The US has already moved to the 'day after' the war - and Israel now has only one choice

Almost three years of multi-front war - and in no arena was there a full decision or 'absolute victory'. In each of the arenas, the IDF continues to clash with the terrain and the enemy; on three borders, buffer zones and forward security spaces were created that pushed back the international border, thereby creating depth that allows for better protection of the border, and especially of the communities near the fence.

Although the intense wars, ground maneuvering, and continuous attacks have long since ceased in the Gaza Strip and also in Lebanon, feelings of renewed fighting have hovered over these areas all the time - the enemy (both Hamas and Hezbollah) is rehabilitating and recovering much faster than estimated (again, this was an underestimate). The remaining enemy continues to challenge and create constant friction that causes damage and casualties to IDF forces. In addition, in the arms race, the enemy is constantly trying to improve (Cibus drones as an example), and the personnel changes between the political and military echelons do not help, when one pushes for an aggressive response and 'breaks the tools' while the other calms down - and sometimes it is the opposite.

This reality has been read and accompanied by the Americans from the first day. The claim was that the preoccupation with Iran pushed the preoccupation with the nearby arenas to the margins, which allowed Israel to continue the same policy without really dealing with the question of strategy and policy that would bring about fundamental change. Thus, maintaining the state of constant fighting in those arenas became the leading strategy.

Here too, we probably miscalculated. The United States has not abandoned ideas it promoted in the past, some before the war and some after it began.

The message did not reach the field

There is a growing gap between the way Washington seeks (or forces) to present the reality in the Middle East and the reality on the ground. From the perspective of the American administration, Lebanon and Gaza are arenas that can be moved from the path of war to the path of settlement - ceasefires, diplomatic contacts, monitoring mechanisms, plans for the day after, and phased plans for ending the war.

But on the ground, both arenas are far from being closed. In the case of the northern arena, the US managed to bring Lebanon and Israel to a series of agreements and a ceasefire, but the very fact that contacts are being held regarding the withdrawal of IDF forces on the one hand and the disarmament of Hezbollah on the other, indicates that the war has not really been closed. The last week was just more evidence of this.

In Gaza, the gap is even more prominent. President Donald Trump announced a transition to the second phase of implementing his plan and Hamas's willingness to disarm (a statement that Hamas was quick to disavow), and added that Israel would withdraw beyond the yellow line (a statement that Israel was quick to disavow), and after days and pressure, one word regarding the withdrawal to the yellow line was changed. Such word games only cover the gaps between the statements and the reality on the ground.

And if we look at the Iranian arena, the gap is most disturbing. It is clear to everyone that any agreement between Oman and Iran (where is the US?) will receive the consent of the US, whose only desire is to put the war behind it, and thus also its main goal - the nuclear project and the ballistic missile project that have long threatened not only Israel.

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The day after America

The strategic danger from the Israeli point of view is that the US will define the very transition from a state of multi-front war to negotiations and forced arrangements, almost unilaterally, as a success ('victory').

In the Middle East, we have already learned that negotiations are not necessarily a sign that the war has ended (the US should learn this lesson from the process with Iran) and sometimes it is simply another stage in the war, only by other means.

A ceasefire can be stable or temporary, a withdrawal can be final or conditional, the disarmament of an organization can be real or declarative, and an international mechanism can monitor it.

The test will not be in the number of statements by leaders, or in the number of summit meetings. The test will be much simpler: Is Hamas capable of posing a threat to Israel? Does Hezbollah have the ability (the desire exists) to open fire and threaten Israel again? Is Lebanon capable of ensuring the realization of its governance? Will a governing mechanism be created in Gaza that prevents the return of Hamas? Does Iran have the ability to break through to nuclear weapons?

These questions and others do not leave Israel with many choices at this point in time. It must continue the processes of building power, learn lessons from all the rounds of fighting in recent years, redefine the threat and the reference scenarios, and build operational competence and plans accordingly.

Israel needs to think about the day after America - that is, the day it leaves the Middle East, the day the Middle East is reshaped before our eyes and Turkey becomes a significant player (under US auspices). As of now, regional defense alliances (without Israel) are taking place instead of continuing the normalization processes and the Abraham Accords. This is a reality that requires a far-sighted perspective that does not ignore the complexities of reality - but prepares for the challenges of the future.

Author: Brigadier General (Res.) Zvika Haimovich, former commander of the Air Defense Array and currently a strategic consultant.