The difficult incident in Lebanon proved: the culture of cover-ups in the IDF has become second nature | Yitzhak Brick

The difficult incident that occurred recently in southern Lebanon, in which two IDF soldiers were killed and four others were seriously wounded as a result of an explosive device detonation, constitutes an open wound and a glaring warning sign. The incident occurred in a house that was claimed not to have been checked properly, without a preliminary tank shell or artillery fire, and without a robot or dog being sent in to neutralize explosive devices in the structure.

Instead of the IDF command standing tall in the face of reality and asking itself how this has happened to us hundreds of times in the three years of the war, when soldiers enter buildings for searches without any checking procedure, and as a result we are counting hundreds of dead and thousands of wounded? Instead of insisting on operational discipline and carrying out orders to the letter, the system chooses to ignore, and to concentrate on bureaucratic and narrow questions such as whether the explosive device was placed before the ceasefire or after it, and thereby to prove, apparently, whether there was a violation of the agreement.

If they reach the conclusion that there was a violation of the agreement, it will be an excuse for the political echelon to renew the war, which will not bring any result that will improve the security of the residents of the North, but on the contrary, it will bring more missile and rocket launches at the settlements of the North. But on the other hand, it will ensure the survival of the government at the expense of the state's security, as they have been doing for a long time, and will cause more numerous dead and wounded and deepen the erosion of the security of Israel's citizens.

What is happening in the army is a clear symptom of a flawed organizational culture in which investigations are covered up and a lack of real lessons learned has become routine. When the senior command is disconnected from the field, the loss of operational discipline and the tragic results are not long in coming. Soldiers in the field pay with their lives again and again due to the lack of basic security procedures and conduct in the field that does not align with the real threats waiting in every abandoned building.

Systemic vulnerability: the preoccupation with the technical question "was the explosive device placed before or after the ceasefire?" is intended to distract from the main failure, the lack of adherence to life-saving operational protocols and the continued sending of forces on exhausted missions without a clear strategic purpose.

The difficult questions about the operational purpose: what do the searches in southern Lebanon serve?

Beyond the point failures, a deep and painful strategic question arises: what is the real contribution to the security of the settlements of the North of those Sisyphean searches in the territory of southern Lebanon? Who and what does it really serve?

If the IDF indeed controlled the space and had the power to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into it, what is the operational benefit in discovering one weapons cache or another, when Hezbollah anyway has no ability to reach them or use them in that purified space? Because of the small size and erosion of the army, it does not have the ability to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into the territory in its possession, and to plant additional explosive devices. The reality on the ground proves that conducting searches, locating weapons, and neutralizing explosive devices are not effective.

The forces holding the occupied territories (about 8.5 km from the border to the yellow line) are sparse due to the erosion of the army, and the holding of the yellow line is as porous as a sieve. In this situation, Hezbollah continues to infiltrate and plant explosive devices that claim human lives and cause serious injuries during house searches.

Therefore, as long as there is no force in sufficient scope that will hermetically secure the yellow line and prevent the passage of squads to the south, it is better to stop these searches, unless they are done with preliminary checks before the soldiers enter the buildings suspected of being booby-trapped, and certainly searches that are done north of the yellow line, since their heavy price no longer justifies their operational uselessness.

The strategic principle

The true security of the settlements of the North does not stem from a point discovery of one ammunition depot or another in the heart of enemy territory, but from a firm deterrent capability, hermetic prevention of infiltrations into the occupied territory, and a continuous and strong defensive presence.

The critical need: force building, increasing the ground army and ending the erosion

The solution to the complex security reality does not lie in Sisyphean show actions that grind the regular and reserve forces alike to dust, but in brave force building. The ground army currently suffers from severe numerical smallness and deep erosion that prevent it from properly performing the central mission of defending the settlements of the North.

Instead of concentrating efforts on increasing the order of forces, strengthening competence, and building sufficient ground power that will be able to ensure hermetic protection, they send the little that exists on search missions that are done contrary to orders, where the cost outweighs the benefit, their operational contribution is marginal, but their price in the blood of our soldiers is unbearable. The senior command must stop burying its head in the sand, abandon the culture of cover-ups, and focus on what is really important: building a broad, strong, and correctly prepared ground force, based on iron discipline, real lessons learned, and firm protection of the country's citizens.