Full-Right and Full of Holes: The Security Equation Changed at a Blood Price
They waved photos of terror victims, raged against a "weak" policy, and promised to deal with terror. Then Benjamin Netanyahu, Itamar Ben Gvir, and Bezalel Smotrich were elected, turned a blind eye to Hezbollah attacks in the heart of the country and to tents it set up on its territory, and reached an agreement with Hamas a week before 7/10. When 1,200 people fell, were murdered and raped, and another 251 were kidnapped, the perception flipped and Israel struck the members of the terror axis one after another, even if it has not yet defeated them. And there were other promises that were not kept, such as equalizing the salary of conscript soldiers to the minimum wage. "You promised, you delivered," a series of articles.
77 days before the elections, the citizens of Israel are again expected to hear promises about security, deterrence, governance, and a firm hand against terror. Except that this time these promises will sound different. Between the 2022 election cycle and that of 2026 stands the October 7 massacre, and after it almost three years of multi-front war that changed Israel, the IDF, and the map of threats around it.
In the previous elections, security was one of the main lines of attack of the Netanyahu camp against the Bennett-Lapid government. In Likud, they blamed the outgoing government for weakness in the face of Hamas and Hezbollah and for dependence on Ra'am, and promised to bring a more aggressive policy. Benjamin Netanyahu presented his security experience as one of the main reasons to return him to power, and committed to restoring the deterrence that he said had been eroded.
One of the prominent examples came in October 2022, about a month before the elections. On the agenda then was the maritime border agreement with Lebanon, which Netanyahu turned into a symbol of what he defined as an Israeli surrender to Hezbollah's threats. "Yair Lapid surrendered shamefully to Hassan Nasrallah's threats," he said then, and claimed that the Prime Minister was handing over "sovereign territory" and assets of Israel. He signed the video with an explicit promise: "If this illegal grab passes, it will not bind us." The agreement passed - but even after Netanyahu returned to the premiership, it was not canceled. Four years later, Israel and Lebanon are already in a completely different reality after two difficult campaigns against Hezbollah, and today they are even holding broader contacts through American mediation for a security arrangement between the countries.
Netanyahu was not alone. In the Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties, dealing with terror and governance became a central banner. Members of Religious Zionism even waved photos of terror victims in the Knesset in protest against the Bennett government, and in March 2022, after the attack in Hadera, Itamar Ben Gvir arrived at the scene and confronted the then-Minister of Public Security Omer Bar-Lev. "Shame on you, you are the most leftist minister, and they gave you to be Minister of Public Security," he shouted at him. Bar-Lev replied: "I am not ashamed, you are a zero."
In this atmosphere, the "Full-Right" government was born, with an especially broad basket of security promises: restoring deterrence, lowering Palestinian terror, changing open-fire regulations, an immunity law for soldiers and police, the death penalty for terrorists, deportation of terrorists' families, changing the structure of powers in Judea and Samaria, and strengthening the status of conscript and reserve soldiers. Alongside all these remained one of the most explosive promises of the coalition - regulating the ultra-Orthodox draft by law.
The promise of deterrence - and the containment policy
In the first months of the government's term, even before October 7, the gap between the security rhetoric and the actual policy began to sharpen. 34 Israelis were murdered in terror attacks until August, with the shooting attack in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Neve Yaakov and the ramming attack in the Ramot neighborhood being especially remembered. Evidence of the lack of a sense of security in the public was received in September 2023, when a routine police chase on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv led to crowds fleeing in panic for fear of another terror attack.
In March 2023, a terrorist infiltrated from Lebanon, reached deep into Israeli territory, and activated a Claymore mine at the Megiddo junction. An Israeli citizen was seriously wounded. The terrorist was eliminated as he made his way back north, but Israel refrained from a broad response against Hezbollah. Shortly after that came the tent affair on Mount Dov, when Hezbollah set up a manned tent in territory that Israel defined as sovereign. Despite the promises of a more aggressive policy, in Jerusalem they preferred for months to try to solve the crisis through mediation and UNIFIL, for fear that military action would lead to days of battle. The tent became one of the most prominent symbols of the erosion of deterrence on the northern border on the eve of the war, and not only that: in September 2023, Hezbollah tried to eliminate the former Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense, Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon, in Yarkon Park, with an explosive device that exploded in the place where he was supposed to pass.
