Neither a total war nor an agreement: The real scenario between Trump and Iran | Yair Marton

Before we rush to declare a full-scale regional war, or an historic agreement just around the corner, it is worth looking at the Middle East as it really is: a region in a state of ongoing war of attrition, where every player tries to exert power — but primarily to avoid the price of a full-scale war.

Iran seeks to clarify that if military or economic pressure is applied to it, it is capable of expanding the battlefield far beyond Israel and the Persian Gulf. Harming shipping lanes, energy infrastructure, and the global economy is, from its perspective, a lever of pressure on Washington and European countries.

The big question is whether the United States will expand the strikes. In my assessment, as long as Iran continues to harm American forces, international shipping, and Washington's allies, the chance of additional American strikes is very high. However, there is no American interest in starting a war of conquest or a move aimed at regime change.

The American goal is expected to remain limited: systematic erosion of Iran's missile capabilities, command arrays, and military infrastructure, while maintaining space for diplomacy if Tehran changes course. In my opinion, the internal conflict between the moderates and the extremists in Iran does not allow for compromises.

Israel, for its part, must distinguish between desire and ability. It will continue to act wherever it identifies a direct threat, but it would prefer that the Americans lead the broad campaign. If Iran carries out another direct attack on Israel, or launches a significant attack through its proxies, Jerusalem will not be left behind.

The most interesting arena is actually the one between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. For years, Riyadh tried to extricate itself from the Yemeni quagmire through agreements. But as the Houthis become an Iranian arm threatening trade routes and regional stability, the Saudis understand that agreements alone do not guarantee security. If the attacks by the Houthis continue, it is possible that we will see Saudi Arabia gradually return to military involvement.

And yet, despite the noise, I do not believe we are on the way to a full-scale regional war. Iran understands that such a war could endanger the very survival of the regime. The United States, after two decades of wars in the Middle East, is not looking for another conquest. Therefore, the most likely scenario is a continuation of a war of attrition: more strikes, more targeted killings, more damage to the Iranian economy, more Iranian attempts to activate proxies and harm trade routes.

Will the negotiations also continue? It seems so. In the Middle East, war and diplomacy are not contradictory — they are conducted in parallel. History teaches that almost every significant agreement in the region was born precisely after a period of exerting force. The question is who will blink first: Iran, which will be required to choose between strategic erosion and painful concessions, or the West, which will have to decide if it is satisfied with deterrence, or acts to fundamentally change the balance of power in the Middle East.

The author is a strategic consultant and crisis manager.