Long on the radar: How the decision was made to strike the Turkish project in Syria

In July 2025, Turkey delivered an unusual "gift" to the Syrian army of Ahmad al-Shara: four modern armored personnel carriers of local production, fresh from the factory. For several weeks, Aman personnel — from the head of the directorate, Major General Shlomi Binder, and below — were busy searching for these APCs, which were hidden in the vast expanses of Syria. The armored vehicles were finally located, partly thanks to quite a bit of luck. Since then, they have been watched like a hawk.

This story, which took place more than a year ago, is a symptom of a much broader process that has been occurring in our region for a long time — the military and political entrenchment of Turkey in Syria, which is being carried out under Israel's watchful eye.

The strike capabilities of the Turkish Air Force, which possesses advanced F-16 aircraft and may soon be equipped with F-35s as well, are also under a magnifying glass.

It is reasonable to assume that during this long period, much more than those four APCs mentioned in the opening appeared on Aman's radar. And yet, until this week, Israel gritted its teeth and showed restraint, and if it did act, it did so under the radar. Even if bellicose statements were released in the background and messages were presumably passed through third parties, the extensive Turkish effort to introduce more and more military systems into Syria and increase its influence in the country had not yet met an Israeli bomb.

Sometimes political and military clocks synchronize

This situation changed this week with the Israeli strike in the Idlib area, which was aimed precisely at that same Turkish buildup in northern Syria. It seems that the Israeli leadership understood that the decision to abandon the containment approach, which prevailed here on all fronts until October 7, is also relevant regarding the Turkish giant.

As fate would have it, the attack took place just hours before the polls opened in the Likud primaries. Immediately, there were those who claimed that this significant move was carried out solely to serve Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Sometimes military and political clocks synchronize, often there are also those who work energetically to synchronize them — but the claim that Israel launched an attack in Syria solely due to electoral considerations is ridiculous: the military friction between Israel and Turkey is not new, and it has been simmering on a low flame for more than a year. Throughout this period, Israel, as mentioned, allocated more and more intelligence resources to Syria. And as is known, the more you look, the more you find.

Syria has always been a case study for the struggles of empires. It seems that this matter is not about to change in the coming decades. The fall of the Assad regime, and subsequently the weakening of Iran as a result of the rounds of fighting against Israel and the American economic siege, created a vacuum in Syria, which Turkey entered willingly. "The events that have occurred recently in our region, especially in Syria, remind us of an important fact," said Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a speech he gave a few days after the fall of the Assad regime. "Turkey is bigger than Turkey."

Erdogan's expansionist ambitions do not end in Syria. "In Turkey, dramatic economic reforms have begun, it has a large army and independent defense industries, it has planes, ships, and submarines — and above all, it has a vision," a very senior official in the intelligence community told me not long ago. "This vision includes Syria, Kurdish lands, and even investment in the Horn of Africa. In 15 years, there will be two regional powers in the Middle East — Israel and Turkey."

The next conflict could be against Turkish planes and missiles

It is not only the intelligence community that is worried. The "Nagel Committee," which was intended to examine the future of the defense budget in light of the changes in the strategic arena, already referred to the Turkish threat in August with razor-sharp words: "The presence of Turkish proxies, or Turkish forces in Syria, could deepen the danger of a direct Turkish-Israeli conflict."

We live in a time when it is not recommended to prophesy. And yet, I will take the risk: a direct conflict with Turkey will not happen in the coming years, but it could certainly develop over the coming decade. If Israel, with the generous assistance of America, indeed succeeds in toppling the Islamist regime in Tehran or at the very least significantly curtailing its steps, Israel's next big conflict could certainly be against Turkish planes, missiles, and ships.

Like in the computer game "Street Fighter," in reality, sometimes as you advance through the stages, your opponent becomes stronger. The great fear of the military power of Iran and its proxies has largely proven unfounded. Israel did indeed take hits and did not manage to subdue Iran, but it emerged from the war against it (as of now) in an improved state. A direct conflict with Turkey will look completely different.

Every time I am exposed to another Turkish military development, I am horrified. Erdogan is building for himself a tremendous military force, with strategic capabilities and technological innovation, and as is known, since October 7 we have learned that it is worth evaluating our enemies according to their capabilities and not according to their intentions. Even Turkey's strategic alliances, its industrial power, its economic strength — dwarf Iran.

Israel did well to send a message in the form of a missile to Turkey's buildup project, while it is still in its infancy.