A Palestinian State in the Making

I have a bad habit: I like to read texts in the original rather than rely on media reports or analyses. When you approach the source, you discover things that were not announced with fanfare but help to understand the situation as it truly is. The outline of the agreement for the Gaza Strip published by the Peace Council is a great example of this.

The US President's statement spoke of a historic move to dismantle Hamas and ensure Israel's security. The clauses themselves, by contrast, reveal mines that we will encounter sooner in the best case, and a substance that benefits Hamas in the worst case. An illustration of such a mine is the "verification committee." This is a new body whose composition or method of operation is unclear, but it is effectively the entity that will decide which party is delaying the stages of the outline. Even if neither party intends to implement the agreement, we have before us an institution that will determine who is to blame. Its decision is critical to the quality of our relations with America, which is pinning its hopes on the existing outline ahead of the midterm elections in November. A Qatari or Turkish presence in this mechanism is likely, and thus we are in a built-in position of inferiority.

But the prominent problem with the outline does not concern point mines like the verification committee, but the essence: the laying of the infrastructure for a hostile Palestinian state. One can support or oppose a Palestinian state, but what cannot be agreed to is the establishment of an entity that will constitute a security threat by default. Reading the outline, it seems that all the components are already there. The main reason for this is Hamas's ability to integrate into the governing bodies that will operate under the "National Council for the Management of Gaza," or the "technocrat government."

In the published outline, it is written that Hamas will not take part in it, but the text contains no mechanism that will truly prevent this. For illustration, the outline notes that every candidate for service in the new "Palestinian police" will undergo a "rigorous screening process," but such a process or those who will define it are not provided. An examination of the statements of those "technocrats" shows that this screening process is not expected to resemble a serious examination. Moreover, the outline declares that a candidate who does not pass the screening process for the police "will be offered a civilian position or retirement in accordance with Palestinian law." Thus, every Hamas member will find himself at most a policeman, and at least a clerk.

Another example: according to the outline, "heavy" Palestinian weapons will be transferred only to the "technocrat government." Personal weapons will be permitted according to "Palestinian law." What is that law, and how do you prevent a Hamas member who miraculously did not become a policeman or a clerk from holding a Kalashnikov? The "technocrats" have the answers. How does such a move, in which weapons will continue to circulate in the Strip, fit with demilitarization processes? It is unclear. Mechanisms for deradicalization do not appear at all.

In historical perspective, this means that the vision of a Palestinian state is taking shape with international support. Whoever holds the helm of the emerging state is not a "lover of Zion." The ability to exclude Hamas from the systems of government is weak, and there is no talk of abolishing the Palestinian incitement system. The current move may have good intentions, but it is full of loopholes. Almost three years since the October 7 massacre, the cornerstone has been laid for the establishment of a hostile state in Gaza.