In the south, too, Israel continued to act according to the perception that Hamas is interested in quiet and improving the economic situation in the Strip. In the months preceding the massacre, there were disturbances near the fence, explosive devices were activated, incendiary balloons were launched, and Hamas conducted open training. In Israel, a large part of the activity was interpreted as an attempt to exert pressure to increase the number of work permits and to flow money into the Strip. In fact, the Netanyahu government even turned to Qatar on the eve of October 7 to increase the transfer of money to Hamas, and understandings were reached on September 29, 2023. Thus, on the night between October 6 and 7, everyone was sure that after an agreement had already been reached - Hamas had no interest in escalation. Alongside the assumption that Hamas is "deterred" and not interested in a total war, the new technological obstacle around Gaza was perceived as a central component in the defense of the communities.
On October 7, 2023, this perception collapsed at once. About 1,200 people were massacred in the Hamas attack and 251 were kidnapped to the Strip. Israelis were taken to the Gaza Strip naked and with amputated limbs, dragged in pickup trucks, and abandoned to horrific abuse by a hate-filled Gazan mob. Women were raped by terrorists on Israeli territory before being brutally murdered. Entire communities were occupied. Netanyahu's election promise to "restore deterrence" took on a completely new meaning.
War and its consequences
Israel went on the offensive. The war that broke out following the massacre became the longest and most multi-front campaign in Israel's history, in which more than 920 IDF soldiers were killed alongside dozens of civilians. The IDF acted with unprecedented scope and power: in the Gaza Strip, a significant part of Hamas's organized military frameworks were dismantled, numerous infrastructures were destroyed, and all the organization's senior officials - including Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, and Mohammed Deif - were eliminated. Hamas suffered the hardest blow in its history. The price was leaving the hostages in captivity for a long time, some for two whole years, and the death of 41 of them who were kidnapped alive. Promises for "mass migration" from Gaza were not realized, and the attempt to achieve them exacted heavy prices. Israel's situation in the international arena and its image also deteriorated significantly.
In the north, too, the reality changed. After almost a year of war of attrition, which began with Hezbollah joining the war to help Hamas, Israel moved to a broad offensive campaign against the Lebanese terror organization. Hassan Nasrallah and many of the organization's senior officials were eliminated, command systems, missiles, infrastructure, and the Radwan Force were severely damaged, and at various stages of the campaign, the IDF entered Lebanese territory. In Syria, Israel took advantage of the regime's collapse to strike within a short time at weapons depots and military capabilities that could have threatened it. In Iran, nuclear facilities, missile and air defense systems were attacked, and regime officials, commanders, and nuclear scientists were eliminated. The campaign deeply changed the regional balance of power and struck Israel's main enemies.
It is impossible to ignore the achievements of the war when examining the government's test of results. The Israel of 2026 is facing a significantly weaker Hezbollah, a beaten Hamas, and an Iran that has been damaged in a way that could not have been imagined on the eve of the war. But here too, the picture is not unequivocal. Weakened significantly, but did not disappear. The question that was at the heart of the security promises of 2022 was not only how hard Israel would strike its enemies - but whether it would succeed in producing a decision and deterrence over time. Hamas lost its leadership and most of its organized military power, but did not disappear. Its remnants continue to operate in a guerrilla format, recruit activists, and try to restore capabilities. Hezbollah also suffered a historic blow, but continues to exist as an armed organization and resist the demand to disarm. Israel and Lebanon are still conducting contacts on a mechanism that could verify its disarmament - proof that the issue has not yet been decided. Also, against Iran, the balance is complex. The blow to it was hard, but the nuclear issue was not removed from the table and the regional campaign has not yet ended. That is, if on the eve of the previous elections the promise was to replace "containment" with "decision," in practice Israel achieved tremendous military achievements - but is still required to hold large forces on several fronts simultaneously and prepare for the possibility that the threats that were damaged will try to rebuild themselves. At the same time, the fear of losing support in the USA - when the midterm elections in November, and especially the presidential elections in 2028, do not bode well - could shuffle the cards regarding the political support it enjoys, and which protects it from international sanctions.
Immunity for fighters: promised, not legislated
Alongside the strategic promises, there were also concrete commitments in the campaign. One of them was an immunity law for soldiers and police from investigations following operational activity. Otzma Yehudit placed it as a central promise and even promoted a bill at the beginning of the term, but in the end, a broad immunity of the type presented to the voters was not legislated. Among other things, concerns arose in the judicial system and the security system that a sweeping internal immunity would actually increase the exposure of fighters to legal proceedings abroad. The promise to change the open-fire regulations was also not realized in the broad format presented in the campaign. The IDF's open-fire regulations were not changed by legislation, and no comprehensive and permanent change was determined in the police either. On the other hand, since the outbreak of the war, the operational freedom of action of the forces has actually changed dramatically depending on the fronts and the circumstances of the fighting.
