Arabs documented classified bases – the security establishment continued to employ them
For years, documentation of Arab contractors inside IDF bases has been published, raising questions regarding their presence alongside sensitive and classified facilities. This evening, we are exposing a series of investigations conducted at several IDF bases, which reveal a severe and worrying picture of deficiencies in information security.
For years, documentation of Arab contractors inside IDF bases has been published, raising questions regarding their presence alongside sensitive and classified facilities. This evening, we are exposing a series of investigations conducted at several IDF bases, which reveal a severe and worrying picture of deficiencies in information security.
As we exposed on News 14, an investigation at the Tel Nof Air Force base revealed that the base was completely exposed from an intelligence perspective to the Hamas terrorist organization. This was made possible, among other things, by Israeli citizens and workers operating in the vicinity of the base and inside it.
Following a series of severe findings, the Intelligence Directorate distributed instructions last month regarding the entry of contractors into IDF facilities. In one case, it was revealed that a Ministry of Defense waterproofing contractor was involved in severe offenses, including security breaches in five different incidents at IDF bases, including Hatzor, the Navy shipyard, Tel Nof, and Hatzerim.
One of the incidents occurred in August 2024 at the Hatzor Air Force base, considered one of the Air Force's strategic sites. According to the investigation, an employee of a subcontractor performing renovations was caught filming fighter jet takeoffs near the control tower.
It also emerged that the foreman managed workers who had not undergone security clearance. The workers entered the base without depositing their mobile phones, which contained active SIM cards. One worker entered using another visitor's tag, and his device was found to contain a gallery with photos of aircraft takeoffs, control tower operations, and other facilities.
Another worker was caught with an active mobile phone containing many photos from inside the base. The information security officer's investigation concluded that "it cannot be ruled out that the photos taken were transferred to other parties."
Only two months later, another severe incident occurred at the same base. Three contractor employees committed security offenses, with one impersonating another person after being denied entry. The three were caught at the exit, and it turned out they had removed the stickers from their mobile phones intended to prevent camera use and had taken classified photos at various sites.
At the end of October 2024, another incident occurred at the Navy base. A person was identified wandering freely and loading equipment into a contractor's vehicle. The investigation revealed he was trying to steal military equipment, and another worker who had not undergone security clearance was hiding in the vehicle.
Police were called to the scene, and a search revealed an accessory used to neutralize and jam electronic locks. Three forged entry permits were also found in the vehicle, intended for future use.
Despite the severity of the findings, the committee that discussed the case determined that the contractors would be suspended from future work and tenders. However, due to the urgency of the work and concerns regarding the base's functional continuity, it was decided to allow them to finish their work, exempting them from the security committee's decision.
Another incident was revealed in a surprise inspection conducted by the Ministry of Defense at the Tel Nof base on November 12, 2024. It turned out that a contractor previously caught for severe offenses had entered the base with workers who had not undergone security clearance, and they were wandering around freely.
It was also found that the Tel Nof base security officer sent an aerial photograph of a neighborhood on the base where fighter pilots and Air Force commanders live to one of the workers via WhatsApp. The photograph included the surnames of the residents in each apartment. In this case as well, the inspection determined that it was impossible to rule out the possibility that classified and sensitive materials were transferred to other parties.
Severe findings continued in 2025. On January 27, an unusual report was received at the Hatzerim base regarding contractor employees, previously caught for information security offenses, who were trying to purchase weapons from soldiers on the base for 30,000 shekels. The soldier immediately reported the incident, and the two were caught.
The materials we are exposing raise difficult questions regarding the conduct of the information security system in the IDF: have lessons been learned after almost three years of war from the exposure of bases to espionage by terrorist organizations, and do current procedures meet the required standard for protecting sensitive facilities?
