Did the Oslo Accords pass thanks to small right-wing parties?
New right-wing parties are warming up on the sidelines, but Minister Amichai Chikli claimed that such a scenario had already led to a "catastrophe" in the past. How accurate is the historical precedent that many in the Likud are waving around? The Whistle (HaMashrokit) by Globes.
For the definitions of HaMashrokit, click here.
True - The statement is true in its vast majority.
Inaccurate - Substantial parts of the statement are incorrect.
Misleading - The statement creates a false impression or takes facts out of context.
False - The statement is incorrect.
For your judgment - The factual situation is too complex to give a definitive grade.
Check Summary
The claim: The Oslo Accords would have been avoided had Tehiya not failed to pass the electoral threshold in the 1992 elections.
On one hand:
Tehiya could have tipped the scales in the other direction.
On the other hand:
- The first Oslo Accord passed thanks to the abstention of the six Shas members, and Tehiya did not have the power to change the picture.
Grade: For your judgment.
Minister of Diaspora Affairs Amichai Chikli sought to warn new right-wing parties against running independently, which, according to him, could "burn" votes for the camp. "I highly recommend," said the minister, "learning the lessons of the '92 elections: Tehiya's failure to pass the electoral threshold paved the way for the Oslo catastrophe." Is that indeed what happened?
After the 1992 elections, the second Rabin government was formed: Labor received 44 mandates, Meretz 12, and Shas 6. In addition, the government relied on outside support from Hadash and Mada. Shas left the government after the approval of the Oslo A Accord and abstained in the vote on it, but the agreement was approved by a majority of 61 thanks to the support of the Arab factions.
Ahead of these elections, the electoral threshold was raised from 1% to 1.5%. Tehiya received 1.2% of the votes: enough to pass the old threshold, but not the new one. Therefore, the key question is what would have happened if it had entered the Knesset anyway.
According to a mandate calculation based on surplus vote agreements and distribution rules, if the electoral threshold had remained 1% and Tehiya had entered, the Labor-Meretz-Hadash-Mada bloc would have dropped from 61 to 60 mandates. Shas would have received more decisive weight, but there is no certainty that it would have joined the right.
However, Tehiya was not the only right-wing party that did not pass the electoral threshold. Previously, it was explained in HaMashrokit that if the votes of four small right-wing parties had gone to the Likud, two mandates would have moved from the Labor bloc to the Likud. Even then, the Shas question would have remained open.
On the other hand, there was also a left-wing party that did not enter: the Progressive List for Peace, which received 0.9% of the votes - more than three of the small right-wing parties besides Tehiya. If it is also taken into account, the balance is again not unequivocal.
Even in scenarios where votes are transferred between ideologically close parties, the main result is that the left-wing bloc could have dropped to 60 mandates - but not necessarily lost the ability to pass Oslo A. This is because Shas abstained in the vote, so a majority of 60 supporters could have been enough to ratify it.
In the Oslo B Accord, the picture is more sensitive: since Shas had already moved to the opposing side, the vote passed by a majority of 61 to 59. Two members of the Yiud faction supported the government and voted in favor, while two Labor members voted against. Adding a mandate to the right could have turned the result to 60 to 60 - but even here it is impossible to know if those splits and votes would have occurred in the same way.
Therefore, the data provides only partial support for Chikli's claim: it is true that Tehiya's non-entry affected the possible mandate balance, and it is true that in Oslo B every mandate was more critical. But the determination that this "paved the way" to Oslo relies on a series of political assumptions that cannot be proven.
Bottom line: Even if Tehiya had passed the electoral threshold in 1992, the approval of the Oslo A Accord in the Knesset would not necessarily have been avoided. In contrast, in Oslo B, such a change could have been more decisive.
