The dismissal that reveals the great problem of the Iranian regime | Dr. Yossi Mansharof

The dismissal of Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr from the position of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and representative of the leader Mojtaba Khamenei in the council, and his replacement by Mohsen Rezaee, is an important event that occurred within the Iranian regime yesterday (Sunday). This move indicates the Iranian regime's attempt to adapt its strategic decision-making mechanism to the new reality created following the war and in light of the severe damage suffered by the Iranian command and leadership echelon.

Zolqadr served as Chief of Staff of the IRGC (1989-1997) and Deputy Commander of the organization (1997-2006). Afterwards, he moved to a series of positions in the regime's political and diplomatic system, until he was appointed in March 2026 as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, replacing Ali Larijani, who was eliminated in the war. Zolqadr's appointment to the position at that time testified to the manpower distress from which the regime suffers regarding the staffing of this strategic and sensitive position.

Zolqadr's dismissal may also testify to the cumulative effect of the targeted killings carried out by Israel against senior officials in the Iranian system during the war. The regime is struggling to rehabilitate its echelon of security decision-makers and to field a personality of stature and experience equivalent to those of Ali Larijani, who played a central role in the decision-making system. In this context, replacing Zolqadr within just a few months of his appointment — an unusual move in terms of the Iranian system and for such a senior position — likely reflects a degree of embarrassment and an attempt to adapt quickly using the manpower remaining in the regime's hands.

It is possible that the dismissal also reflects disappointment by Mojtaba Khamenei in Zolqadr's performance. Zolqadr apparently failed to establish the council as a body capable of providing the new leader with a situational picture, coordination, and recommendations at the level required in a time of war and crisis. Thus, the dismissal may reflect not only a change of personnel, but an attempt to re-strengthen an institution whose status and ability to influence strategic decision-making have been damaged.

However, Rezaee's appointment also exposes the limitation of the human pool from which the regime is forced to choose. Mohsen Rezaee is indeed a man of vast experience, a former commander in the IRGC and a hero of the Iran-Iraq War, but he is identified with a different generation and political reality. This criticism was already heard from the regime's base immediately upon his appointment, presenting him as a conservative and elderly man who had already retired from the security system in the past, ran many times in presidential elections and failed to be elected, and afterwards moved to deal mainly in the economic field. Even if Rezaee has much experience, it is difficult to see him as a figure with political and professional weight equivalent to that of Larijani. In this sense, the appointment may testify not only to an attempt to strengthen the council, but also to the regime's difficulty in quickly finding a replacement of stature.

In this context, one must also examine the attempt by elements in the conservative camp to defend the system's conduct by presenting the negotiations and understandings reached between Iran and the USA in Islamabad as a move intended to deceive the enemy and actually serve as part of a war plan. As recalled, Iran was supposed to derive political and economic achievements from the memorandum of understanding, but the understandings reached a dead end after Tehran and Washington interpreted their meaning and the obligations regarding the strait differently, and in particular the scope of freedom of action that was supposed to remain in Iran's hands. However, Zolqadr's dismissal weakens this explanation as well. If the contacts and understandings were indeed part of a planned deception plan, Zolqadr should have been considered as one who successfully fulfilled his role within the framework of the strategy approved at the top, and not as one who was required to end his role a few months after being appointed. Therefore, the dismissal may teach that the Iranian leadership is not satisfied with the narrative that the diplomatic move was part of a sophisticated plan to deceive the enemy, but seeks to make a real change in the focus of security decision-making and to draw lessons from the council's conduct during the war period.

Alongside this, one should not see Rezaee's appointment as evidence that the Iranian system has gone out of control. On the contrary: the very ability of Mojtaba to carry out from his hiding place, within a few months, a change in such a senior position testifies that the central government mechanisms are still functioning and that the new leader is capable of forcing personal adjustments in the centers of power. Rezaee, with his deep background in the IRGC, may even strengthen the connection between the council, as the center of strategic decision-making in the regime, and the IRGC, as the strongest security organization in the country.

However, the appointment does not solve the central problem revealed in the war: the damage to the pool of senior officials and the regime's ability to maintain a high-quality decision-making mechanism under crisis conditions. Zolqadr was appointed to the position only a few months earlier, and now he is replaced and transferred to serve as an advisor to Mojtaba. This is a move that allows the leader to keep him close to him, but at the same time to remove him from the council's decision-making focus. In doing so, Mojtaba adopts a method that his father, Ali Khamenei, used more than once: instead of completely dismissing senior figures, to preserve them in the close circle through an advisory and non-binding position.

Ultimately, replacing Zolqadr with Rezaee is more than a change of roles. It reflects a system that is in the process of adaptation after severe damage to its leadership and security mechanisms. On one hand, the regime proves that it is still capable of making quick adjustments and maintaining control over the system. On the other hand, the very need to replace the leader's representative and the council secretary within a short time, and to appoint in his place a figure from the old generation, illustrates the shortage of figures with weight who are capable of dealing with the new challenges. The test of Mohsen Rezaee will therefore be not only whether he succeeds in strengthening the council, but whether he succeeds in proving that the regime is capable of maintaining quality in decision-making even after the war has significantly damaged the human pool from which it assembles its security top.