The next war might start from the map: Israel must have borders that nature drew | Col. (res.) Amir Noy

For decades, Israel managed its borders as if a line on a map is a real border. It is not. A line can be straight, crooked, blue, green, or red. It can be determined by an international agreement, at a peace conference, by a decision of powers, or in the aftermath of a war. But if it does not create reasonable security conditions — it is not necessarily a good border.

The best borders are those that nature has already marked for us: a river, a mountain ridge, a deep valley, a hill, a dominant height, or a significant geographical obstacle. Nature does not negotiate. It also does not change its mind following changes in government. Therefore, Israel must use this war to formulate a new border concept: topography, strategic depth, buffer zones, international supervision, and Israeli operational capability in case of a breach.

No more lines on a map

This is, in fact, one of the fundamental principles of the "defensible borders" concept developed by Yigal Allon after the Six-Day War. A study by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) on the Allon Plan notes that a proper strategic border should be based on a topographical route that serves as a permanent obstacle, provides strategic depth, and allows for early warning. This is not a nostalgic idea. Even in the era of missiles, drones, and satellite intelligence, the need for space, warning time, and control over dominant terrain has not disappeared. The Iron Swords War has re-emphasized how dangerous a border is where the enemy is at too short a distance from civilian communities. Israel cannot end one historical war while building the next one within it.

Sykes-Picot is a lesson

The borders created in the Middle East after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire are an example of the danger of geographical engineering by people who are not necessarily those who will have to live with its results. Sykes-Picot itself was not the final border of Lebanon, and it was implemented only partially. But it symbolized a broader phenomenon: European powers established zones of control and influence in a space whose local and security logic was completely different. The final borders were formed later — in a series of additional arrangements.

And this is the important point: a border born out of a certain political concept can become a security problem when reality changes. What was true in 1920 is not necessarily true in 2026. And what looks reasonable at the negotiating table is not necessarily reasonable when an anti-tank missile is a few hundred meters from a house in Israel.

Therefore, the first question is not "what line will the neighbors agree to accept?" The question is: what border will allow the State of Israel to protect its citizens even if the neighbor on the other side decides one day to be an enemy?

A border needs space. Topography alone is not enough. Between the border and the threat, there must be space for warning and a buffer.

Not a no-man's-land, but a defined and supervised zone where the neighboring state is forbidden to station army forces, missiles, artillery, militias, or offensive infrastructure. Police and border guard forces can operate there — but not an army. This principle proved itself on the Israel-Syria border after the Yom Kippur War. The 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement created a separation zone between Israel and Syria, where a UN UNDOF force was stationed, alongside areas where forces and armaments were limited. The result was exceptional in the Middle East: for decades, relative military quiet was maintained in the sector. This is a lesson that must not be ignored.

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Syria: Not returning automatically to the old line

The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 changed the reality. Israel expanded its hold in the buffer zone and the areas adjacent to it and acted to destroy large parts of the military capabilities that remained from the previous regime.

At the Institute for National Security Studies, frameworks were also proposed for a future arrangement in Syria that would maintain a buffer between Israel and Syria alongside international supervision mechanisms. From here, a simple principle should be derived: one must not return automatically to the old line just because it appears on a map. A new arrangement is needed based on the terrain, warning depth, demilitarization, and limitation of forces. If the regime in Damascus is stable, responsible, and committed to the agreement — it will be possible to discuss an arrangement. If not, there is no reason for Israel to give up the security space that reality forced it to create.

Lebanon: The Litani is a strategic border

In the north, the logic is even clearer. For years, Israel was told that the international border is the border. But Hezbollah proved that an international border is not necessarily a security border. Resolution 1701 effectively established the Litani as a militarily significant line: south of the river, only the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces were supposed to be present. However, the arrangement was violated time and again, and Hezbollah established itself south of the Litani. The Litani is a clear natural route. It creates geographical depth and an obstacle.

Therefore, if it is possible to reach an agreement with Lebanon on an arrangement under which the Litani will be the security line — this is a preferred solution. And if there is no agreement, Israel must hold to the concept of the dominant terrain routes north of the international border, at a distance that will allow effective protection of the Galilee communities. The principle is not "more territory." The principle is more time, more depth, and more topographical control.

The Jordan border must also change

The eastern border received less attention for years because the reality there was relatively quiet. But smuggling, infiltrations, and threats coming from the east require a new concept. The Ministry of Defense has already begun building sections of an obstacle on the eastern border, as part of a renewed defense concept for the Jordan Valley and the eastern border. A border that is not protected is not a "quiet border." It is simply a border that has not yet been tested enough. The tests that the "eastern reality" poses to it may be critical to Israel's security.

Gaza: Not giving up security control

Gaza is the greatest test. The Disengagement proved that a unilateral withdrawal without a security arrangement can turn an area adjacent to the State of Israel into a launchpad for war. Therefore, it is forbidden to return to a reality where Israel gives up security control on its border and hopes that someone else will do the job. Protecting the "gate line" — failed.

The border with Egypt should remain the international border, but it must be backed by an effective security mechanism that will prevent smuggling, weapons infiltration, and the construction of terrorist infrastructure. The principle should be simple: international border — yes; security lawlessness — no.

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International supervision — but with teeth

This is the fourth principle. The future arrangement must determine in advance who supervises, who is allowed to enter the territory, who checks for violations, and what happens after a violation is discovered. No more international force that photographs, reports, and settles for a report.

Every violation must immediately go to the Security Council. Serious violations should trigger economic and personal sanctions. And a state or organization that violates an agreement again and again should know that the agreement itself will not protect them. Because an agreement without a price for its violation is not a security agreement. It is a piece of paper.

The goal: to prevent the next war. There are those who will argue that demanding such borders will make Israel an aggressive state. The opposite is true. A state that seeks a clear border, strategic depth, a buffer zone, and a supervision mechanism is a state that seeks to prevent war. The true goal of a border is not only to mark where another state begins. The goal is to determine where the enemy's ability to approach you ends.

The Iron Swords War must end not only with a military defeat of Israel's enemies, but with a deep conceptual change. No more borders determined only by what looks good on a map. No more agreements that assume the other side will respect them just because it signed. And no more reliance on international forces that are unable to enforce their mandate.

Israel needs borders that nature helps to defend, buffer spaces that give it warning time, supervision mechanisms that identify violations, and a clear military capability to destroy any threat built beyond them. Because true peace does not start with a line drawn on a map. True peace starts with a border that the enemy cannot breach.

The author is a former commander of the operational coordination cell with the US Army, a security and political commentator, and a columnist.