The failure in Iran takes its toll: what is really behind the dismissals in the Mossad | Ben Caspit

The dismissal of two senior Mossad officials by the new head, Roman Gofman, is a bad sign. I did not join the immediate pile-on against Gofman following the publication of the dismissals because it is a bad reflex. True, the very appointment of Gofman was controversial and quite a few warning signs were written in red on quite a few walls in this context - but from the moment he was appointed and the appointment was approved in all instances, one must let him work.

Gofman's mission is fraught with danger and is greater than the missions of all his predecessors. He receives the Iranian arena in a state of clear inferiority: the Iranian regime has survived, there is no danger of its fall. The Iranian regime has lost its fear of attack. The Iranian regime has internalized that without a nuclear weapon, it will fall. This means they will strive with all their might for a nuclear weapon. Add to this the fact that the uranium is in their hands and the knowledge as well, and the fact that they are gaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, which will increase their economic means - and you get a catastrophe. Oh, one must not forget that the Americans will not rush to attack Iran again. After Donald Trump, it is doubtful if this will be possible. We are left alone, and all this is on Gofman's shoulders.

Furthermore, a new Mossad head has the legitimacy to do a clean-up, even a purge, even extensive personnel changes. If the new head wants to change, shake up, reboot the system - it is his right, and perhaps even his duty. And the Mossad needs an urgent reboot. If he had asked me, I would have told Gofman to start with the budget. To check the amounts of money that are wasted there between the chairs and the rows and start dealing with it.

But there is something else. The context of the dismissals is the failure in Iran. The two dismissed (a man and a woman) are the head of the Intelligence Directorate in the Mossad and the head of the Iran arena. Theoretically, if an orderly investigation had been conducted in the Mossad on the failure to topple the regime in Iran, I assume their names would have graced the top of the list of those responsible. They are the ones who helped convince Mossad head Dadi Barnea and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who then convinced President Donald Trump. This is the chain of persuasion.

In Gofman's environment, they say that the dismissals are not related to the issue of the failure in Iran. As published here a few weeks ago, Gofman is conducting a general reassessment of the Mossad, its roles, methods of operation, use of force, and priorities. In this context, he also organized a list of external consultants for himself, who received full access to everything happening in the Mossad, which is sparking very sharp criticism from within. "Strategic focus," is what this process is called in the Mossad.

Gofman, according to this theory, wants to replace the people and establish a headquarters for himself in which he has full confidence. "It is not what was, it is what will be," said someone connected to the event. "He is not keeping a ledger or settling scores over this or that failure in Iran, he is preparing the organization for the next moves in Iran and other places. It is natural that he wants to bring his own people."

Furthermore, the two dismissed are appointees of his predecessor Dadi Barnea, who, as remembered, opposed Gofman's appointment with all his might. The head of the Iran arena was appointed by Barnea a year ago. The head of the Intelligence Directorate was appointed half a year ago. "Barnea appointed them both, when he was about to finish, in order to present his successor with a fait accompli," said someone who said. "Well, it did not help." According to Gofman's version, the process was orderly and included interviews, work meetings, and deep learning before the decision was made.

Not everyone buys this version. "Gofman broke the basic code of the concept of 'commander' and the most important rules of leadership and command in a hierarchical security organization," said a former senior Mossad official. "This code is as ancient as the army and the Mossad, it is essential for continued functioning. It is not complicated. This rule is simple: whoever approved the operational plan bears 100% responsibility for it, and cannot cast this responsibility downwards afterwards, onto his subordinates.

"A commander who approved a plan cannot hide behind his subordinates after it failed. In such a situation, no subordinate will agree to promote ideas or plans anymore, out of an understanding that in the end, he is the one who will have to answer and bear the responsibility. The responsibility will always be that of the supreme commander, and that is the Mossad head and above him the Prime Minister. What will the operational people say if they know that in the end, they will be thrown to the dogs when something goes wrong? What kind of leadership is this? There is a destruction here of the delicate fabric in secret organizations of this type."

Here another element enters the event: the leak. Most chances, if not all, are that this leak came from the Prime Minister's office. The reason is clear: the moment two senior officials responsible for the plan to topple the Iranian regime are dismissed, then there are culprits and there are those responsible, and here again, Netanyahu can continue as usual. As if he did not adopt the Mossad plan and as if he has no responsibility for anything ever.

This claim is well-founded. If those responsible for an operational plan that did not succeed are dismissed, how can one expect those next in line to submit any bold plan without fearing that they will suffer? Who will dare to bring the next plan for stealing the Iranian nuclear archive from the heart of Tehran, without knowing that even in case of failure, there will be someone to protect him and take full responsibility?

Gofman's position in this context is even more complex. He was Netanyahu's military secretary when this plan was presented to Netanyahu and adopted by him. Did he take care to bring to Netanyahu the harsh opposition of the Chief of Staff to the plan? The concern of the heads of Aman and the Operations Directorate? The letter of the head of the Research Division in Aman? This is exactly the role of the military secretary: to help the Prime Minister understand the broad picture, to hear the risks, the warnings, the reservations.

If Gofman had done his job properly, it is possible that Netanyahu would not have rushed to drag Trump into this farce. If Gofman had done his job, the Chief of Staff and the head of Aman would have been invited to Netanyahu to present to him all their concerns and reservations. And then, it is possible that the entire event could have been spared from us.

For the sake of fairness, it must be added here that according to Dadi Barnea, the Mossad plan to topple the Iranian regime did not fail for a simple reason: it was never executed. The plan was torpedoed a moment before implementation by US President Donald Trump, who absorbed heavy pressure from Turkish President Erdogan, who opposed the activation of Kurdish forces within the framework of the plan. Trump pressed the brakes at the moment of truth. According to Barnea, the plan was not given a chance, and it had a not-bad chance to mature and succeed - if they had believed in it. Whether this is true or not, we will never know.