The Diversion War
The idea that the Prime Minister might start a war to divert public opinion and prevent or postpone elections is not far-fetched. However, not every department head in the Intelligence Corps is a senior security official who can warn about such things, especially since Israel is already at war with almost every country in the region.
"We did not initiate the security zone in Lebanon," they said yesterday in the security establishment, "and we did not initiate the volatility in the West Bank ahead of the elections. All of these are the result of decisions by the political echelon, and it is they who must ensure the resources to deal with these matters." The security official, a senior one it must be said, to whom the quote was attributed, also took the trouble to explain that the remarks were made to "reflect," in his words, the situation in the IDF and the need for resources.
And there is more: following the results of the primaries, one of the commentators estimated, due to a conversation with a "senior official in the security establishment," as he defined him, that Benjamin Netanyahu had cooked up for himself a convenient list of "yes-men," who would make it easier for him to pass a decision to go to war in order to postpone the elections or influence the results. And if proof from the field is needed, then elsewhere a senior official was quoted claiming that the refueling planes, Gideon, that landed in the country, are part of the preparations for another round in Iran.
As the election date approaches, the fear that Benjamin Netanyahu might initiate a military move to strengthen himself politically is taking up an increasing volume in the public discourse. This is not a new claim, and it is also not far-fetched by virtue of being political. "Diversionary war," they call it in academic language - the use of an external conflict to divert public attention from an internal crisis. The Falklands War in 1982 is the most classic example studied in this context, while referring to the instinctive tendency of the public, or at least a large part of it, to close ranks in the face of an external threat and unite around the government and the leader. However, studies prove that the effect is not automatic and is limited in time and by the results of the campaign. A "diversionary war" is not a one-way ticket.
And regarding all this, three things must be said: the first concerns the inflationary use of the definition "senior security official." Without meaning to offend, and without names of course, it is appropriate to say here that this credit should be taken with a very large grain of salt. It is true that rank does not guarantee mastery of the material, innovative vision, and creativity, and certainly not eloquence, but still - a senior official is a senior official. A department head in the service is not a senior official in the Shin Bet, and not every former officer in 8200 is a senior official in Israeli intelligence. And this is not nitpicking. When they say "senior security official," the tendency is to attribute to him intimate knowledge of what is really happening.
A second note concerns the term war, or the synonyms - "conflict" or "sharp conflict," "explosive event," which is by the way a somewhat festive definition, "round," a term that has become a household name in our parts, "campaign," which is, how shall we say, a somewhat stale term - and so on. And the obvious question in this context is which war-conflict-round-volatility is being talked about now, and what exactly do the senior officials who talk about initiated volatility ahead of the elections mean, because except for Turkey, which is now starring in the headlines, Israel is already at war anyway. Or at least in a continuous military conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, dealing with high volatility in the territories, and on the verge of volatility in Syria. A round in Iran will not take place without American approval, which will probably not happen before November. So what is left? Turkey? Is this the initiated war that Benjamin Netanyahu will cook up to avoid elections or improve his chances?
What should worry the voters is not the conspiratorial question of which war Benjamin Netanyahu will invent for us, but in which war we are still stuck up to our necks. Even if one chooses to ignore the legal infrastructure that requires a majority of 80 Knesset members to postpone the election date, the question that remains on the table is why this argument in particular is taking up such a wide public volume. So it is true, as mentioned, this is not a far-fetched fear, and yet there is a long distance between the fear and its realization. Especially when we are sitting on the yellow lines in Gaza and Lebanon, and bombing in Syria.
And the next obvious question is whether the other arguments have run out. The democratic celebration in the Likud, for example, which produced distorted primaries with disgusting results, which perhaps pushed out of the list deeply corrupt figures like Silman, but there is no doubt that it is not an expression of the realization of the Israeli dream for different leadership. Especially after some ultra-Orthodox tell how they were paid to participate in this democratic dream. In other words, what should worry a not insignificant part of the voters ahead of October is not the conspiratorial question of which war Benjamin Netanyahu will invent for us, but in which war we are still stuck up to our necks, how the burden is divided, and where the budgets are flowing. Who is being bought and who is being sold. Everything that is on the public agenda, open and exposed, for four years already.
