Alarm Signal: The Concept Strikes Back, This Time in Syria
This is not just an opinion piece about the future of the Golan Heights, but a strategic warning. Israel is following a political course that leads to the loss of sovereignty, ignoring Syria's real plans.
This is not another opinion piece about the future of the Golan Heights. In the language of the defense establishment, it should be called a "strategic warning." It is not a forecast that tomorrow morning negotiations will begin on an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, but a pointing out of a process that has already begun on this front, a political course that Israel is walking blindly.
Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara said this week to Al Jazeera things that must not be mistaken:
"We are avoiding a confrontation with Israel, as we have no interest in it. We are working to reach a security agreement with Israel with the participation of a group of countries. If the security agreement with Israel succeeds, it will pave the way for a comprehensive peace without giving up Syria's right to the occupied Golan."
Al-Shara's words summarize an orderly Syrian process that has been underway for a year and a half, backed by Turkey and Qatar. The Syrians are advancing according to a clear plan, the beginning of which is the unification of the Syrian state, and the end of which is heavy international pressure to get Israel off the Golan. Israel stands before this move like a cat frozen in the headlights of a truck about to run it over in the darkness of night. Al-Shara hid nothing. He also presented the timing — a two-stage outline: first, a security agreement that will distance the danger of confrontation, help stabilize his rule, and open the gates of the West to Syria, and later — a comprehensive peace including a descent from the Golan.
We've been in this movie before
The Israeli conception is hitting us again: it does not hide the information, but filters it. It adopts what fits the basic assumption and neutralizes what undermines it. In December 2022, less than ten months before October 7, Yahya Sinwar said explicitly: "We will come to you, with Allah's help, in a roaring flood... with endless rockets... and with a boundless flood of soldiers." The things were said publicly, but Israel clung to signs of restraint, to regulation and economic interests, and read his threats as bragging that would not translate into practical intent. It preferred to wait rather than act.
This time, too, the leadership is listening only to the convenient half of al-Shara's words, and is sealing its ears to the statement about the Golan. Reality will force it to listen to the other half, at the time and under the conditions that Syria will choose.
Al-Shara is weak today. Syria is destroyed, his regime needs legitimacy, aid, the removal of restrictions, and American protection. Precisely for this reason, he is asking for a security agreement now. But Syria's current weakness does not indicate a future concession. Israel is closing its eyes wide, continuing to let al-Shara establish himself and waiting for the Syrian side to bring the Golan issue to the table at a time convenient for it. After all, the end is known in advance: the issue will be raised when Syria is ready, and when the unbearable international pressure matures into the ability to crush Israeli resistance.
The time to raise the question of Israel's sovereignty on the Golan was with the fall of Assad, when the new regime begged for recognition, when Washington held unprecedented leverage in its hands, and when Israel enjoyed regional superiority and American backing. That was the moment to condition international recognition of the new regime on Syrian recognition of Israel's sovereignty on the Golan. Instead, we settled for a temporary military hold on the Hermon ridge and a buffer zone — tactical thinking to the end of the sight range, instead of shaping the map for generations.
A security agreement that does not decide the border question will not freeze the dispute — it will freeze Israel's advantage. Syria will receive time, stability, and legitimacy. Israel will receive quiet, promises, and side letters. In the second stage, the full deal will be presented: withdrawal from the Golan in exchange for peace, demilitarization, American guarantees, regulation with Lebanon and Turkey, a land axis to Europe, a regional alliance against Iran, and of course — "hummus in Damascus." Then the familiar change in the position of the defense establishment, the media, and public opinion will also begin. What seems impossible today will be presented tomorrow as a strategic necessity and a historic opportunity.
In the early 90s, the Golan was perceived as an Israeli consensus, but within a short time, this consensus collapsed. Generals, statesmen, and opinion leaders explained how early warning systems, demilitarization, and international guarantees could replace the mountain itself. Such a mechanism will work again, this time with greater force.
It is possible that the final agreement will be signed on the watch of a different leadership, but the responsibility for it will also be on those who are laying the track today, and especially choosing to do nothing. Four Israeli prime ministers have already conducted negotiations in the past on descending from the Golan. Those who believe that the current consensus is an eternal insurance policy are not reading Israeli history correctly.
Even American recognition of Israel's sovereignty on the Golan is not the final word. It relies on a presidential letter that is not legislation, and in the international system, it has no partners. Israel failed when it could have joined countries like Argentina, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to recognize Israeli sovereignty on the Golan, in parallel with recognizing the al-Shara regime. What was given in one American presidential decision is liable to be eroded or overturned by another decision, especially when it is presented as the last barrier to a regional peace agreement.
The first condition
Therefore, Israel's sovereignty on the Golan must be the first issue in any negotiation with Syria, not the last. One must not grant the Syrians the full rewards of a security agreement and leave the Golan question as a deposit for a time of peace. At the same time, American recognition must be anchored in legislation, international recognition must be expanded, settlement on the Golan must be doubled, and the naturalization of the Druze on the Golan and their integration into the Israeli system must be completed.
This is a true alarm. An intelligence warning must be placed on the table of decision-makers even before the matter is visible to everyone. The role of a warning is to be heard precisely when the threat is not yet tangible, when the price has not yet been paid, and when it is still possible to change the course. The test of the defense establishment is today — and not when the tsunami is visible to everyone from the shore.
