The war in Ukraine proves: there is no substitute for significant air power

The Russia-Ukraine war has revolutionized the battlefield. Drones and UAVs have transformed within four years from a complementary tool into a central weapon system. They locate targets, destroy tanks, hit headquarters, and allow Ukraine to attack targets even hundreds of kilometers inside Russia. However, this success may hide a much more important lesson: drones are not a substitute for an air force.

Ukraine is perhaps the most clear example of this. It has fighter jets, including F-16s, experienced pilots, and strike capabilities. What it lacks is an air force with the mass and freedom of action required to achieve air superiority, suppress Russian air defense systems, and attack targets deep inside Russia powerfully and systematically.

The difference is not semantic. A drone carrying tens of kilograms of explosives can hit a radar, a fuel facility, or an ammunition depot. A swarm of drones can cause great damage and even disrupt a defense system. But there is no substitute for fighter jets capable of quickly bringing half-ton and one-ton precision bombs to a target, returning to attack, and generating a sequence of intelligence, attack, and damage assessment.

The weak point

Israelis know the meaning of this difference well. The ability of the Israeli Air Force to operate precise and heavy armament deep in enemy territory is a completely different dimension of military power. So is the ability of the USA to operate air power with force, at long ranges, and in a sustained manner. The UAV is an important part of this system — it does not replace it.

For Ukraine, the problem is even more severe because the offensive air inferiority is joined by an increasingly worsening weakness in air defense. Russia is increasing the use of ballistic missiles, while Ukraine is struggling to receive a sufficient quantity of interceptors for the Patriot systems. The result is a dangerous equation: the Russians can launch hundreds of UAVs and dummy missiles to overload detection and interception systems, and among them integrate cruise and ballistic missiles that are much harder to intercept.

According to Ukrainian intelligence estimates, Russia is currently capable of producing more than 200 cruise and ballistic missiles of various types per month. In July alone, it produced 65 Iskander-M missiles, and in the same month launched more than 120 ballistic missiles and weapon systems with a ballistic trajectory at Ukraine. This gap takes on tangible meaning in Ukraine's cities: in the recent attacks on Kyiv, the shortage of Patriot interceptors left the defense particularly struggling against ballistic missiles, and the increase in launch rates translates into more lethal hits in the rear.

Moscow has understood the weak point. It does not have to achieve full air superiority over Kyiv to create a strategic effect. It is enough that it can penetrate the defense envelope again and again and hit cities, energy infrastructure, industry, and strategic centers. This is probably one of the most important signs of the next stage in the war. As Russian missile production grows and the Ukrainian interceptor stock is eroded, the gap may turn from a tactical threat into a strategic problem. Air defense systems are useless without ammunition, and the number of launchers is less important if there are not enough interceptors for them.

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The Russian conclusion

However, the story does not end at Ukraine's borders. In parallel with increasing its military power, Russia continues to test Europe through cyber, sabotage, disinformation, airspace violations, and actions whose execution can be denied. The Baltic states and Poland are treating these scenarios with increasing seriousness.

There is currently no proof that Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to invade another country, but that is also not the only question that should worry NATO. The question is what conclusion Moscow is drawing from Western conduct. If the Kremlin sees a persistent difficulty in providing Ukraine with Patriot interceptors, limited European ammunition stocks, gaps in production capacity, and political hesitation in the face of escalation — it may interpret them as weakness. Wars do not break out only because one country wants them; sometimes they break out because a leader becomes convinced that the other side will not respond with force — and here lies the Israeli lesson as well.

The Russia-Ukraine war proves that new technology does not cancel the principles of military power. Drones change the battlefield, but they do not cancel the need for fighter jets, heavy armament, intelligence, air superiority, and multi-layered defense with a large stock of interceptors. Ukraine has become the world's largest laboratory for drone warfare, but it also provides a painful reminder of what happens to a country forced to fight for a long time without air superiority and without a robust air defense envelope. If the West does not close this gap, Russia may conclude that pressure pays off. And then the question will no longer be just what the next campaign in Ukraine will look like — but where it will take place.