No More Automatic Solidarity: The Country Redefining Its Relations with the Palestinians

The war with Iran is changing the way many Saudis look at the Palestinian issue, and consequently, at normalization with Israel: the Saudi discourse does not abandon the demand for a Palestinian state, but increasingly separates support for the national principle from the attitude toward the Palestinian leadership—and especially toward Hamas.

An analysis of 63,964 posts on the X network in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, between April and August 2026, reveals a "Saudi Arabia first" narrative—national interest, security, and economic stability are placed above traditional Arab commitments. Hamas is presented not as a liberation movement but as a branch of the Iranian "axis of resistance," which sacrificed Gaza for Tehran's strategy.

This is a fundamental change. For decades, the Palestinian issue provided legitimacy to leaders, movements, and countries that sought to speak on behalf of the Arab world. Now, a growing part of the Saudi discourse is reversing the equation: whoever joins Iran, supports its militias, or justifies firing toward the Gulf states cannot expect continued automatic support in the name of Arab solidarity.

Not Pro-Israeli

The criticism is not directed only at Hamas. In fact, it is evident in the discourse that it is also directed at the Palestinian Authority, which is perceived as having received economic and political aid from Saudi Arabia for years but responded with criticism, accusations, and ingratitude. From this grows a new demand: to stop viewing the Palestinian issue as an open and unlimited commitment and to condition support on political conduct that also serves regional stability.

However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that Saudi Arabia is becoming pro-Israeli. The Iranian threat, the missile and drone launches, and the Houthi activity increase the recognition that Israel has intelligence, technological, and defensive capabilities that can assist in deterring Iran and its proxies. Therefore, there is greater openness to point-based security coordination and cooperation in the face of a common threat.

But this openness is not equivalent to agreement to full normalization. In the Saudi discourse, a sharp distinction appears between defensive cooperation and political recognition. Israel may be a tactical partner, but it still does not receive "normalization for free." The Saudi condition for the establishment of a Palestinian state remains in place even when trust in the Palestinian leadership is eroded.

The change is not linear but accelerated in times of crisis: on June 22, following reports of attacks against Iranian oil targets and the escalation of direct confrontation, 3,581 posts were recorded in a single day, and the broad topic of regional politics and Israel grew by about 1,708% throughout the period. When the Iranian threat became tangible—damage to energy infrastructure and trade routes—the tendency to link Hamas to the price paid by the Gulf states increased, and the war moved the discussion from the symbolic Arab level to questions of responsibility, utility, and national security.

New Regional Horizon

For Israel, the meaning is twofold. On one hand, the Iranian threat creates a real opportunity for deepening security, intelligence, and technological ties with Saudi Arabia. The erosion in Hamas's legitimacy even reduces the Palestinian veto power over Israel-Saudi relations. On the other hand, Israel might err if it interprets the criticism of the Palestinians as removing the Palestinian issue from the agenda.

The message emerging from the Saudi discourse is that because the kingdom is no longer willing to be held hostage by a certain Palestinian leadership, it seeks to take ownership of the political process. If Israel is interested in a breakthrough with Riyadh, it must offer a new regional horizon, not as a concession to Hamas but as part of a strategic deal with Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it must avoid creating the impression that it seeks to drag the Gulf states into a long war of attrition against Iran.

Saudi Arabia is not abandoning the Palestinian issue—it is redefining it. The support remains, but the commitment to the leadership is eroded, and Iran and Hamas are losing ownership of the subject. Saudi Arabia seeks to shape its own regional order—and this is a window of opportunity for Israel, for those who understand that "Saudi Arabia first" is not a slogan but an invitation to a renewed discourse.

The Israeli interest is that the discourse with Saudi Arabia will not come at the expense of the strategic relations built with the Emirates. Therefore, the talks with the Saudis should take place out of the shared destiny between the Arab Gulf states and Israel, which is intensifying in the war with Iran, and even more so with the renewal of Houthi attacks on the Saudi kingdom.

The author is an expert on Saudi Arabia from Bar-Ilan University.