Death penalty and deportation passed - and remained on paper. In the field of legislation, the picture is more mixed. The law for the death penalty for terrorists, which for years was one of Ben Gvir's flagship promises, did indeed pass in the end. It was approved by the Knesset last March and published in the law book at the beginning of April. In terms of fulfilling the political promise, it is a clear achievement for the coalition. However, as of today, the law has not yet been applied in practice, and it is unclear if it has really changed anything in the existing legal situation in Israel. Hundreds of Nukhba terrorists arrested following the October 7 massacre are also not expected to be tried under it, and the legal difficulties surrounding the conditions of its application leave a big question mark around the question of how much practical significance it will have. The law for the deportation of terrorists' families also passed in the Knesset as early as November 2024. However, almost two years later, a Ynet and "Yedioth Ahronoth" investigation revealed that despite more than 100 requests prepared for its implementation, the mechanism was blocked and the law effectively remained on paper.
In Judea and Samaria: the change that did happen. In one area, it is difficult to argue that the reality remained as it was: Judea and Samaria. The promise of "Religious Zionism" to transfer some of the civil powers from the hands of the Civil Administration to the political echelon was partially realized through the changes in the Ministry of Defense and the establishment of the Settlement Administration. On the other hand, the move to leave broader control over the system in the hands of the civil echelon encountered friction again and again with the Central Command and the IDF. The intention to transfer the Judea and Samaria Border Police to the full responsibility of the Ministry of National Security was also not completed, among other things due to the IDF's opposition to splitting the operational chain of command. But as far as the settlements are concerned, a much larger change has taken place. A large number of outposts were regulated, agricultural farms were expanded, construction plans were promoted, and a new reality was created on the ground. Official sovereignty was not applied, and the results of the moves are subject to disputes, but the government's policy in Judea and Samaria is one of the promises where the gap between the campaign and the execution is significantly smaller than in other areas.
The promise that became a manpower crisis
But precisely one of the issues that was almost not at the top of the security agenda on the eve of October 7 became the most urgent problem of the IDF at the end of the term: manpower. The coalition committed to legally regulate the status of yeshiva students, and that did not happen. The High Court of Justice ruled that in the absence of a legal arrangement, the state has no authority to continue to avoid drafting yeshiva students, and the IDF began issuing draft orders to the ultra-Orthodox public. In practice, the number of recruits is still far from the needs pointed out by the army. At the same time, the burden on the public that is already serving has grown. Last month, the Knesset approved that the mandatory service for men will not be shortened to 30 months as it was supposed to happen in January 2027, and will remain for the time being 32 months. The IDF demanded 36 months and clarified that even the arrangement that was approved does not provide a full answer to the manpower shortage. The reserve system was also required again and again for tens and even hundreds of days of service. Families, workplaces, and businesses had to deal with repeated rounds of recruitment, while the army currently holds more active fronts and more lines of defense than on the eve of the war. Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir even warned in the cabinet that without a comprehensive solution to the manpower crisis, which includes extending service, regulating the reserve system, and expanding the base of recruits - "the IDF will collapse into itself."
And the gap is especially prominent against one of the promises that were heard on the eve of the establishment of the government: to strengthen those who serve. The plan to equalize the salary of conscript soldiers to the minimum wage was not realized. Reserve soldiers did receive grants, benefits, and compensation in large volumes during the war, but these were born mainly as a response to the long emergency war - and not as the structural reform that was promised in advance.
In summary, four years after the previous elections, the security balance of the "Full-Right" government does not easily fit into a table of "you kept" or "you did not keep." The deterrence promised on the eve of the elections collapsed in the hardest way on October 7. Then Israel went out to a campaign that changed the Middle East, eliminated leaders, dismantled military systems, and struck its enemies with power not seen for years. Some of the promises became laws or policies on the ground. Others got stuck, were blocked, or lost relevance within a new security reality. And the problem with which Israel enters the next election campaign is not only the question of whether Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran are more deterred than they were in 2022. After almost three years of fighting, the question is also how much longer the army that is entrusted with this deterrence can continue to bear the burden.
