Extorted and helpless: The great threat to Europe - and who holds the key to the gates
The mass breach into Ceuta exposed Brussels' open secret: Europe pays hundreds of millions to countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Mauritania to stop migrants far from its territory. But now it turns out that these agreements have turned refugees into a strategic bargaining chip - and the entire continent vulnerable to constant extortion.
They arrived running, swimming, and on inner tubes. Within a short time, tens of thousands of people crossed the border from Morocco to Ceuta, the Spanish enclave in North Africa, through the sea and by breaching one of the gates in the fence. Spanish security forces were overwhelmed, reception centers filled up, and the local event turned into a crisis that echoed across Europe. Ceuta, along with the Spanish enclave of Melilla, is part of one of the most unusual borders in the world: European territory located on the African continent and surrounded by Morocco. For those who manage to cross into it, it is an entry into Spanish territory and, in effect, into the European Union. For Madrid and Brussels, the high fences, cameras, and patrols are only the last layer of defense. The more important layer of defense is on the other side - in the hands of the Moroccan security forces.
The reason for the current wave is still unclear. At first, the storming was attributed mainly to rumors spread on social media, the activity of smugglers, and a misinterpretation of a court ruling in Spain, which limited the possibility of immediately returning to Morocco migrants who arrived in the enclaves by sea. However, in the days that followed, the suspicion strengthened that Rabat's conduct also played a decisive role. According to reports in the Spanish media, the country's intelligence services reached the conclusion that Morocco did not organize the mass infiltration in advance, but allowed it to happen. Moroccan border control, according to the assessment, was gradually eased during the month of July, and on the day of the storming, it barely stopped the masses. The head of the regional government of Ceuta, Juan Jesus Vivas, updated the European Parliament the day before yesterday that about 100 people were killed in the border breach and that 3,000 to 5,000 migrants are still in the enclave. EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner called for also using trade and visa policy to pressure Morocco, while the leader of Ceuta declared: "Morocco is not a reliable country." But the event raises a much broader question: how did so many manage to arrive almost at the same time at a border considered one of the most secured in the region - and what happens to Europe when the country it relies on fails, or is not interested, in stopping them?
The border that starts in Rabat
Since the great refugee crisis of 2015, Europe has been working to move its borders effectively south and east. Instead of waiting for boats off the coasts of Italy, Spain, or Greece, the European Union invests in countries of origin and transit: training forces, purchasing equipment, improving surveillance systems, fighting smugglers, returning migrants to their countries, and preventing their departure to the sea. Morocco is one of the key partners in this method. According to European Commission data, between 2015 and 2021, the EU committed to transferring 234 million euros to projects related to migration in the kingdom. The money was directed, among other things, to border management, fighting smuggling and human trafficking, protecting migrants, voluntary return, and improving Moroccan migration policy.
In 2023, the EU launched another program, amounting to 152 million euros, designed to strengthen Morocco's ability to manage its borders, dismantle smuggling networks, and return migrants to their countries of origin. The program was part of a much broader cooperation package with Rabat, worth 624 million euros. From Europe's perspective, the logic is clear: it is cheaper to stop a boat before it has sailed, or a group before it has reached the fence, than to deal with thousands of people who have already entered its territory, grant them the opportunity to request asylum, and manage deportation and appeal proceedings for months or years. Morocco also benefits - not only money and equipment, but a status of a strategic partner, access to decision-makers in Europe, and leverage in negotiations on trade, visas, investments, and political issues. But this is exactly where the weak point lies. Once the European border is entrusted to another country, that country can decide how much to tighten supervision - and when to loosen it.
The most prominent precedent occurred in Ceuta in May 2021. Within two days, about 8,000 people entered the enclave, including about 1,500 minors, after the Moroccan security forces demonstrated, according to Spain, unusual passivity. Many of the migrants simply walked along the beach or swam around the maritime obstacle. The event occurred at the height of a diplomatic crisis. Spain allowed Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front fighting for the independence of Western Sahara, to secretly receive medical treatment on its territory. Morocco, which sees Western Sahara as an integral part of its territory, was furious. Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles then accused Rabat of "extortion," and claimed it was using migrants and minors to pressure Spain. The European Parliament later condemned "Morocco's use of border control and migration, and in particular unaccompanied minors, as a means of political pressure against an EU member state." Morocco rejected the claims, but the message was well received in Madrid: its borders do not depend only on the amount of police, soldiers, and fences on the Spanish side - but also on relations with Rabat. In the following year, the Spanish government changed its long-standing position on the Western Sahara issue and expressed support for the Moroccan autonomy plan as a basis for resolving the conflict. Relations improved - and cooperation on the border strengthened. This does not mean that every wave of migrants from Morocco is a planned action by the government. Rabat also deals with young people who seek to leave, smuggling networks, and thousands of migrants from countries south of the Sahara. But the events of 2021 illustrated that even a temporary and unofficial change in the level of enforcement can turn into a European crisis within hours.
From Tunisia to Mauritania
The Moroccan model is not an exception. The European Union has signed in recent years a series of agreements with countries in North Africa and the Sahel, which combine economic aid and investments with a commitment to fight irregular migration. In 2023, Europe signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia, with the clauses including a support package of 105 million euros for migration - almost three times the average annual funding transferred to the country in the field in the two years preceding it. The money was intended for strengthening borders, fighting smugglers, returning migrants, and preventing disasters at sea.
