Between the farms and Qusra
The events in Qusra are not a "historical traffic accident" but a direct result of the "revolution" in the West Bank. Under the auspices of the public trauma from October 7, the leaders of the "revolution" are promoting a supposedly national-security vision, while masking the religious-ideological foundation at its base.

There is almost nothing surprising in the difficult events that have been continuing for about a week in the village of Qusra in Samaria: not the brutal violence of settlers against Palestinians, not the helplessness of the enforcement agencies (and the involvement of soldiers in the "siege" on houses in the village), not the silence accompanied by a wink from the decision-makers, and to a large extent also not the sharp American condemnation that illustrates that Israel is gradually cementing an image of a state in distress.
The only surprise is the astonishment and even the uprising of many in the right-wing camp, and in particular those promoting the expansion of settlement in the West Bank, in the face of what is defined as reckless acts that harm the entire enterprise. This is a strange effort to hold the rope at both ends: on one hand, to support the establishment of farms, most of which have no legal basis and whose existence is accompanied by violent friction with Palestinians, and also to call for the application of sovereignty in the West Bank and to side with the "Smotrich revolution" whose goal is the establishment of one state between the sea and the Jordan in which there are two types of citizenship (without any real deliberation regarding the fate of three million Palestinians in the West Bank), but on the other hand to be astonished in the face of other moves that are labeled illegal and immoral.
It is necessary to look reality in the face: the events in Qusra are not a "historical traffic accident" but a development that has a direct connection to the "revolution" in the West Bank and is its result. The events in Qusra, like those in the village of Tal which began with a "hike" and ended with the fall of a settler and an IDF officer, present to the public the formation of an "ex-territory" possessing unique laws and values, and what happens in it is not "beyond the mountains of darkness," but affects the entire state.
The time has come to present things clearly: what is happening in the West Bank under the auspices of an unprecedented political turmoil is a sectoral project on a religious-ideological basis that is actually forced upon the entire public, most of which does not understand or know what is happening in the West Bank, does not visit the area, does not identify with the vision of the "revolution," and it is doubtful whether it wants to live in a state whose "strategic goals" in the 21st century include promoting the building of the Temple and applying biblical laws.
The complex situation is made possible to a large extent due to the fact that most of the public is in the trauma of October 7. The severe massacre committed against Israelis burned into the collective consciousness an unwillingness to see Arabs and hear Arabic, a complete distrust of Arabs (including Arab parties in Israel), the normalization of terms like transfer ("voluntary migration") and "there are no uninvolved," a belief that one must rely only on oneself ("the new Sparta"), support for continuous use of force, and of course the rejection of a political settlement, especially with the Palestinians. Living within a continuous trauma without processing — which is embodied in a state investigation — prevents a complex understanding of reality. Thus, Israelis do not really think about the meaning derived from the "sober" approach, and above all find it difficult to imagine what one state looks like in which two peoples who are hostile to each other live without partitions, which guarantees a Balkan reality.
The promoters of the "revolution" identified the crack and seek to penetrate it while presenting themselves as a sober correction and a solution to "what Amalek did to us," while presenting the sectoral vision as a national project that contributes to all of us and enjoys a collective consensus. This is done while masking the religious foundation standing at the base of the "revolution" through supposedly strategic arguments that will be easy for the public to digest: the farms embody learning the lessons of October 7 (a failure that occurred under the government that the promoters of the "revolution" are members of), taking more territory allows for security, victory, and deterrence, and of course that settlement everywhere is a national asset and eradicates terror. The vision is of course legitimate, but requires clarification that its motives are religious at their core, and also an explanation regarding the dramatic consequences of its realization for Israel's democratic character and international legitimacy.
In this context, it is important to notice the growing intolerance of Donald Trump towards Israel. He was fascinated by its operational performance, but is gradually discovering that it is losing strategic balance, selling fantasies that cause Washington complications (especially in Iran), and above all is addicted to the use of force and full of appetite for territories. Consequently, Donald Trump is taking measures of containment and external enforcement, as is embodied in Lebanon and Gaza, and it is possible that this will lead to a conclusion in the spirit of internationalization that it is better for the Americans to be the ones to restore order in the West Bank. In Qusra, therefore, the failure of the conception that Donald Trump is always with us and that we are the ones who make the decisions was once again demonstrated.
The upcoming elections are about many fateful issues, and one of them must be the future of relations with the Palestinians. In the shadow of October 7, the discourse on the issue has become shallow, distorted, saturated with fantasies, and devoid of complex examination, when any criticism is immediately labeled as "defeatism in the spirit of October 6." Most parties present slogans on the Palestinian issue such as "conflict management," which collapsed on October 7, and the public for its part does not demand a more sophisticated platform from them.
A look devoid of illusions reveals two bad possibilities in the complex situation in which the conflict is currently located: progress towards one state, as is being realized daily through construction and the fusion of infrastructures and procedures, or finding a way to physical separation, which is not necessarily the establishment of a Palestinian state (a scenario for which the feasibility and maturity are currently slim), while drawing a partition that will be done wisely and without endangering Israel's security, and will include maintaining control over the Jordan Valley and freedom of action in the Palestinian arena. Sober separation is not an ideal alternative and the troubles will not end if it is promoted, but it is preferable compared to a fanatical and bloody existence in one state.
Dr. Michael Milstein is a senior researcher at the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University.



