A few days before October 7: The warning Benjamin Netanyahu received from himself
At the end of a closed security meeting held days before the massacre, the Prime Minister accurately predicted what might happen on the way to normalization with Saudi Arabia. So how did it happen that at that very same meeting, he approved increasing benefits for Yahya Sinwar?
In early October 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened a meeting with the heads of the security establishment under the title "Multi-Front Situation Assessment." He did not know that a week later he would find himself in the middle of exactly such a multi-front situation. But he should have known. This knowledge was lying at his feet, right under the lamp. One only had to look at it. But Netanyahu preferred to continue running with the judicial coup, the reasonableness standard, etc. In the dilemma between the security of the state and the lives of its citizens and his personal security and freedom, there is no dilemma for him.
At that same meeting (the story is brought in Amos Harel's book "06:29"), Shin Bet head Ronen Bar repeated his claim that Israel must prepare for a major operation in Gaza, and recommended assassinating senior Hamas officials. In summarizing the meeting, Netanyahu gave instructions: "To increase the use of humanitarian benefits, to promote a settlement process in the Strip, and conversely, to upgrade operational readiness for assassinations." What did that mean in practice? To continue to reward Hamas. "To promote operational readiness" is empty talk.
Operational readiness existed. It did not need to be "promoted," but rather the order to execute it needed to be given. But what Netanyahu did in those days was to approve the increase of benefits to Hamas, according to the demands of Yahya Sinwar: increasing the quota of workers entering from Gaza (an all-time high), efforts to convince Qatar to increase support in dollars, expanding the fishing zone, etc. Sinwar made sounds of being appeased. Netanyahu was satisfied. Hamas's deception exercise succeeded. Netanyahu took a "calculated risk," as Sinwar suggested.
All this is known ad nauseam. But here comes the punchline: at the end of the meeting, Netanyahu informed those present that "Israel is on the verge of a historic peace agreement with Saudi Arabia, there will be 'states and organizations' that will try to sabotage it."
Meaning Netanyahu, who knew he was on the verge of signing with Mohammed bin Salman, and out of his vast experience and the intelligence he read, understood the danger. He knew that signing with Saudi Arabia meant the end of the Palestinian dream, at least at this time. He knew that Hamas could not let such an event pass in silence and would do everything to torpedo it. And therefore he sent this explicit warning, which is anchored in the protocol.
A slightly deeper thought would have defined Hamas in advance as the main factor ("organizations") from which the evil might arise. Iran ("states") is the inspiration that will fuel the event. From the perspective of Iran and Hamas, the Israel-Saudi agreement is a disaster. A death blow. A donkey's burial for the dream of Jihad and the destruction of Israel. And therefore, Netanyahu understood and warned.
It must be emphasized: contrary to his constant alibi — they didn't warn me, they didn't tell me, they didn't wake me up — the one who warned was actually him. Netanyahu. In his own voice. At that meeting, a few days before the massacre. Warned against the "possibility of sabotage" of the Israel-Saudi agreement by "organizations." How do you sabotage an agreement? You start a war.
Several days earlier, on September 21, 2023, a Twitter user named TULIP published this tweet: "Another angle in the story with Saudi Arabia: currently Saudi Arabia is conditioning the agreement on coordination with the Palestinians. Because the Palestinian leadership is split between Hamas in Gaza and the PLO in the West Bank, could this story lead to a heating up of the front by Hamas in order to prevent an agreement? Or maybe they are also in the deal? I'm still betting there won't be an agreement."
In retrospect: no, Hamas was not in the deal. They were deep in the preparations for the attack. Exactly as Netanyahu warned, exactly as TULIP understood. The deal included only the Palestinian Authority. And TULIP was right: there was no agreement in the end. Netanyahu's prophecy came true in the most monstrous way imaginable. On October 7 at 7:10 in the morning, 40 minutes after the attack began, TULIP tweeted on Twitter: "Betting that this is a very serious move intended to prevent the deal with Saudi Arabia."
He tweets this when Netanyahu hasn't even put on makeup yet, ahead of leaving for the Kirya. He tweets this when no one in the General Staff, in the Gaza Division, in the bunker in the Kirya, and even in the Shin Bet, understands what is happening. An ordinary citizen understands the danger 16 days earlier and identifies the incentive minutes after the start of the attack. I would appoint him head of Aman.
Remember what Netanyahu said when they woke him up at six in the morning with the news about the rocket attack? "Why are they shooting?" he asked. On the face of it, a justified question. Only a few days earlier, Netanyahu had approved a long series of benefits for Hamas. But in reality, Netanyahu knew the answer to his own question. They are shooting to stop the normalization with Saudi Arabia. You yourself warned about this a few days ago. Don't you remember?
Blind on a minefield
TULIP is called Tal Angert. I didn't know him before. This week he drew my attention to his tweets in real-time. A talented young man, a Tel Avivian, who works at the resilience center in the Eshkol Regional Council. "This story is a significant point that touches on the failure in general, and that night between October 6 and 7 in particular," he told me. "How do I understand this and no one else does? How does Netanyahu understand this, warn against it, but do nothing about it?".
"When I read all the reports about the deal being formed with Saudi Arabia," he explains, "I did 1+1 and understood that Hamas would have no choice, in order to thwart it they would have to attack Israel. I decided to tweet it. But since my younger sister, Gili, follows my tweets and was just about to move in with her partner Udi Ben-Zvi in Kibbutz Be'eri, I decided to add question marks. In order not to cause her anxiety. I became anxious myself.
"Three weeks later I woke up to the missiles. I immediately understood that this was not just another day of launches. And then I tweeted that this is a significant event." What about Gili, I asked him. "Gili and Udi were not at home that Saturday, fortunately. Udi's cousin, Itay Svirsky, was kidnapped and murdered."
What should we understand from all this? Netanyahu, who considers himself a statesman, is unable to read two steps ahead. Like the disastrous exit from the nuclear agreement, like the failed announcement about toppling the Iranian regime, so too in the matter of Gaza. To tell himself a simple thing: I am going for peace with Saudi Arabia. Mohammed Deif and Sinwar see this as a historic defeat of biblical proportions. This seals their fate. They will try to do something.
Instead of urgently calling all the heads of the security establishment, immediately airing all the intelligence, enforcing on the army a dramatic increase in readiness until after the signing of the agreement, Netanyahu instructs at that meeting he convened a few days before the massacre to increase the concessions to the Palestinians.
It's not that they didn't wake him up in the morning. It's him, who didn't wake them up in time. This is the real conception. Anyone who goes for peace with Saudi Arabia and knows that his bitterest enemy will see this move as the sealing of his dreams, must adopt a conception according to which there is no situation where Hamas will not try to thwart the agreement. This Netanyahu should have understood. This is the job of "Mr. Security." This is the job of someone who declared: "Now it is our shift. Now it is our responsibility. Now it is my responsibility."
This failure is the deepest and most horrific in the history of the state. To navigate a Middle Eastern minefield without seeing one step ahead. To say there is a mine ahead and then step on it with complacency. Without saying wait, let's secure the dangerous flank from which the evil might arise, when we are finally burying Hamas and the Palestinian state.
There was no need for the four Aman letters and not for all the warnings of the system's senior officials and not even for Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. All Netanyahu needed was to understand his own warning, take off the ridiculous pink glasses he was wearing, stop the publicized vacation tour with "my wife" and protect Israel's security, as he was supposed to do. But as has already been written here, it was not Israel's security that was on his mind, but his own security.



