Why the Mossad believed in Ahmadinejad - and what was the grave warning of Aman

In a presentation shown to the cabinet by the Mossad on the eve of the launch of Operation 'Lion's Roar', it was stated that regime change in Iran would arrive within 'one to three years'. The music the ministers heard was different.

'We understood,' one of them told me, 'that we are heading for regime change in a fast and sweeping process, with the killing of the current leader, with a Kurdish invasion, with Ahmadinejad as our agent, with protesters in the streets.'

Many of those involved claim that the operation could have succeeded had the US not changed its mind regarding its components. There are not enough tools to judge, because parts of the plan are still in the dark. The story is one of a systemic failure: how a huge strategic goal turned into an operational mission without the political echelon, the IDF, and the Mossad truly agreeing on its essence, its centrality, its feasibility, and the suitability of the tools to reach the goal. Most of these parties also disagree on the facts.

In closed discussions, the heads of the army warned that the approach led by the Mossad is pretentious and hollow in light of the strength of the regime's control over Iranian society. The Research Division in Aman believed, in a written report, that if the effort for regime change fails, the risk of an Iranian breakout to obtain nuclear weapons will increase, and that this is a 'risk that must be fenced in'. The grave warning was that the price of failure in changing the regime could be very expensive.

Many Iran experts today estimate that Mojtaba Khamenei is indeed considering a breakout to the bomb. The Mossad, on the other hand, presented to the political echelon analytical evidence based on the strength of Ahmadinejad and his status in the Iranian public. These are pieces of evidence that proved themselves again and again, and were known to Aman as well. He emerged as a central candidate for an alternative within Iran. The fact that he grew up within the regime made him a more credible figure, apparently.

Alongside this, Israeli intelligence personnel believed that the Mossad's reliance on the Kurds is 'a complete, wild delusion'. The Mossad said, in essence: Iran is our department. We understand this. The Kurds will not take over Iran; they will occupy the regime while the public topples it. Despite this, the Mossad feared that the Kurds would carry out pogroms during their invasion. The condition set for them was dubbed the 'Ten Commandments': no murder, looting, theft, rape, or war crimes.

'If you deviate from this,' the Kurds were warned, 'the Israeli Air Force will not back you. The Iranians will slaughter you.'

Cabinet members were not warned that Turkish President Erdogan could thwart the plan. They also did not discuss in depth the implications of a new war with Iran on Israel's status in the US. In the Mossad's plan, there are additional components of great and relatively convincing importance that have not been published. Their non-publication can create the impression that it is a much 'thinner' plan than what the organization really tried to bring to fruition.

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The full column is in the Saturday supplement of 'Yedioth Ahronoth' and in 'Yedioth+'.