Does Israel really know how to distinguish between a strategic peace and a tactical peace?

One of the immortal sentences in Sun Tzu's book, "The Art of War," states that "all warfare is based on deception." More than two thousand years after it was written, it seems that this principle remains more relevant than ever, especially in light of the Israeli trauma of the events of October 1973 and 2023. But sometimes even diplomacy, agreements, and gestures of reconciliation can serve as a tool in a broader campaign, and not necessarily herald the end of a war or conflict.

Against this background, one should read with concern the publication by Roi Kais that officials in one of the countries in the region recommended to another Arab country to reach an agreement with Israel in order to "lull" it, so as to prepare for a future confrontation against it. If the report is accurate, the important question is not only who the countries involved are, but whether Israel - the one that seeks to expand the circle of relations with Arab countries under the auspices of the Abraham Accords, but also the one that was brutally awakened on October 7th - knows how to distinguish between peace as a strategy and peace as a tactic.

In this context, there is no shortage of precedents in Muslim history, and the first and most famous of them is the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. In 628, the Prophet Muhammad signed a ten-year ceasefire agreement with the Quraysh tribe, his rivals from Mecca. The agreement, which was perceived by some of his supporters as a concession, gave Muhammad room for action, and within two years the balance of power changed and Mecca fell into his hands like a ripe fruit. According to Muslim tradition, it was the side identified with the Quraysh that violated the agreement, so presenting Hudaybiyyah as a simple permission to sign an agreement in order to violate it is a distortion of history. However, history, as is known, is written by the victors, and the debate over the true meaning of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah continues to this day.

However, the precedent has taken on modern political significance. Months after the signing of the Oslo Accords, Yasser Arafat compared the agreement with Israel to Hudaybiyyah. In a speech in Johannesburg in May 1994, about eight months after the famous festive ceremony on the White House lawn, he said that just as Muhammad accepted the agreement with the Quraysh, "we accept this agreement," and later spoke about the road to Jerusalem. His words aroused fear among many in Israel that Oslo was perceived by him not as the end of the conflict, but as a stage on the way to realizing future Palestinian goals, among which is the elimination of the "Zionist entity."

One should not conclude from this that every agreement with an Arab country is a deception exercise. The peace with Egypt from 1979 and with Jordan from 1994 has survived wars, crises, and regional upheavals, and these are perceived as significant strategic achievements. However, it also teaches that signing a peace does not guarantee reconciliation.

The hostility towards Israel that exists among broad parts of the media and public discourse, and even in the education system in both countries, and alongside it - in the Egyptian case - the ongoing military buildup, require Israel to examine not only statements and intentions in the present, but also capabilities and long-term strategic trends.

This is perhaps the most important lesson after October 7th. Israel should not fear agreements. It should be wary of misconceptions. Not every peace is Hudaybiyyah, but not every agreement heralds peace, and certainly not the end of the conflict.