From Iron Dome to joint production: Israel's secret move regarding Ukraine revealed | Yoni Reini
Defense ties with Kyiv, votes against Russia at the UN, and support for Ukraine's territorial integrity point to a strategic trend that has been ongoing for over a decade. Both in Kyiv and Moscow, the direction in which the Netanyahu government is heading is recognized.
The meeting between Gideon Sa'ar and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv in July 2025 was no coincidence. Discussing "opportunities for joint weapons production" was the culmination of a deep, long-term process, the seeds of which were sown two years earlier. Then-Foreign and Defense Ministers, Eli Cohen and Yoav Gallant, signed defense export licenses for Elbit and Rafael — the first permit of its kind for the sale of defensive equipment to Ukraine since the war began.
This breakthrough was accompanied by the deployment of an Israeli warning system in Kyiv and financial aid amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Another key pillar was recorded in August 2024, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initiated a phone call with Zelensky, expressing support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Zelensky thanked him for Israel's participation in the peace summit and support for the concluding declaration, and the two agreed to tighten communication channels. The Israeli government is consistently tightening its ties with Kyiv, moving away from the Russian axis.
Consistent policy, not a one-time event
The current trend is far from accidental; it is a direct continuation of strategic moves that began more than a decade ago. The infrastructure was laid back in 2011, when Netanyahu met with then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to examine the expansion of ties. In 2016 and 2018, Israel stood by Kyiv in the international arena, voting at the UN against Russia in favor of resolutions condemning the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula.
The change permeated the Knesset, when MK Nava Boker (Likud) initiated a bill for Israel to recognize the Holodomor as genocide. The peak was recorded in August 2019, when Netanyahu became the first Israeli Prime Minister in the 21st century to make an official visit to Kyiv.
During the visit, he signed the ratification of a free trade agreement with Zelensky and participated in a ceremony in memory of the victims of the Holodomor — a step that caused severe resentment in Moscow. Eastern Europe and Russia researcher Dr. Evgeny Klauber pointed out as early as 2019 that official diplomatic channels between Jerusalem and Kyiv had become much more frequent and intense than those Israel managed with Russia.
Bennett ran to Putin, Netanyahu ran to defend Ukraine
At this point, the fundamental contrast sharpens: in June 2021, then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett held a conversation with President Zelensky, in which he was invited to visit Ukraine, but the visit did not materialize. Moreover, in October 2021, a few months before the Russian invasion, Bennett chose to fly to Sochi and meet with Vladimir Putin.
Conversely, with the outbreak of the war, Netanyahu — then in the opposition — adopted a distinct pro-Ukrainian line: he supported absorbing refugees and pushed for granting work visas to Ukrainian programmers. This trend intensified in September 2022, when MK Nir Barkat (Likud) toured Ukraine and expressed public support for transferring the "Iron Dome" system to Kyiv — a move coordinated with Netanyahu.
In contrast, within the government itself, there was coldness towards Kyiv. Then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz clarified to EU ambassadors that Israel "will not supply weapons to Ukraine." Simultaneously, then-Finance Minister Avigdor Lieberman worked to ease restrictions on the banking system to reduce the impact of international sanctions on Russia. The diplomatic crisis worsened: Zelensky canceled a planned call with Yair Lapid, and Israel chose to be absent from the "Crimea Platform."
Both Kyiv and Moscow notice the difference
The most conclusive evidence comes from the Ukrainian side. In October 2022, under the Lapid government, Zelensky's senior advisor Mykhailo Podolyak declared that "Israel has chosen the wrong side of history." However, just four months after Netanyahu's return to power in February 2023, Podolyak's tone changed: "We see a big difference between Netanyahu's Israel and the Israel of Lapid and Bennett... Kyiv trusts Netanyahu more," he stated.
Zelensky also asked Netanyahu to mediate between him and Putin — a channel Bennett refused to allow. The Russian side also recognizes the limits of Jerusalem's loyalty. Dmitry Solonnikov, director of the Institute for Modern State Development, warned in February 2023 that Israel "was never a 100 percent ally" for Russia and that Netanyahu would ultimately weigh only his own interests.
The cumulative picture paints a clear and consistent trend. The proof: when Kyiv is required to decide who to trust, their choice is not the "change government."
The author is a historian, researcher, and academic consultant. Author of the book "Is Gaza Really Occupied and Besieged?"
