Neither technology nor money: what is Israel still missing in the face of the drone threat? | Listen

They are small, cheap, simple to operate, and produced in huge quantities. In recent years, it has become clear that they pose a strategic threat capable of changing the face of the campaign. How prepared is Israel for the drone threat, and what is required to deal with a mass attack?

In the 50th episode of the "Al Ze" ("About This") podcast, the guest is Brigadier General (Res.) Ran (Rancho) Kochav, former commander of the Air Defense Array. He explains why drones pose a challenge to security systems different from anything they have known until today, and why the solution cannot be based only on expensive and advanced systems.

"The threat is small, simple, cheap, and massive. In the end, the world of drones deals with very small devices, powered by an electric motor and operated remotely by all sorts of means," explains Kochav. "This threat does not require a runway, it takes off vertically, and any child at bar mitzvah age can learn to fly it relatively easily. It is very simple to operate, very cheap, and can be massive."

The detection challenge

Kochav demonstrates the magnitude of the threat using one of the most prominent events in the war between Russia and Ukraine. "If you want to illustrate the civilian threat, you need to look at the 'Spider Web' operation that the Ukrainians carried out inside Russia, where drones attacked strategic civilian aircraft at airports and caused great damage."

So how do you deal with a threat that is difficult to detect, can be operated with almost no training, and can be produced in huge numbers? According to Kochav, one of the key components is creating a clearer picture of the drones in the skies of Israel.

"There is a national drone project for licensing and regulation of drone aviation in the State of Israel. In the not-too-distant future, if you want to fly a drone above a certain height, you will need to register it just like cars or electric bicycles are registered today. Once the drone goes above a certain height, it will need to report to the authorities. Through this mechanism, we will be able to get a better picture of what the enemy wants."

But even when it is known that a threat exists, you still need to be able to locate it. Here lies one of the main challenges: existing detection systems were largely developed to deal with much larger and faster threats.

"In the end, such drones are very small, fly at a very low altitude, and it is very difficult to detect them. Our regular radars do not know how to detect this thing, because they are aimed at looking for a passenger plane or a fighter jet, and not a drone the size of a table," notes Kochav.

The interception challenge

From here comes the next challenge: not only to detect the drone, but also to make a quick decision on how to deal with it.

"The challenge is first of all in detection, and then in the decision whether to intercept the threat or not. This is actually classic air defense, only at much smaller resolutions. There are a great many tasks, and you have to make a decision where you deploy your more advanced detection systems."

What happens after the drone is detected? The options are many, but according to Kochav, there is still no one solution that provides a full answer to the threat.

"The interception is carried out in several ways: by a fighter jet, a combat helicopter, a classic air defense battery, or by electronic means. There are all sorts of tricks for interception today, and plenty of patents, but at the end of the day, the complete answer is still missing, we haven't found the 'trick patent' yet."

The integration challenge

Israel is not necessarily far from a solution, but the technological ability to deal with drones requires connecting all capabilities and operating them in volumes that match the threat.

"The technological solution exists. It is possible to detect drones in all sorts of ways, it is possible to intercept them in all sorts of ways. In my opinion, some integration between all these components is missing."

According to him, the budget is not necessarily the bottleneck. The real challenge is both economic and operational: when the enemy can operate hundreds and thousands of cheap drones, the defense system must also be able to deal with the quantity.

"It's not a matter of money, because the Israeli government recently transferred two billion shekels for this subject. It's also not a matter of technology or engineering. The problem is in the scale and massiveness of the drones. Just as the threat is massive, so the response must be massive. You need a lot of them, and therefore the response must be cheap. You can't buy an advanced radar for millions and settle for that. This is not a correct economic war. On the other hand, there is no price for human life."

Israel is closely following the experience gained in the war in Ukraine, which has become a huge testing laboratory for drones.

"It is customary to criticize Israel and say that we learned nothing. But I can reveal that even in my time as commander of the Air Defense Array, there were proposals for cooperation with Russia and Ukraine, and in many places we learned - even during their war."

The sensitivity challenge

In the end, the question is not only who manages to intercept more drones, but also what is the price a country is willing to pay to protect its citizens and its infrastructure.

"I don't think the interception percentages of the Russians or the Ukrainians are dramatically better than our percentages. Their sensitivity to human life and infrastructure is smaller than ours. With us, it is very high, and rightly so," concludes Kochav.