Dismantling the Iranian regime from the bottom up

Over the past three years, Israel has been working systematically to dismantle the "axis of evil" — in Iran, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. The central strategy chosen was to strike at the leadership of the organizations and regimes. Ali Khamenei, Hassan Nasrallah, and Ismail Haniyeh were removed from the decision-making circle, and in their place came replacements who are sometimes perceived as less charismatic and less experienced figures. However, in practice, they are not more moderate than their predecessors; they are highly motivated for revenge and continue to lead a radical ideological line.

Parallel to striking the leadership, Israel worked to destroy the military and operational infrastructure of Hamas and Hezbollah. These achievements were made possible thanks to the heroism of IDF soldiers and impressive intelligence and operational superiority. However, the experience in Gaza teaches that a military achievement alone does not guarantee long-term strategic change. In Gaza, no alternative governing mechanism was built, and no other Palestinian force was established that could challenge Hamas. As a result, the organization managed to rehabilitate a significant portion of its personnel and continue to control every area not held directly by the IDF. Even if it is a weakened Hamas, it still constitutes a significant governing factor, one that may force Israel to continue security activity for years.

In Lebanon, the picture is different. Israel chose to act through an arrangement with the government of Lebanon, and in parallel, the Lebanese army began to increase its activity in the south of the country. This is a complex and slow process that will require American and Israeli support over time. If it succeeds, it may undermine the status of Hezbollah and reduce its control over the country without needing a prolonged military confrontation.

In Iran, too, significant achievements were recorded. The strike on the top of the Revolutionary Guards and on military infrastructure revealed the possibility for deeper change. In parallel, reports surfaced about attempts to strengthen opposition elements, create leadership alternatives, and even train and arm groups from among the ethnic and political mosaic of Iranian society, with an emphasis on the Kurds. There was even a published attempt by the Mossad to install in place of the eliminated Ali Khamenei the former president, Ahmadinejad, who is considered more pragmatic on the nuclear issue, alongside being a conservative, a religious figure, and a Holocaust denier. However, as time passed since the end of the fighting, the regime managed to re-stabilize its control, and the opportunity to implement these moves gradually diminished.

Today, we are witnessing again a rise in regional tension, mainly around the Strait of Hormuz. Mutual threats are heard, forces are being concentrated, and limited attacks are recorded by the United States and by Iran, as part of an ongoing struggle over creating deterrence and influence. In parallel, US President Donald Trump continues to threaten to strike the regime's strategic infrastructure — electricity, oil, and gas facilities — out of an understanding that a blow to the Iranian economy could undermine its internal stability.

In my opinion, if the West indeed seeks to bring an end to the rule of the Iranian regime, it must examine a strategy different from the one tried so far. Instead of an attempt to topple the leadership from above, one must act gradually from below. This approach can be based on dividing Iran into geographical spaces. At each stage, the effort will focus on one area only: striking the regime's capabilities in that space, creating conditions that will allow the residents to revolt, and encouraging the establishment of an alternative local leadership. After such a leadership arises, the international community must grant it recognition, provide civil and security assistance, and help it establish effective governance.

Iran is a vast country, diverse in ethnic and geographical terms. An attempt to take it over or change its regime in one move is expected to fail. On the other hand, creating a sequence of areas where the regime loses its grip may create a cumulative process, at the end of which its power base will be eroded. The main lesson from recent years is that striking the leadership alone is not enough. Radical organizations and regimes know how to grow replacements, even if less charismatic. On the other hand, when they gradually lose their control over the population and the territory, their ability to rehabilitate is significantly impaired.

Colonel (res.) Doron Hadar, Commander of the General Staff Negotiation Team.