Netanyahu chooses politics over an exit from Gaza | Dan Perry

Israel has every reason in the world to be suspicious of Hamas. The October 7 massacre removed any doubt that remained (for Benjamin Netanyahu — not for me or any reasonable person) regarding the organization's intentions, and the possibility that Hamas would exploit a ceasefire, hide weapons, or rebuild its military capabilities must stand at the center of Israel's security planning.

This is an argument for vigilance, for monitoring and verification mechanisms, and for a demand that Hamas actually disarm and not just announce that it is willing to do so. This is a very poor argument for Netanyahu's categorical rejection of the new 15-point plan of President Trump's Peace Council.

Netanyahu likes to speak directly to his voters, bypassing journalists who might show critical thinking, and anyone listening to him might think that Trump is demanding that Israel withdraw from Gaza and then trust Hamas to disarm. However, the plan says something entirely different. Hamas's heavy weaponry, weapons factories, weapons depots, and tunnels are supposed to be rendered unusable in a "gradual, continuous, and time-limited" process, under the supervision of an international verification committee and with the assistance of an international stabilization force. Each stage is conditional on the verified completion of the stage that preceded it. The Israeli withdrawal is linked to this process and advances alongside it in stages — while, in fact, the exact details are still to be determined.

In other words, Israel is being asked to exchange verified steps for Hamas's disarmament for phased withdrawals. Netanyahu demands that Hamas completely disarm before Israel gives up any additional territory. This position has a certain intuitive appeal after October 7. However, it also threatens to make a viable agreement impossible, because it demands the final result before the reciprocal process intended to bring it about can begin. There is nothing sacred or security-critical about the exact locations currently held by the IDF, which controls more than 60 percent of the strip's territory — an area most of whose residents have emptied.

Israel should have said yes — alongside a demand for strict verification, well-defined benchmarks, and an immediate response to any violation. This way, Israel's security could have been protected while simultaneously beginning the much-needed transition from war to something resembling a future.

There is also a moral imperative here that Israel should embrace instead of evading. Gaza is devastated. Its residents need homes, hospitals, schools, electricity, water, and an economy. Reconstruction must begin as quickly as the security situation allows. The plan provides a framework for this, under a new technocratic Palestinian administration instead of Hamas, with the Peace Council overseeing reconstruction and international funding.

Israel also has a clear interest in reconstruction. Israel cannot benefit from two million people living along its border, indefinitely, amidst ruins, poverty, rage, and despair. Every apartment rebuilt, every business that returns to operation, and every family that has something tangible to lose creates at least the possibility of reducing the reservoir of hatred from which Hamas and its successors recruit their people. Palestinians must have a real interest in what comes next. Israelis must have an interest in them having one.

Israel must also deal with the catastrophic deterioration in its international standing. Some of the condemnations were grotesquely one-sided, and some stem from open hostility toward Israel itself — and even, in my opinion, from classic antisemitism. All this does not negate the basic strategic problem: Israel has squandered enormous diplomatic capital during this war, and accepting an American plan that removes Hamas from power, disarms its militias, introduces international security guarantees, and begins reconstruction would have allowed Israel to show that its goal is security, not permanent occupation or an endless conflict.

Netanyahu, instead, exacerbated the damage when he added to the rejection of the plan another declaration: "As long as I am prime minister, a Palestinian state will not be established — not in Gaza and not in Judea and Samaria."

There is a special measure of cynicism in this, because the original 20-point Trump plan, presented in September 2025, explicitly included the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state. Israel accepted that plan, because Trump's promise was stronger than the opposition of Netanyahu's partners in the far-right coalition, who preferred to continue the war, sacrifice the hostages, and resettle Gaza with Jews.

That plan did indeed state that as Gaza is rebuilt and the Palestinian Authority undergoes reform, conditions might be created for a "credible path to self-determination and a Palestinian state." Netanyahu accepted the Trump plan then. The new 15-point roadmap simply continues the same idea and adds nothing to it.

This requires a certain measure of honesty. Israel controls millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and cannot forever combine permanent control over territory with democracy and a Jewish majority at the same time. Ultimately, the options converge on partition or some kind of binational reality. The details of the partition can be negotiated, conditioned, and protected through security arrangements. One can demand that the Palestinian leadership undergo reform. Palestine, whatever its borders may be, must be demilitarized. After October 7, Israel can demand extraordinary security arrangements. But pretending as if the basic demographic and political equation has disappeared is a strategy of denial.

Netanyahu understands politics well. Israelis fear, and rightly so, that a Palestinian state in the West Bank could become a base for another attack in the style of October 7, this time from positions overlooking Israel's population centers. By declaring that a Palestinian state will never be established, Netanyahu can try to push his political rivals into an electorally toxic position, where they will be seen as those who promote a Palestinian state during an election campaign. It is to be assumed that they will be smart enough not to swallow the bait.

And that is exactly the problem. A decision with enormous strategic consequences is being subordinated to Netanyahu's electoral survival. Israel needs a government capable of distinguishing between legitimate security concerns and their political exploitation. It needs leaders capable of identifying an opportunity that is not perfect and improving it instead of destroying it.

Netanyahu, on the other hand, instinctively pulled out the categorical "no." God knows what is going through his mind, because Smotrich and Ben Gvir can no longer bring down his coalition. But that no longer matters either. There is no one to talk to.

One must hope, wish, act, and pray that the voters in Israel will remove him from office when they go to the polls on October 27. He seems determined to leave power as he has conducted it in recent years: with irresponsibility and without a coherent strategy for Israel's future. I am truly in favor of the independence of the sovereign Israel, but sovereign of the USA: make it clear to him who is in charge, and let's move forward with the plan.