The cumulative lesson of the last 30 years is clear: there are no magic solutions for the underground threat in the Gaza Strip
Destroying the tunnels is a necessary condition for reducing Hamas's capabilities, but it requires control over the territory, perseverance, and continuous engineering and intelligence efforts. As long as there remain spaces where the organization is capable of digging, rehabilitating, and building up its strength, the tunnel threat will not disappear.
The public debate surrounding Hamas tunnels is currently focused on the question of how to properly destroy the underground infrastructure remaining in the Gaza Strip. However, to understand the magnitude of the challenge, it is important to remember that the phenomenon was not born on October 7, nor during Operation Protective Edge. It grew over decades, in parallel with changes in the security reality in the Gaza Strip.
From my personal perspective, as someone who served as the engineering officer of the Gaza Division in 1997-1999, it was possible even then to identify the beginning of the process. The implementation of the Oslo Accords and the withdrawal from the cities of the Gaza Strip, including the city of Rafah, created a new reality in which Israel lost direct control over the areas used for digging tunnels. During this period, we located the first 35 tunnels that crossed from the Gaza Strip into Egypt — smuggling tunnels that seemed like a localized phenomenon at the time, but in retrospect, constituted the beginning of an underground revolution.
In the 2000s, the phenomenon developed into booby-trapped tunnels dug under IDF outposts. After the disengagement, it grew exponentially, as Hamas invested enormous resources in establishing a system of offensive tunnels that penetrated into Israeli territory, as was revealed in Operation Protective Edge. Simultaneously, a vast underground network was established beneath the Gaza Strip — a kind of "underground city" — which was used for movement, command, storage of weapons, hiding terrorists, and holding hostages. Even after nearly three years of fighting, the mission to destroy this infrastructure in areas where the IDF operates is still far from complete.
The effective solution
The operational experience accumulated over the years teaches that when one can choose between an explosion and sealing by pouring concrete, in many cases, pouring concrete is the more effective and reliable solution. Its purpose is not only to cause the tunnel to collapse but to prevent the possibility of renewing its use in the future. In contrast, explosions can in some cases expand existing voids or create soil that is easier to rehabilitate and re-dig.
However, the means of destruction, as important as it may be, is not a substitute for control over the territory. In areas where the IDF has full control, Hamas's ability to rehabilitate or re-dig tunnels is very limited. Conversely, in areas where Hamas continues to maintain control, including the Al-Mawasi area, the central camps, and Gaza City, there still exists a large-scale tunnel network that cannot be dealt with fundamentally without operational control over the territory.
The cumulative lesson of the last 30 years is clear: there are no magic solutions for the underground threat. Destroying the tunnels is a necessary condition for reducing Hamas's capabilities, but it requires control over the territory, perseverance, and continuous engineering and intelligence efforts. As long as there remain spaces where the organization is capable of digging, rehabilitating, and building up its strength, the tunnel threat will not disappear. If one wishes to ensure that the security reality does not repeat itself, one must complete the achievement of the war's goals and prevent Hamas from the ability to re-rehabilitate the underground infrastructure upon which it built its power for years.
The author is the founder of "Habithonistim" and a former deputy commander of the Gaza Division.
