The elimination of Ali Khamenei was a military success - but now there is a strategic problem | Prof. Amatzia Baram
From a military perspective, the elimination of Khamenei was a resounding success. However, in terms of the long-term strategic interests of Israel and the USA, the picture is problematic. He should not have been eliminated as long as there was no certainty of toppling the entire system.
On the morning of February 28 of this year, with the opening of the war against Iran, Ali Khamenei was eliminated in the "Leader's House" complex in central Tehran. Along with him, senior commanders and family members were eliminated. From a military perspective, this was a resounding success for the Israeli Air Force and intelligence. The strikes also caused heavy damage to the Iranian war machine and enhanced deterrence.
However, in terms of the long-term strategic interests of Israel and the USA, the picture is very problematic. We won the battle, but we are in danger of losing the campaign. What could end the entanglement with a victory on points is a mistake by the new Iranian leadership, which is already emerging.
If the operations were indeed not intended to topple the regime, why did we eliminate the supreme leader, why, according to reports, were Kurdish forces prepared, and why did the Prime Minister declare that we are "creating the conditions" for a popular uprising? Any recruit knew that when it comes to a regime that has already suppressed uprisings with much blood, an attempt to topple it without "boots on the ground" would fail. It was known that if the Kurds rebelled, the Persians, including enemies of the regime, would unite against them.
Pulling Ahmadinejad out of mothballs as an alternative leader? The man is hated by the Iranian middle class because of the mass killing of protesters he ordered in 2009. A popular uprising? The masses are still in shock from the murder of tens of thousands in January 2026. The Iranian leader should not have been eliminated as long as you are not sure of toppling the entire system.
It was well known that the Revolutionary Guards were waiting for Khamenei to pass away in order to seize power. It was also known that they are much more radical than him and that he is the only one capable of restraining them. Starting in 2012, Khamenei instilled in the minds of the Guards' commanders that in the history of Shi'ism, political flexibility and a willingness to compromise, if they come from the supreme leader, are valor. This principle was implemented when Iran signed the nuclear agreement with the powers in 2015 for economic reasons. Also during the 12-day war, the principle was implemented: although Iran had warned for years that if attacked directly it would block Hormuz, Khamenei prevented the Guards from doing so.
The planners of the elimination should also have known that if the regime survives, the elimination of the supreme leader would severely damage the honor of the Guards' commanders, who failed to protect him, and they would not give up on revenge. And finally, it will now be harder to prevent the Guards from rushing to nuclear weapons.
An intense war that will lead to the destruction of Iran's civilian industrial infrastructure is not desirable now, firstly because it will mainly harm the opponents of the regime. Secondly, it will lead to an Iranian counter-attack on the infrastructure of oil countries and to a global energy crisis. What seems like a promising path is maximum tightening of the siege, including blocking Iranian financial assets. If the Guards do not initiate a surprise strike, this will give time to the pragmatic parts of the Iranian elite, for example, Iranian President Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, to moderate the Guards. With some symbolic sovereignty in Hormuz, there is a possibility that they will agree to restore freedom of navigation and to oversight of the nuclear program.
The author is a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Haifa.
