"Everyone wants to be king": The new appointment that may exacerbate tensions in Iran's leadership
World press headlines: Khamenei strengthens the hawkish wing in the leadership, which may lead to a confrontation with the Speaker of the Parliament; the UAE is considering building a facility for natural gas exports that would bypass Hormuz; and is it time for Israel to stop hiding its nuclear weapons? Globes presents a daily short review of interesting news from the world media about Israel.
About world press headlines
Against the backdrop of the constantly evolving security situation, the lens of the world media reveals unique perspectives on what is happening in the country. From analyses by international experts to small stories from Israel that disappear from view, every day we present a short daily review of what is written in the world media about Israel to decipher how things look overseas.
The articles presented in this section are taken from major newspapers around the world and do not necessarily reflect the worldview of Globes.
1. In Iran, the Revolutionary Guards are being strengthened: "The more hawkish wing is gaining power"
The appointment of Mohsen Rezaei as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in Iran may signal a further strengthening of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the decision-making center in Tehran, according to an analysis published in Middle East Online. The council, which he will head, brings together senior political and military officials and plays a central role in shaping Iran's foreign and security policy.
Rezaei, who commanded the IRGC for 16 years (1981–1997), is one of the most influential figures in the Iranian security establishment. He enters the position at a sensitive time, following months of confrontation with the USA and Israel, the collapse of understandings with Washington, and disagreements within the Iranian leadership on how to manage the ongoing confrontation and negotiations.
According to the analysis, the appointment also has significance in the power struggles within the Iranian elite. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, himself a former IRGC commander, leads contacts with the USA and has been criticized by hawkish elements for his support of the ceasefire agreement. Iran researcher Hamidreza Azizi estimated that the move might be an attempt by the Supreme Leader to prevent what he calls "excessive influence of Ghalibaf." According to him, the appointment of Rezaei "means that the more hawkish wing within the system is gaining the upper hand."
However, it is not certain that the change will automatically lead to a more aggressive policy towards Washington. Iranian security forces researcher Saeid Golkar warns against the intensification of competition at the top between two senior officials with political ambitions. According to him, "this setup will not work. Everyone wants to be king." Either way, placing one of the oldest IRGC commanders at the head of the body that centralizes the most sensitive security decisions highlights how much the organization continues to stand at the center of Iran's political and security system.
2. The UAE is looking for a way to bypass Hormuz with gas as well
The UAE is considering building a new facility for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) on the country's east coast, outside the Persian Gulf, in a way that will allow it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, according to Bloomberg. ADNOC Gas, the gas arm of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, is examining several options for building the facility, but a final decision has not yet been made. If the plan is implemented, it may become the first attempt by one of the major LNG exporters in the region to create an export route that does not depend on passing through the strait.
Bloomberg wrote that the move is part of the UAE's attempt "to reduce its dependence on the strait to zero." The war has illustrated how much Hormuz, through which a significant part of the Gulf states' energy exports passes, can turn from a geographical asset into a strategic vulnerability.
The urgency is clear: according to Bloomberg, three ADNOC tankers were attacked by missiles and drones last week, bringing to 15 the number of the company's vessels damaged since the beginning of the war. A new LNG facility on the east coast could cost billions of dollars and would likely require the construction of a pipeline to connect it to gas fields in the west of the country. At the same time, ADNOC Gas is already building a new LNG terminal in Ruwais, inside the Persian Gulf, which is supposed to more than double its export capacity to about 15 million tons per year, and is promoting additional investments of $8.2 billion to increase gas production.
3. Is it time for Israel to stop hiding its nuclear weapons?
Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, which has lasted for decades, may at some point stop serving its purpose and even weaken Israeli deterrence, according to an article published by Prof. Louis René Beres in Modern Diplomacy.
He argues that the mere assumption that Israel has nuclear weapons is not enough to produce credible deterrence: rivals must also be convinced that Israeli capabilities will survive a first strike, be able to penetrate their defense systems, and above all that Israel will be prepared to use them in extreme circumstances. Therefore, he suggests a gradual transition from "deliberate nuclear ambiguity" to a policy of "selective nuclear disclosure." The intention is not a full declaration of the Israeli arsenal, but a calculated disclosure of certain details about Israel's deterrence capabilities and doctrine, with the aim of reducing the risk that an enemy will err in assessing its ability or willingness to respond.
Beres presents a series of situations in which the nuclear arsenal might be relevant to Israel's security: from deterring a large-scale conventional attack to backing a conventional preemptive strike and the "Samson option" in an extreme case. However, he emphasizes that the main role of nuclear weapons should be to prevent war and not to use them on the battlefield. He writes that "the only reasonable use of nuclear weapons could be as a controlled component of deterrence, never as a weapon of war."
