Not Worth the Paper: When the US Fails to Understand the Language of Hamas and the Middle East

Last Friday, senior officials in the American administration were quoted regarding the emerging agreement between Israel, the United States, and Hamas on the issue of disarming the organization and the withdrawal of the IDF: "Israel has signed, Hamas has signed, there is a commitment here." In this short sentence, once again, the deep gap between Western ignorance and the Middle Eastern bazaar is encapsulated.

In the Western perception, an "agreement" is almost synonymous with progress: if a document is signed, if both sides have made declarations, and if there are monitoring mechanisms, the assumption is that the conflict has moved from a path of violence to a path of resolution. However, this assumption rests on a liberal-Western structure of thought: a belief in mutual legitimacy, legal finality, and the ability of text to create reality. This is exactly where the problem begins.

The quotes attributed to the American officials reveal the Western belief in the power of the signature itself. Once a document is signed, decision-makers feel that reality has already been settled, even if there is no proof on the ground that the terrorist organization has changed its character or goals. As if more than three decades have not passed since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the quintessential model for the gap between these perceptions.

Prof. Shaul Mishal, one of the greatest researchers of the Middle East, once published the article "Hamas Time: Violence and Compromise." The article dismantles the assumption that compromise in the Arab-Muslim world is necessarily peace. For Hamas, a compromise may be a survival maneuver: buying time, preventing isolation, and waiting for a shift in the balance of power. That is, the agreement is not the end of the struggle but a part of it.

According to Prof. Mishal, Hamas can agree to a truce as long as it is not translated into a final recognition of the opponent's legitimacy. Here lies the critical difference between a 'hudna' (truce) and peace as a Western concept: a hudna is a suspension; liberal peace is the closing of a conflict. For Hamas, suspension is permissible if it serves the goal; peace is problematic if it cements the abandonment of fundamental principles.

Agreement as a simulation

The Western structure of an agreement assumes three things: that if there is a commitment, there is an intention to fulfill it; that if there is an implementation mechanism, there is a desire to implement; and that if there is a gap between rhetoric and the field, time will solve it. However, in the case of Hamas, this gap is not a glitch. It is the mechanism itself.

Islamic-political organizations do not move in a straight line from "war" to "peace," but between controlled violence, bounded compromise, and continued struggle. Therefore, when American officials speak of a "commitment," they attribute a Western validity to the word: a signature that regulates reality. However, for a player of the type Hamas represents, a signature may be a tool for reducing international pressure or gaining time until a more convenient moment.

The Waqf of compromise

One of the deep components in the concept of compromise is its delimitation: what is permitted to be suspended, and what must not be abandoned. Here enters the religious-political logic of the Waqf, which sets a normative ceiling: it is possible to postpone and maneuver, but it is forbidden to turn a temporary concession into a final recognition that erases the historical claim. This logic is also true for Iran's conduct toward the United States and the Gulf states.

From here stems the Western misunderstanding: the West sees an agreement as a document; the Islamic movement sees it as a space for action. The West seeks an end; Hamas seeks conditions. The West asks, "Has the problem been solved?"; Hamas asks, "Do we have less pressure, more freedom, and more time right now?"

Disarmament as an illusion of finality

The announcement of an agreement to disarm Hamas sharply illustrates this gap. The Americans speak of a "historic step" and "lasting security," but at the same time, they admit skepticism regarding Hamas's willingness to disarm, thereby revealing that the agreement was born within deep distrust.

Here lies the structural problem: if an agreement is presented to the public as a solution, but it is clear to its drafters that it is mainly a pressure mechanism or a framework for a long process, then the agreement does not cancel the conflict but manages it. In other words: the West celebrates "peace," while the other side celebrates a truce.

Western language, different logic

The liberal West assumes that an agreement is a product of good faith. But for Islamic-political players, politics is not judged primarily by loyalty to the liberal model of trust, but by utility, survival, and the preservation of the ideological goal. Therefore, when American officials say "Israel signed, Hamas signed," they describe a legal situation, but not necessarily a political reality. This difference is exactly the place where the Western gaze goes blind: it sees a commitment, but does not see the strategy behind it.

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Bottom line: read the agreement in Hamas time, not Washington time

In the Middle East, an agreement is not a synonym for peace. Sometimes it is only a more sophisticated form of struggle: less fire, more time; less open confrontation, more preparation for the next stage.

The West does not just interpret the agreement differently - it sanctifies it. It believes that the document overrides the intention, that the signature overrides the ideology, and that the wording overrides the balance of power on the ground. This is the cult: worshiping the signing ceremony instead of a sober examination of the reality after it.

Therefore, the true test of the current agreement is not the question of who signed, but the question of what is actually being dismantled: how many tunnels were destroyed, how many weapons were taken out of use, and how much of Hamas's military and governing capability has ceased to exist. Israel cannot afford to read the agreement in Washington time; it must read it in Hamas time. Whoever counts signatures instead of capabilities might discover, again, that they celebrated peace while the other side celebrated only a truce.