the vulnerable minorities in Syria.

Even the "David Corridor," mentioned in strategic discourse as a possible axis between the Druze in the south and the Kurdish areas in the east, should remain for now an idea of continuity of influence, not a fantasy about an Israeli territorial corridor. There is no such corridor today, and it is not an official Israeli plan. One can hear in this geography a biblical echo of "from the Euphrates River to the Brook of Egypt." But Israeli policy does not need messianic justification; it needs strategic logic. Because against al-Shara and against Erdogan, the goal is not to expand borders but to shape the balance of power.

And in the Middle East, paper can be important, but only when there is power behind it, and alongside it stand allies who have a real reason to maintain it. The alliance of minorities in Syria serves Israel's fundamental interests much more than an agreement with a jihadist like al-Shara who serves the competing power, Turkey.

Prof. Moshe Cohen-Eliya is the founder of "Masad HaAretz - The Research Institute of the People of Israel."