Wounded animals do not stop biting: Hezbollah's war for survival
The organization, which in the past was relatively careful about harming Lebanese civilians, is currently in the most severe crisis in its history. The loss of Syria, the elimination of its leader, its military and political weakening, and the uncertainty surrounding Iranian aid are pushing it to take more risks. Israel is required to strike at Hezbollah's violations, but at the same time to strengthen the Lebanese state. Commentary.
Hezbollah did not regret the deaths of 11 Lebanese last Friday, following the Israeli strike on the organization's headquarters, in which field commanders were also killed. To Israelis, this may sound self-evident, but it is not: Hezbollah, unlike Hamas, is relatively sensitive to the lives of its operatives and the well-being of the Shiite community. In fact, the strategy that Hassan Nasrallah has chosen since October 7th expresses exactly the balance he tried to manage — not with great success, as reality shows — between the instincts of the struggle against Israel and the need to prevent Lebanon from becoming a pile of ruins.
It is not for nothing that Hassan Nasrallah admitted after the Second Lebanon War that he would not have gone out to kidnap the soldiers had he known to what war it would lead. From his point of view, the Shiites in Lebanon were not a silver platter for the destruction of Israel, but a community that Hezbollah has a responsibility to protect.
So what happened to today's Hezbollah, 20 years after that famous speech, that causes it to consciously endanger Lebanese Shiites? In one word — distress. In two words — great distress.
Hezbollah is in the most severe crisis in its history: it has lost Syria as a strategic anchor and its legendary leader, the future of Iranian aid is uncertain, and its military and political power has been eroded. Its legitimacy in Lebanon has also diminished. In its distress, the organization has no choice but to do everything in its power to prevent the State of Israel and the Lebanese government from leveraging this reality and promoting a future in which it will no longer be a relevant player in Lebanon — a scenario that was once perceived as clearly implausible, and today is increasingly appearing to the organization as a real possibility.
Hezbollah is in a war of survival, and in such a war all tools are legitimate — including putting Lebanese civilians in direct danger. In its view, one of the most effective ways to throw a wrench in the works of the effort to disarm it is to increase the number of civilians killed in Lebanon. Such a result has a double beneficial effect for it: it increases the pressure of the international community to restrain Israel and also severely damages the legitimacy of the Lebanese state to act decisively against the organization.
In the most basic sense, Hezbollah sees the direct contacts between Israel and Lebanon as an existential threat, and it is determined to do everything to disrupt them.
Hezbollah is also looking for ways to solve the more urgent problem on the Ali-Taher ridge, where dozens of its operatives are besieged. In its view, violating the ceasefire now is necessary to force an agreement for their safe withdrawal, against the backdrop of the great humiliation associated with the organization's inability to rescue them.
The State of Israel and the Lebanese government have no interest or urgency to deal with this problem, and Hezbollah understands this well: the State of Israel will not be sorry if they continue to be imprisoned until their last breath, and the Lebanese government very much does not want to get into a scenario where it is required to deal with the problem itself. Therefore, Hezbollah has no choice but to take matters into its own hands.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah is still cautious — as evidenced by the fact that it is careful for now to operate only in Lebanese territory and not in Israeli territory. However, history shows that weak Israeli responses invite increasing audacity on the part of the organization, and it cannot be ruled out that the organization will escalate its actions as Israel continues its restrained operations and as the crisis in which it finds itself in Lebanon worsens.
Israel must now act wisely and in the spirit of Ben-Gurion: fight with force against Hezbollah's violations as if there are no direct contacts with Lebanon, and manage the direct contacts with Lebanon with determination as if there are no Hezbollah violations.
The way to promote a better reality in Lebanon also passes through the formulation of a broad strategy, which goes beyond the barrel of a rifle, whose purpose is to weaken Hezbollah and strengthen the Lebanese state. Alongside this, Israel must continue to be careful to prevent harm to Lebanese civilians: the low rate of civilians killed in the conflict so far is an important component in damaging the legitimacy of Hezbollah, which finds it difficult to explain that Israel is the main aggressor and not it.
Hezbollah is weaker than ever — and that is exactly the reason why it should not be underestimated. Wounded animals do not stop biting; sometimes they bite harder, and less predictably.