In Mauritania, which has become a central departure point towards the Canary Islands, the EU launched in 2024 a migration partnership and an aid package amounting to 210 million euros. The money was not all intended for migration, but also for humanitarian aid, job creation, and security - but a central part of the program is strengthening borders, fighting smugglers, and preventing the departure of boats to the Atlantic Ocean. Egypt also received the status of a strategic partner. The European aid package to Cairo, announced in 2024, stood at 7.4 billion euros and included loans, investments, and grants. Out of the grants, about 200 million euros were allocated for migration management. From Europe's perspective, Egypt's economic stability - a country where more than 100 million people live and which has absorbed refugees and asylum seekers from the region - has become an internal security interest. The agreements are presented in Brussels as broad partnerships: they include investments in infrastructure, energy, education, and employment, and are not just payment in exchange for blocking migrants. The claim that the response to migration must include addressing the factors that drive it - poverty, wars, unemployment, and instability - also lies at their foundation. In practice, however, the ability to reduce the number of boats arriving at Europe's shores is one of the central metrics by which they are judged.
Erdogan's "opening of the gates", Lukashenko's "hybrid attack"
The country that proved most explicitly how migrants can be turned into a tool in the relationship with Europe is Turkey. In an agreement signed in 2016, Ankara agreed to accept back migrants who arrived irregularly to Greece, and Europe committed to transferring billions of euros for aid to refugees and the communities that hosted them. The European Refugee Fund in Turkey later reached a scope of six billion euros. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened repeatedly to "open the gates" and send millions of refugees towards Europe if he did not receive political and economic aid, and in February 2020 the threat became policy: Ankara announced it would no longer stop migrants seeking to reach the borders of Greece and Bulgaria, and thousands moved towards the crossings.
The move came in the shadow of the fighting in Syria and Turkey's demand for European support. Europe then discovered that the deal that dramatically reduced the number of arrivals to the Greek islands also created a deep dependence on Ankara. Any dispute over money, visas, Syria, or relations with Erdogan could have turned into an immediate threat to the continent's external border. On Europe's eastern border, the use of migrants took on an even sharper character. In 2021, the European Union, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia accused the regime of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus of helping to bring migrants, mainly from the Middle East, to Minsk - and from there transferring them to the EU borders. The EU Asylum Agency determined that Belarus took steps designed to facilitate irregular migration first to Lithuania and later also to Latvia and Poland. Brussels defined the move as a "hybrid attack," designed to take revenge on Europe for the sanctions imposed on the Lukashenko regime and to destabilize member states. Belarus and Russia denied that they were organizing the flow.
In this case, Europe did not pay a neighboring country to guard the border, but dealt with a hostile country that it claimed recruited the exact same weakness against it. Migrants who tried to reach Europe found themselves stuck between Belarusian forces that pushed them west and Polish forces that prevented them from entering, in harsh cold conditions and without sufficient protection. The lesson was similar: the movement of migrants is not just a humanitarian or economic issue. When it occurs in a large volume and in a short period of time, it can become a tool of foreign policy, pressure governments, ignite disputes within the EU, and strengthen parties opposing migration.
The policy known as "externalization of borders" also has another price. As Europe transfers the work of containment to countries outside its territory, it also distances migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from its legal, oversight, and media systems. The harshest example is Libya: for years, the European Union and member states assisted the Libyan Coast Guard with equipment, training, and funding with the goal of locating boats and returning their passengers to Libya. Human rights organizations claim that many of the returned are sent to detention facilities where torture, sexual violence, extortion, forced labor, and arbitrary arrests have been documented. Brussels claims that the aid includes oversight mechanisms, fighting smuggling networks, and programs for the voluntary return of migrants to their countries. However, critics of the policy claim that Europe is effectively paying others to perform actions it could not perform in the same way on its territory - and distancing from itself the legal and public responsibility for the results. Similar claims were raised also regarding Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt: countries with a controversial record in the field of human rights receive money, equipment, and political legitimacy because they are perceived as vital for the stability of the European border. As the fear of migration grows within EU countries, the power of the conditions and criticism that Europe places on its partners decreases.
Who holds the key
The European system is not without achievements. Cooperation with transit countries can save lives, dismantle smuggling networks, create legal routes for migration, and prevent departure on dangerous journeys. Countries like Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania are not just "gatekeepers": they themselves deal with migration pressure, with long borders, and with populations of refugees and migrants. But as the European Union relies more on countries that are not its members, it transfers to their hands part of its sovereignty. European money buys cooperation - but does not guarantee it forever. An economic crisis, a diplomatic confrontation, a demand for political recognition, or simply a failure in enforcement can reopen a route considered closed.
The current breach into Ceuta does not prove that Morocco intentionally activated the migration lever, as Spain accused it of doing in 2021. The Spanish intelligence assessment is not that Morocco created the migration wave out of nothing: rumors on social media, the court ruling, and economic distress are what motivated thousands to set out on the way. But when they reached the border, the country that Europe pays to stop them allowed them, according to the assessment, to pass. The event teaches that Europe's border does not end at the fences of Ceuta, the shores of Greece, or the waters off Italy. It starts at the coast guard bases of Libya, at police checkpoints in Morocco, in the ports of Tunisia and Mauritania, and in the negotiation rooms of Ankara. The tap that regulates the flow of migrants to Europe is often found outside of Europe - and in the hands of governments that know very well how much it is worth.
