When a country exports a nuclear reactor, it builds a long-term strategic partnership
Exporting nuclear reactors is not just an infrastructure deal, but a tool for geopolitical influence. The supplier secures technological and political ties for decades to come.
At first glance, a nuclear power plant looks like just another infrastructure project: the country needs electricity, a company builds a reactor, and power flows into the grid. However, in the nuclear world, the deal does not end with connecting the station to the grid. The supplying country often remains involved for decades through fuel supply, engineer training, maintenance, and spent fuel management. This is why the current race to build reactors is a geopolitical struggle.
Currently, 77 reactors are under construction, with about 120 more in planning. Growth is concentrated in Asia and nations seeking to build their first reactors or expand existing programs. For the USA, Russia, and China, every reactor sold is an opportunity to lock in technological, financial, and political relationships for a generation.
Strategic Significance
A recent example is Saudi Arabia. On July 22, Washington and Riyadh signed a "123 Agreement" for civil nuclear cooperation. The US Department of Energy defined it as a "basis for a partnership of decades worth billions of dollars," emphasizing the goal of strengthening US competitive standing. Behind the commercial language lies a strategic choice: if the US does not provide the technology, Russia, China, or South Korea will.
Moscow has turned nuclear exports into a key tool of influence. By the end of 2025, Rosatom had agreements to build 22 reactors in seven countries.
The Risk of "Latent Capability"
A power plant itself is not a nuclear bomb. The risk lies in the fuel cycle. Uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing can bring a country closer to producing fissile material for weapons. Thus, the issue in Saudi Arabia is not just about building a reactor, but about what additional capabilities the kingdom might gain.
The 2009 US-UAE agreement was considered the "gold standard" because Abu Dhabi renounced enrichment and reprocessing. This is critical in the Middle East, given Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s statements that Saudi Arabia would seek nuclear weapons if Iran does so.
Models of Dependency
The Russian model, prominent in Turkey’s Akkuyu plant, follows a Build-Own-Operate structure. This creates a deep dependency, unlike gas or oil; changing a nuclear supplier is extremely difficult due to licensing, fuel adaptation, and training requirements.
China, while trailing Russia in export numbers, offers comprehensive packages including credit, construction, fuel, and training. When these packages come from state-owned companies, the line between commerce and foreign policy blurs. The problem is the concentration of knowledge and funding in the hands of a single supplier. The deeper the dependency, the higher the cost of political confrontation with that power.
