A Strip of Illusions

The peace council's proposal regarding a settlement in the Gaza Strip, published the day before yesterday, did not come as a surprise. While Israel was preoccupied with campaigns in Iran and Lebanon and internal struggles, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt — the mediators on the Gaza issue — were working on a plan for the future of the Strip, focusing on the establishment of a Palestinian technocratic government in place of Hamas and the formulation of a vague formula regarding the disarmament of the organization.

The one who brought about the breakthrough is, as always, Donald Trump, for whom narrative and image are more important than the truth. He is the one who will determine whether Hamas is disarming, regardless of reality, just as he declared last October that the organization had agreed to disarm, even though the latter publicly denied it, or that Iran was defeated in the last campaign, is begging for an agreement, and its regime has become moderate. Hamas, for its part, identifies more advantages than disadvantages in the agreement and therefore welcomes it. The organization that inflicted the hardest blow in Israel's history and which was promised by Benjamin Netanyahu to be eliminated, but in practice survived after three years of bitter war and remained the dominant factor in Gaza, does not assess that the settlement threatens its status and assets.

In its understanding, it will be able to continue to maintain its military and civilian power under the cosmetic cover of the technocratic government, in other words — adopting the Hezbollah model, meaning existence alongside a weak formal government. On the issue of weapons, the organization emphasizes that the demand for disarmament concerns only heavy weapons (which it barely has left anyway), and that it is a gradual process that includes, among other things, the possibility of keeping personal weapons and completely unclear moves such as storing and depositing weapons, without a clear condition that the settlement will be initiated only after disarmament, as Benjamin Netanyahu consistently demands. Furthermore, Hamas demands a full withdrawal of the IDF from the Strip, even without disarmament, and demands that Israel not be involved in the issue.

The settlement has not yet been signed and is still shrouded in question marks, but it seems that it is already creating a trap for Israel. The greatest challenge is embodied in the possibility that Hamas will maintain its power under the technocratic government and the multinational force planned to be deployed in the Strip, a move that the government supported a week ago, despite the promise that nothing would be promoted in the region without Hamas being disarmed first. Moreover, the very establishment of the technocratic government and the multinational force on the ground could narrow the Israeli space for action, since it is likely that arguments will be raised that continued attacks will undermine the attempt to establish a "new order" in the Strip.

Another challenge could develop in relations with Washington. If Donald Trump insists on promoting the settlement, increasing pressure on Israel could develop, to the point of dangerous friction between the two countries. In this context, it is possible that demands will be raised not only to allow the entry of the technocratic government but also to moderate Israeli military activity (including the elimination of terrorists), promote rehabilitation, and above all to withdraw, even if gradually, from the "yellow line", and all this — without full and immediate disarmament of Hamas.

The settlement outline in Gaza is being promoted at the sensitive time of the eve of elections, and it is likely that if it is accelerated, it will negatively affect the image of Benjamin Netanyahu, who promised total victory, boasted about cultivating militias (which Hamas demands be disbanded as part of the agreement), and continues to deal with the possibility of emptying the Strip of Gazans. Deep frustration could lead to initiating a military move in Gaza on the eve of the elections, which would deteriorate relations with the US, and all this while Israel needs a close relationship with it for the purpose of dealing with the critical threat of the Iranian nuclear program and for establishing a settlement in Lebanon.

The settlement outline presented embodies a significant gap from the goals presented in Israel, and seems to have the potential to join a chain of strategic failures that occurred during the war and embody the same flawed pattern: a leadership that never investigated its past failures, preserves their seeds, and unsurprisingly reaps many failures. All this, while obsessively relying on continuous use of force, harmful fantasies, the belief that Donald Trump is always with us, and contempt for the demand to formulate a strategy. The end of the stubbornness to act only by force, not to discuss the question of the day after, and to believe that we are soon returning to fighting in Gaza, was known in advance: enforcement by Donald Trump that contradicts the principles presented by Benjamin Netanyahu (especially since the settlement also mentions the goal of a future Palestinian state).

All these raise the thought that perhaps it was possible to reach the same settlement without returning to fighting in March 2025, and that perhaps taking over a large area in Gaza is not necessarily a "long-term strategic achievement" as claimed, but a move that is expected to "fold" soon. At the present time, when Israel must focus on the Iranian nuclear threat and maintain close coordination and trust with Washington, it is dangerous to get into a sharp confrontation because of Gaza. The settlement in the region is far from being an achievement, but it is the lesser of two evils compared to the alternative that many in the government adhere to: intense war and even occupation of the Strip, while in the background continues the wave full of enthusiasm — and to a large extent detached from reality — of "returning to Gaza" and establishing settlements in the region.

Under the circumstances that have arisen, it is required to define vital interests in Gaza in the spirit of the "prevention" principle, and above all: preserving freedom of action against emerging threats in the region, determining a large area near the border where any activity of any kind will be prohibited, let alone the establishment of an enemy, preserving the right of veto over foreign elements that will enter Gaza, and above all — ensuring that the "Philadelphi" corridor will not be under Hamas control.

The author is a senior researcher at the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University.