The Big Winner of the "Muslim NATO" - and the Israeli Opportunity

Almost six months into the war with Iran, the Middle East is rediscovering an ancient truth: when a great power gets entangled in a long war, small and medium-sized countries start looking for insurance. And when everyone is looking for insurance, China does not need to be the insurance company. It is enough for it to sell the cameras, drones, missiles, ports, and factories. When American power seems absolute, Riyadh draws closer to Washington. When Israel demonstrates military superiority, an opportunity for rapprochement with Israel opens up. When Iran proves it is capable of inflicting pain, a compromise with Tehran arrives. And when Turkey and Pakistan offer an additional umbrella, Riyadh immediately joins it.

This is exactly what makes the "Mecca Pact," the new defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, an important development far beyond the three signatories. Saudi Arabia was looking for a protector. Turkey was looking for a foothold. Pakistan was looking for money. China got all three.

The Mecca Pact was signed in Saudi Arabia, and the man who benefits from it more than anyone else did not even arrive in Mecca: Xi Jinping. And the one who should be worried about it is not Iran. The message to Tehran is: do not be alarmed by the family photo in Mecca. It can be estimated that Beijing is interested in strengthening exactly this interpretation: the alliance does not have to become a Sunni front that goes to war with Iran. Saudi Arabia gets a layer of protection; Pakistan gets money and status; Turkey gets influence; and Iran gets a reason not to see every Sunni organization as a declaration of war.

The agreement states that an attack on one will be considered an attack on all, although for now, it is unclear what exactly each will do in the real test case. The alliance is not yet a "Muslim NATO," but it is definitely a signal: the countries of the region are no longer willing to put all their security eggs in the American basket.

Sun Tzu wrote that "the skillful leader subdues the enemy's army without battle." Beijing does not need to replace the American Fifth Fleet, establish dozens of bases in the Gulf, or commit to die for Riyadh. On the contrary: the Chinese model works better when the Americans pay the security bill, while the Chinese collect the trade bill. The new Middle East is no longer divided between friends of Iran and its enemies. It is divided between those who produce power and those who look for which power it is worth standing next to.

The Sunni alliance that does not want to be anti-Iranian

Apparently, three large Sunni countries are establishing a security alliance at a time when Iran is conducting a confrontation against the United States and Israel. In Tehran, this could have been immediately interpreted as the establishment of a Sunni front against it.

However, the public message from Ankara and Islamabad is the opposite: the alliance is not aimed against Iran or against any specific country. Behind the scenes, according to the strategic logic attributed to Chinese channels, Beijing wants Tehran to understand one more thing: there is no necessity to see the alliance as a mechanism intended to join the war against Iran.

The meaning for the Iranians is quite reassuring. Even if the Houthis continue to harass Saudi Arabia, it is not certain that Turkey or Pakistan will run to bomb Sanaa. It is easy to sign an "all for one" clause in Mecca; it is harder to explain to the public in Ankara why Turkish soldiers should fight in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia itself is also not necessarily looking for a war with Iran. It is looking for insurance against it.

From here, another possible Chinese message to Tehran is born: the new Sunni alliance can serve not only as a deterrent mechanism against Iran but also as a counterweight to another regional system that relies on Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and on their security ties with Washington.

For Beijing, this is an almost perfect balance. It does not want a victorious Iran, because an Iran that is too strong could destabilize the Gulf and endanger energy routes. It also does not want a defeated and crumbling Iran, because Iran is an energy supplier, a political partner, and an instrument for balancing American power. China wants an Iran strong enough to survive but weak enough to need it.

Pakistan is the Chinese door to the Gulf

The security connection between Beijing and Islamabad is very deep. A significant part of Pakistani systems relies on Chinese technology, and the JF-17, for example, is a product of Chinese-Pakistani cooperation.

If Pakistan becomes a central pillar in the new security architecture of the Gulf, China gets a key to the apartment without needing a lease of its own.

Weapon systems require maintenance, spare parts, software, training, communication, and upgrades. Therefore, whoever sells a military system is not just selling metal. They are selling a relationship for twenty years.

If in the future Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey are required to develop joint capabilities of drones, air defense, intelligence, or communication, China already has a built-in advantage through Pakistan.

The big money is actually outside the battlefield

But it would be a mistake to view this move only through a narrow periscope. After all, China's big prize is economic. The Gulf is a critical energy source for the Chinese economy and a huge market for infrastructure, technology, electric cars, communication, artificial intelligence, ports, and military equipment. As the Gulf states want to reduce their dependence on the United States, they are looking for additional suppliers.

China offers a deal that is hard to compete with: we do not ask you how to manage the country, we do not demand an ideological alliance, and we will be happy to build you the port, the communication network, and the drone factory.

According to data published in Israel, the volume of Chinese trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE reached about 108 billion dollars with each of them in 2025. That is, from Beijing's perspective, the Gulf is not a geopolitical margin; it is a business of hundreds of billions.

Whoever sells a drone earns once. Whoever builds the factory, supplies the components, trains the engineers, updates the software, and sells the spare parts gets a customer for a whole generation.

And then comes Taiwan

As the Gulf becomes more complex, and as Washington is required to defend bases, allies, and shipping lanes, Beijing gets breathing room in East Asia. The assertive Chinese conduct around Taiwan and in the Indo-Pacific region continues while global attention is divided between other arenas.

And what does all this mean for Israel?

Israel might find itself facing a Middle East where there is no longer a simple division between the "Iranian camp" and the "pro-American camp." Instead of two camps, several overlapping circles of power are being created: Israel and the partners to the Abraham Accords; Iran and its proxies; Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan; and above them all, China, which talks to everyone and commits to almost no one.

The Israeli opportunity is actually in Abu Dhabi

But Israel has a counter-move, and it does not pass through Riyadh. It passes through Abu Dhabi, as the UAE needs to examine the Mecca Pact carefully. A power center composed of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan is not just a mechanism against Iran. If it becomes a permanent political-military framework, it may also change the balance of power within the Sunni world.

From the perspective of the Emirates, this is a strategic question. Abu Dhabi and the Emirates, including Kuwait and Bahrain, have invested for years in building an independent foreign policy, an advanced army, regional centers of influence, and an economy that is not prepared to live in the shadow of Riyadh. Now Saudi Arabia is trying to build a security club where it holds the keys, Turkey brings the muscles, and Pakistan brings the bomb. There is no reason for the Emiratis to be "enthusiastic."

And this is exactly Israel's opportunity. Not to offer Saudi Arabia another layer of protection. On the contrary. Israel can deepen the axis with the UAE around a common interest: preventing the formation of a new regional hegemony — Iranian, Turkish, or Saudi.

The connection does not have to start with tanks and missiles. It can be built through technology, cyber, energy, trade routes, investments, ports, ties with India, and the creation of an economic space that connects the Mediterranean to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Abraham Accords, in this view, are not just a peace treaty. They can turn into an alliance of countries that are not prepared for someone else to decide for them what the Middle East will look like.

The Mecca Pact teaches something deeper. Saudi Arabia is looking for who will guard it, while Pakistan is looking for who will finance it. While Turkey is looking for who to influence. And as mentioned, Iran is looking for how to survive, and Israel should look for who shares an interest with it.

And China? China is not looking; it is waiting while the US fights. Iran shoots. Saudi Arabia deliberates. Turkey advances. Israel recalculates the route. A Chinese proverb says: "When the wind changes, some build walls and others build windmills." Israel builds defense systems. Iran builds missiles. Saudi Arabia builds alliances. The United States tries to hold onto the old order, and China? It sells windmills to everyone.