The plan to break Ben Gurion Airport: This is how the biggest monopoly in Israel will be dismantled

In recent decades, since the great strike that took place following the 2003 economic plan, the committees controlling the 'switch' have rarely gone on strike. Among the main reasons for the scarcity of strikes were the decision, which I had the privilege of being a partner in, not to pay wages to strikers, who are required to finance their wages during the strike from the Histadrut's strike fund; the policy of the labor courts, which are not quick to approve strikes in essential public services; and the public's anger towards those who use monopoly power to shut down a service that has no alternative.

Last week, the Israel Airports Authority workers' committee crossed every line. For hours, operations at Ben Gurion Airport, the main entry and exit gate of the State of Israel, were severely disrupted. The Authority's management claimed that these were intentional sanctions by the workers, while the committee chairman, Pinhas Idan, claimed that there was no strike and that the workers simply refused to continue working beyond long shifts, against the backdrop of a severe shortage of manpower.

If there is indeed a shortage of manpower and if workers are required to work unreasonable shifts, then the Authority's management has a heavy responsibility and must answer for it. However, a management failure, as severe as it may be, does not give the committee the right to effectively shut down Israel's main entry and exit gate through sanctions that were not declared legally. If it turns out that the disruptions were the result of an organized and intentional action by the committee, then this is an especially serious event. The fact that the Israeli public, yearning for a vacation after three difficult years of war, is forced to pay the price only exacerbates it.

Organized labor is an important fundamental right in any democracy, and the right to strike is an inseparable part of it. However, the right to strike also has rules. If it turns out that these were organized and illegal sanctions, the state must also consider imposing personal liability through personal lawsuits against everyone who ordered them and those who managed them. There is no reason for the public to bear the damage caused by an illegal act alone.

However, a lawsuit, as important as it may be, deals with the event and not the root of the problem. The root of the problem is the monopolistic structure of the aviation industry in Israel, which gives one group of workers immense power because the public has almost no alternatives. When a workers' committee knows that it has the ability to stop the country's main entry and exit gate, a bargaining power is created that stems not only from the right to organize but also from the monopoly it sits on.

Therefore, the real answer to the events at Ben Gurion is not just legal. It is structural: competition.

First, the government must cancel its decision to expand Ben Gurion Airport solely through the Israel Airports Authority. The expansion project should be put out to a BOT tender in which a private company will finance, design, build, and operate the infrastructure and activities allocated to it for twenty-five years. The goal should be to create another operator within Ben Gurion, which will compete with the Israel Airports Authority in all those areas of activity that can be separated from the common infrastructure and from the state's security and regulatory powers.

There is no need for two bodies to manage the same runway or control tower in parallel. However, it is certainly possible to separate and put up for competition terminals, operational services, ground services, and commercial activities, including, of course, the runways. Instead of one monopoly, two competing operating systems should be created as much as possible within Israel's main airport. Similar things have been done in seaports around the world, and I am confident that the operational solution for separation within the airport is possible, perhaps with joint management of the control tower.

Second, the government must launch another tender for the construction of Israel's future international airport using the BOT method through a third operator — separate from both the Israel Airports Authority and the new private operator at Ben Gurion. This will create a competitive market structure at the planning stage, rather than another public monopoly.

Third, the government must privatize the operation of Ramon Airport in Eilat and transfer it via tender to a fourth private operator. There is no justification for the same failing and monopolistic body, the Israel Airports Authority, to operate Ben Gurion, Ramon, and other airports, thereby concentrating almost all of Israel's civil aviation infrastructure in its hands.

These steps will not change the reality tomorrow morning, but within a decade they can create real competition between airport operators in Israel. This is the best structural remedy for a situation where one group thinks it can take an entire country hostage.

Competition does not cancel the right to strike and does not eliminate strikes. Workers in private companies and competitive markets strike, and it is their right to do so. However, in competition, the ability of a workers' committee to shut down an entire country is dramatically reduced. When customers have an alternative, activity can move to competitors; and when a strike also harms the competitive position of the company where the workers are employed, both the workers and the management bear a larger part of its economic cost. The bargaining power remains, but the power of the 'switch' weakens.

Pinhas Idan and the Israel Airports Authority workers' committee made a serious mistake last week. Instead of settling for extinguishing the current fire, the government must use the event to address the root of the problem. The right to strike deserves protection; the right to hold an entire country on the 'switch' — does not. The way to break the 'switch' is not to break organized labor, heaven forbid, but to break the monopoly.

*The author is the chairman of the Economic Party and head of the School of Accounting, Economics and Financial Management at the Ono Academic College.