The hegemony is over: Russia clings to its last foothold in Syria

Russia has lost its hegemonic status in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime, but it is not abandoning the country. Recent developments point to a change in the model of the Russian presence: from bases under independent control and broad military deployment to a more limited presence, subject to Syrian sovereignty and based on training, cooperation, and economic-technical dependence.

According to an Alma Center report from May 2022, on the eve of the war in Ukraine, the Russian force in Syria numbered about 10,000 soldiers. They were deployed at two main bases — the Hmeimim airbase and the naval base in Tartus — as well as at smaller bases and field posts throughout the country.

The force included air, sea, air defense, intelligence, armor, infantry, engineering, special forces, and military police components. Hmeimim served as a hub for Russian air power operations and the headquarters for coordination with Israel, while Tartus provided Russia with a strategic maritime anchor in the eastern Mediterranean and a logistics and intelligence center.

The presence relied on long-term lease agreements that gave Moscow extensive control over the facilities. It allowed Russia to protect the Assad regime, influence Syrian force buildup, and compete with Iran for power centers in the country. On the other hand, the deployment of Russian forces near Iranian targets limited Israeli freedom of action and required the operation of a coordination mechanism to prevent friction.

Already after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there were signs of a certain reduction in force and the transfer of soldiers and attention to the Ukrainian theater. However, the Alma Center's assessment was that Russia would continue to view Syria as a strategic asset and would not give it up.

The situation after the fall of the regime

A Washington Institute analysis published on July 27 determined that Russia had lost its hegemonic status in Syria, but its adaptation to the new reality was rapid. Russia seeks to remain one of several players competing for influence in Syria, but it is no longer the dominant military and political patron of the government.

The new Syrian leadership is moving closer to the United States and the West, but is not interested in a complete break with Russia. Russia still holds significant assets: veto power in the Security Council, wheat and energy supplies, the ability to maintain Russian and Soviet military equipment, and ties in the currency and phosphate sectors. Furthermore, the new Syrian government inherited a debt of about $1.2 billion to Russia.

Despite this, Syria is working to reduce dependence. It is exploring alternatives for printing currency in the UAE and Germany, and according to another report, has agreed to drastically reduce the import of Russian crude oil as part of its talks with the United States on lifting the remaining sanctions. This move may weaken a key Russian leverage, but it could also create an energy shortage in Syria if an alternative source is not found.

The new arrangement in Hmeimim and Tartus

The most significant development was reported on August 9: according to a statement by the Syrian Foreign Ministry, Damascus and Moscow reached an agreement regarding the future of the Russian military facilities in Hmeimim and Tartus.

Civilian infrastructure, including the airport in Hmeimim and the commercial maritime pier in Tartus, will be gradually transferred to the management of the Syrian government. The military facilities will be converted into joint training and instruction centers. In addition, the Syrian Civil Aviation Authority has already received from Russia the Latakia International Airport located in the Hmeimim complex and has begun working to make it operational for civilian flights. The process is expected to be completed within three months.

If the agreement is fully implemented, it is a fundamental change compared to the Assad era: Russia is losing exclusive control over strategic infrastructure, but is maintaining a certain military and professional foothold through joint training mechanisms. This was reported by the Presidential Administration of Russia on January 28, 2026.

Assessment of the situation

This is not a full Russian withdrawal but a change in the method of operation. Russia is moving from an independent military presence, relying on bases under its control, to a model reminiscent of a security partnership with the host country. This model is cheaper, less exposed to political pressure, and allows it to maintain physical access in Syria.

On the ground, the balance of power has shifted in favor of Syria. During the Assad era, the lease agreements granted Russia long-term control over the facilities without significant compensation. The new arrangement, by contrast, restores control over civilian infrastructure to the Syrian government and reduces Russian autonomy. Damascus is not cutting ties, but is using the rapprochement with the West to improve its terms vis-à-vis Moscow.

The focus of Russian influence is shifting from direct use of force to institutional dependence in force buildup. Maintenance of weaponry, training of the army, supply of spare parts, and ties with the Syrian officer corps may become more important tools than the number of soldiers or aircraft on the ground. The reduction of Russian oil imports is the central test. If Syria succeeds in finding alternative suppliers and funding sources, an important Russian lever will weaken. If the alternatives are not sufficient, energy dependence may continue even alongside the rapprochement with the West.

From Israel's perspective, a possible reduction in the risk of direct friction with Russian forces is emerging. Moving from operational facilities under Russian control to joint training centers may reduce the coordination limitations that previously affected Israel's activity in Syria. However, the presence of instructors, Russian systems, and intelligence ties requires re-examining the friction prevention mechanisms rather than assuming they have become redundant.

Russia of the Assad era was a dominant military power, with autonomous bases and the ability to directly influence the Syrian arena. Russia after the fall of the Assad regime is emerging as a more limited player: it is losing control over infrastructure and Syrian policy, but is maintaining influence through military training, weapons maintenance, economic ties, and its international status.

The new arrangement does not signal the end of the Russian presence in Syria, but rather its transformation from the presence of a regime-protecting power to a conditional, joint, and negotiable presence.