IDF Investigation Details Systemic Failures and Heroism at Paga Post on October 7
An official IDF investigation reveals systemic readiness failures and tactical breakdowns during the October 7 attack on the Paga military post near Be'eri, resulting in 18 deaths and two abductions amid fierce combat.
Nearly three years after the October 7 surprise attack, the detailed operational investigation into the fall of the Paga military post was presented to families who lost their loved ones in battle. The investigation, which was also presented to the IDF Chief of Staff, was conducted by Colonel Uri Ron, Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Tzachi Arouati, and other team members. Collecting testimonies, communication recordings, video documentation, and investigation products over 10 months, the report unequivocally determines that the IDF failed in its defense mission, failing to prevent the fall and capture of the post as well as the infiltration of terrorists into Kibbutz Be'eri. During the brutal attack on the area, 18 commanders and fighters fell, 22 were wounded, and two additional soldiers were abducted to the Gaza Strip.
Systemic Readiness Failures and Tactical Breakdown
The investigation indicates that the battle results reflect a systemic failure in readiness for a wide-scale surprise attack and in exercising the responsibility to defend the sector. At the tactical level, the company combat team from the 13th Battalion of the Golani Brigade was insufficiently prepared for the mission in terms of combat equipment, the operational readiness of combat positions, and outpost infrastructure. The mindset prevailing until that morning, which relied primarily on dealing with riots at the fence, led to a lack of preparation and drills suited for a massive enemy invasion scenario.
With the start of the attack, Hamas targeted sector intelligence-gathering means and neutralized force multipliers, while key commanders fell early on, including the post commander and mortar platoon sergeant, severely impacting combat management while the company commander failed to reach the sector. Furthermore, most Air Force airstrikes were insufficiently effective due to gaps in coordination with ground forces.
Chronology of the Battle and Heroic Resistance
The timeline revealed by the investigation shows that "dawn alertness" was performed as required on the morning of the event. With massive firing starting at 06:29, fighters entered the fortified dining room designated as a collection point. Tanks sent to seize positions at the fence engaged the enemy, with the tank of Sergeant Shay Levinson (Z"L) eliminating ten terrorists, but the tanks were hit by anti-tank missiles and a drone-dropped explosive.
"The investigation unequivocally determines that the IDF failed in its defense mission, failing to prevent the fall and capture of the post and the infiltration into Kibbutz Be'eri."
At 06:55, nine terrorists infiltrated the Paga post through the armored vehicle gate and split into squads attacking the mortar compound and outpost openings. Fighters in the mortar compound engaged in a fierce hand-to-hand combat where four terrorists were killed, but sustained heavy casualties. The post commander, who assumed command, reinforced positions and coped with a severe shortage of weapons and full equipment.
At 07:49, the post commander and fighters went out to retrieve an anti-tank missile to neutralize a sniper in the pillbox, and under grenade fire and shooting from Nahal Oz hill, fighters were killed and wounded. An attempt to rescue the wounded from the dining room using a Namer armored vehicle at 09:34 failed after a terrorist attached an explosive to the vehicle's rear door and a firing slit malfunction prevented the force from neutralizing it.
At 10:35, the post commander was killed alongside his radio operator while engaging and eliminating terrorists at the gate. The platoon sergeant managed to break contact with the company commander's permission alongside some fighters and join the Namer in the orchards, while fighters remaining in the dining room fortified the openings and fought desperately.
Rescue Operations and Final Toll
At 13:00, terrorists set fire to both sides of the dining room, and fighters began suffocating from smoke. Five fighters made the brave decision to exit the burning kitchen to fight terrorists outside, and all fell in battle. Only between 16:20 and 16:50 did rescue forces from the Counter-Terrorism Unit (LOTAR) and Golani officers arrive at the post, clearing the site and evacuating the wounded and fallen. In the evening, an anti-tank missile was fired at the rescue convoy, causing the loss of another soldier.
The summary of the investigation emphasizes that given the data on that Saturday, IDF forces were expected to produce a different reality and defeat the terrorists who raided the outposts, as force readiness did not align with the defense mission. However, alongside the systemic failure, it was noted that extraordinary acts of heroism, camaraderie, and drive to engage by fighters and junior commanders stood out as they fought in an operational reality ranging from complex to impossible.
