The Race for the Kirya is On: Security Challenges Do Not Stop
The next Israeli Minister of Defense will immediately face the rehabilitation of the IDF, a manpower crisis, strained relations with the US, and multiple active combat zones. With budget deficits and exhausted forces, the new minister will have no time for an adjustment period.
After three years of continuous fighting, the IDF is exhausted, the defense budget is stuck, the Iranian threat is back at the center of the agenda, the various arenas continue to burn, and the entire system is required to prepare now for the next war — while the previous one has not really ended.
The next Minister of Defense will be required to deal simultaneously with the rehabilitation of the IDF and force buildup, the manpower crisis in the regular, career, and reserve forces, the struggle against Iran's buildup, the attempt to prevent the rehabilitation of Hamas, maintaining achievements against Hezbollah, the explosive reality in Judea and Samaria, the issue of Haredi conscription, relations with the USA, and the struggle for the budget. In other words, he will not receive even one day of grace.
Iran at the top of the priorities
Assuming there are no dramatic changes before the elections, such as the fall of the Iranian regime, Iran will continue to be a central threat to Israel.
The elimination of the Iranian leadership as part of Operation 'Lion's Roar' led to significant radicalization within the new regime, and the Revolutionary Guards are the ones who actually run the country. The assessment is that Tehran understands that the only way to ensure the regime's survival is a rapid and secret breakout to the nuclear bomb. At the same time, the Iranians are working to rehabilitate their missile and UAV systems, restore capabilities, and draw lessons.
To deal with this challenge, a clear policy will be required, alongside budgets that will allow the IDF to prepare. However, the defense establishment is already warning that the lack of budget is harming its ability to prepare for the next confrontation.
Back to Gaza
The arrangement that led to the return of all the hostages did not end the campaign in the Strip. The IDF currently controls more than 60% of the Gaza territory and is interested in expanding control to 70%. However, even while surrounded on all sides, Hamas continues to rehabilitate its military and civilian power, partly through humanitarian aid and smuggling. The terrorist organization that carried out the October 7 massacre has indeed weakened, but it is far from being defeated. The questions that will face the next Minister of Defense are clear: how to stop the process of Hamas's rehabilitation, how to maintain IDF freedom of action within political constraints, how to condition the rehabilitation of the Strip on demilitarization, and how to prevent deterioration into another campaign.
Stopping Hezbollah
Hezbollah has suffered blows over the last three years, but it still holds significant capabilities. The challenge will be to prevent its strengthening and continue to disconnect it from Iran. To this end, Israel seeks to strengthen the Lebanese government and allow it to take responsibility for parts of the south of the country. However, the defense establishment is skeptical about its ability to do so — after it failed to fulfill its commitments to disarm Hezbollah during the ceasefire in November 2024.
At the same time, the defense establishment believes that the IDF must continue to hold the security zone in southern Lebanon to keep threats away from the border, but it is unclear how acceptable this policy will be to the USA and the Lebanese government over time. It is not impossible that Hezbollah will try at this stage or another to renew fire towards Israel.
Judea and Samaria's powder keg
Judea and Samaria are like a powder keg. Over the last three years, through systematic and intensive work against terror nests, the Central Command has managed to reduce the number of terror incidents. But as the events of the last few days have proven, any small incident can be a catalyst for a significant outbreak.
At the same time, the IDF is forced to deal with an increase in nationalist crime, which diverts forces from counter-terrorism missions to enforcement missions against Jews. Furthermore, the expansion of settlement poses another challenge: the establishment of dozens of new farms and settlements requires the allocation of forces, at a time when the IDF is in three security zones — in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. The next Minister of Defense will have to examine Israeli policy in this context and find a way to deal with the wave of crime by Jewish settlers. This is not currently being handled properly by the authorities responsible for it — the IDF, Shin Bet, Israel Police, and the courts.
The race for force buildup
Three years of war have worn down the IDF in every field — from ammunition stocks, through vehicles and armored fighting vehicles, to logistical and defensive systems.
Now the army is required to replenish stocks, draw lessons, and integrate them into force buildup plans. The central problem is that there is no budget for this. Defense officials warn that the Ministry of Finance is delaying the transfer of the 40 billion shekels required to close the gaps, even though the Prime Minister ordered the immediate transfer of 12 billion shekels of that amount. The defense establishment warns that while Israel's enemies are already accelerating their arms race, Israel is struggling to keep up the pace.
Manpower crisis
If there is one threat that worries the top of the system more than anything, it is the manpower crisis. The years of war have worn down the regular army, burdened the reserve system in an unprecedented way, and led to the departure of many officers. The fear in the system is that if the trend continues, it will be very difficult — and perhaps impossible — to rehabilitate the army in the coming years.
Alongside this stands the issue of Haredi conscription. Whoever enters the Ministry of Defense will be required to make decisions that can no longer be postponed.
Connection with Washington and the Chief of Staff
Alongside the operational challenges, the Minister of Defense will have to maintain the security relationship with the USA, which reached its peak in the war in Iran — starting from security assistance and procurement, through intelligence cooperation, and ending with political and operational coordination in the various arenas.
Experience shows that no less than external threats, the relationship between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff affects the functioning of the defense system. There have been successful collaborations in the past, but also sharp confrontations — from the Harpaz affair to the crises in recent years between Minister Israel Katz and Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir — which severely harmed the IDF. One of the first challenges of the next Minister of Defense will be to build a professional, substantive, and ego-free relationship with the IDF leadership.
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No time for adjustment
Bottom line, the next Minister of Defense will not receive an adjustment period. From his first day in office, he will be required to make decisions that will determine what the IDF will look like in the coming years, what Israel's security concept will look like, and whether the defense system will succeed in moving from survival to rehabilitation. In other words, his mission will not only be to manage the next war — but to rebuild the army that is supposed to win it.
