Either core education or the army — the dilemma of the Haredi public | Gershon Baskin and Samy Singer

The Haredi public, and especially the relations between it and most parts of Israeli society, is in a crisis that has been worsening since October 7. Like many crises in Israeli society, this crisis is largely the result of political decisions made over the years without considering their long-term consequences.

This also happened regarding the settlements. From one settlement, an entire system developed, and later an ideology and political leadership grew from it that currently threaten the foundations of the state and the very Zionist vision. Similarly, David Ben-Gurion's original decision to exempt a few hundred yeshiva students from military service, and later the cancellation of quotas during the Menachem Begin era, created a completely different reality over the years: a broad Haredi autonomy that receives significant public funding but large parts of which do not participate in the labor market and do not bear the economic and civil burden equally.

This is a real problem, and if it is not addressed, it could become a heavy economic and social threat to the future of Israel.

But here one must ask a question that public discourse almost ignores: why is all the fire directed at the Haredim, while the settlement enterprise receives a completely different treatment?

Settlers also received huge budgets during the war. However, unlike the Haredi public, whose main budgets were intended to support systems already built over decades, the settler leadership used the current term to promote a far-reaching agenda: expanding settlements, legalizing outposts, promoting de facto annexation, and deepening Israeli control in the West Bank.

This is a policy that most of the Israeli public does not really discuss its meaning. The government presents it as a security or national necessity, and many opposition leaders are afraid to confront it because they identify a "right-wing sentiment" in the public that must not be challenged.

And here lies one of the great absurdities of Israeli politics.

The Haredi public is presented as a threat to the future of the state, while the settlement enterprise — which in many ways creates a much more immediate security and political threat — receives legitimacy, and sometimes even admiration, from parts of the media and the political system.

Some opposition leaders come from the right themselves or are ideologically linked to the settlement enterprise. Others simply refuse to deal with the central question: can Israel continue to hold millions of Palestinians under its control forever, expand settlements, and believe that this reality does not exact a huge security price?

This failure is not only moral or political. It is also a security one.

Since October 7, the claim has been heard again and again that Israel needs a much larger army, more soldiers, more battalions, and more reservists. The IDF talks about a need for tens of thousands of additional soldiers, and therefore the demand to draft Haredim arises immediately.

But almost no one asks the obvious question:

Why exactly are all these soldiers needed?

A significant part of the burden on the IDF stems from the need to protect hundreds of settlements, outposts, and isolated farms in the West Bank. Each such settlement requires secured roads, patrols, checkpoints, response forces, intelligence, and a permanent military presence.

Settlers claim they are protecting Israel. In practice, in many cases, it is the IDF that protects them.

If so, before we demand that young Haredim enlist, it is appropriate to ask if the state itself is not intentionally creating the need for more and more soldiers.

There is no logic in a state endlessly expanding the territory where the army is required to protect citizens, and then claiming that its problem is a shortage of manpower.

The meaning of "more soldiers" is not just a question of equality in the burden. It is also a political question: does Israel choose annexation and continued control over another people, or political separation that will reduce the burden on the army and the constant friction with the Palestinians?

Precisely the Haredi public should be the first to ask this question.

If there is an interest that can connect the Haredi public with the democratic and liberal camp in Israel, it is the interest to reduce the need for wars, dramatically reduce the burden of military service, and rebuild a society where Haredim integrate more fully into the economy and civil life.

The central challenge of Haredi society is not necessarily conscription into the IDF. The big and more urgent challenge is real integration into society and the labor market.

For this, real core education is needed: Hebrew, English, mathematics, sciences, and skills that allow a young person to integrate into a modern economy, earn a living with dignity, and be independent.

Instead of an endless debate of "army or no army," a new social deal should be presented to the Haredi public:

Not everyone must serve in the IDF, but everyone must contribute to the state.

Those who do not serve in the army can serve in civil service: in hospitals, in Magen David Adom, in the fire department, in schools, in local authorities, in welfare, or within the Haredi community itself.

At the same time, the state must ensure that every Haredi child receives the basic tools needed to integrate into society and the economy.

The leadership of the Haredi public is now at a crossroads.

It can continue to tie its political fate to Netanyahu, Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and the camp that promotes annexation, Jewish supremacy, and permanent control over the Palestinians. If it does so, it may cement itself in the eyes of large parts of the public as one of the allies of the forces deepening the Israeli crisis.

Or it can choose another path.

Ahead of the elections, the Haredi leadership can say clearly: we want to integrate into the state, we understand that we have a responsibility towards Israeli society, and we are ready to agree on a real program of core studies, integration into the labor market, and civil service.

At the same time, it can demand that the state also do its part: stop creating more and more unnecessary military missions by expanding settlements and outposts, and start a political process that will reduce the need to maintain a huge army in the Palestinian territory.

The Haredi public is not an enemy of Israeli society.

It also does not constitute a direct security threat to our lives as the settlement enterprise might become.

But to recreate an Israeli partnership, the Haredi leadership must also change.

It can say to leaders like Gadi Eizenkot, Yair Golan, and others in the change camp: we are ready for a new agreement. We are ready to integrate into society and the economy. We are ready for meaningful civil service and core studies. In return, we demand a state that stops conducting a policy that generates more wars and more need for soldiers.

Ultimately, this should be the starting point for all of us:

Israel needs fewer wars — not just more soldiers.