Live Broadcast Dismissal: How Israel Katz Sacrificed Security for Primaries

I was an average fighter and a good commander (at least that's what I think), somewhere in the Nahal Brigade in the second half of the 90s.

Where does this gap between "average" and "good" come from? It stems, apparently, from an improved ability to see the human soul and understand what drives it, as opposed to the average ability to sprawl on the floor at the moment of an encounter, roll behind cover, and return accurate fire toward the source of the shooting.

Why am I bringing you into my personal path? Not so that you can learn from me how to leap, but to say that I understand the hearts of the Tzabar Battalion soldiers. I was there.

I understand, but in no way do I accept it. This "do not accept" applies even after giving the veteran fighters a discount, not because of seniority but by virtue of the knowledge that they, from the moment they finished their training, are subject to incessant fighting, including encounters that cost them wounded and dead.

One must salute them, it is mandatory to embrace their pain, but in no way can one accept the fact that they took the law into their own hands.

Discipline in the army is not a central part of existence, but existence itself. All of it is directed to the moment when the animal instinct embedded in all of us tells us to stick to safe ground, and then the order will be heard: "Forward, charge!". Anyone who does not understand this will never be a true fighter or commander.

Veteran Housing

This is true for every commander, and doubly so for those sent to command veteran soldiers. Roughly after two years in the army, a change occurs in veteran fighters. Most of the NCOs are already younger than them, they feel like veteran battle foxes, counting the days until discharge, and wearing a pose of "no one will tell me what to do".

A smart commander manages within this range of emotions wisely, understands the sensitivity, but does not let it loosen discipline. He knows when to put a friendly hand on the shoulder and when to cast a look that says: "if you don't do exactly what I say now, you will regret it". Unfortunately, this ability, which some would call "charisma", cannot be taught in any course.

A young battalion commander who seeks to implement new procedures does not pull out a hammer and smash signs. On the contrary: he might hold a hammer in one hand, but keeps it behind his back while the other hand works with tweezers. A commander who pulls out the hammer to prove he is "hardcore" is demonstrating nothing but insecurity.

And yet, even if all possible mistakes were made at the level of command over the Givati Tzabar Battalion, mutiny is in no case an option - and mass desertion should be treated severely.

From Paratrooper to Schemer

From the Tzabar Battalion, we will move to the Shaked Battalion, which was once commanded by Dado Bar Khalifa. He grew up to be a brigade commander and then became the head of the Manpower Directorate - and as of last night, also a public candidate for the position of GOC Central Command.

Major General Bar Khalifa was caught in the line of fire. Not the fire he knows from the battlefield, but fire that is much more insidious. Let's leave aside Bar Khalifa and move to the soldier, commander, and former officer in the 890th Paratrooper Battalion, Israel Katz.

Yes, even to someone who turned scheming into an art, it is worth remembering his youthful grace - Katz was a paratrooper fighter who served under fire in the First Lebanon War. Precisely for this reason, he should have understood the severity of his act when he dismissed Major General Avi Bluth in a live broadcast and announced the intention to appoint Bar Khalifa in his place.

What is most terrible in this story is that Katz likely initiated the entire incident to bring matters to a boil on the eve of the Likud primaries, like a yellow card pulled in the first half to become bright red in the decisive stages of the game.

Knife in the Back

Major General Bluth is very far from my own views. But I do not forget that he has responsibility for the most explosive sector — Central Command (Judea and Samaria). This is a crazy task, in which the general is forced to maneuver between civilians and national aspirations. The expression "pressure cooker" would be too small to describe this reality.

Now Bluth has another front, after a knife was stuck in his back by the Minister of Defense. If a flame has fallen in the Minister of Defense's office, what will the fighters say? Why should we pick on those who abandon a base when the minister does something much worse — not out of frustration, but out of cold, internal party political considerations?

It is so serious that Major General Bar Khalifa must refuse the appointment. The Chief of Staff must act, not by going out officially against the Minister of Defense, but by finding a way to empty his statement from last night of content.

If it turns out that decision-makers are willing to sell Israel's security for a few votes in the primaries, senior commanders are required to show a set of traits that cannot be acquired in any course. To Generals Bluth and Bar Khalifa is added Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, who is now required to put his hand on the shoulder of his reckless Minister of Defense, but to clarify to him that in the other hand is a hammer.