AI simulator reveals: What are the conditions for defeating Iran — and at what price
The simulator, developed by Avner Vilan, a former senior security official and expert on Iran, pointed to a path where Iran retreats from its demands. The decisive variable is not the extent of the damage, but who convinces their opponent that they are willing to pay a high price over time. However, the conditions for this, including a campaign without a time limit, could cost too much for the White House and the Gulf states.
The campaign against Iran has once again demonstrated one of the central limitations of American and Israeli power: the ability to inflict heavy damage on Iran is not equivalent to the ability to force it to surrender. Even after sustaining significant hits, the regime in Tehran remains stable and is not rushing to wave a white flag, certainly not on issues it perceives as vital to its security, its regional status, and its force buildup.
A test conducted using a new strategic simulator based on artificial intelligence, developed by Avner Vilan, a former senior security official and expert on Iran, apparently points to a path that could change the equation. However, the price it sets before the US and its allies is extremely high, and it is possible that it is higher than they are willing to pay.
The simulator starts from a detailed world situation, built on the basis of deep familiarity with the arena and existing research, where every player has goals, constraints, partial information, and operating assumptions. It does not pretend to predict the future, but to serve as a kind of thinking laboratory that allows challenging basic assumptions, running alternatives, and reducing the risk of a failure of imagination.
The stalemate between Washington and Tehran does not stem only from the gaps in the parties' positions. It also stems from the way Iran evaluates the limits of American willingness to use force.
The American fear of broad escalation is understandable. A prolonged confrontation could lead to severe damage to energy infrastructure in the Middle East, shocks to the markets, damage to Washington's allies, and even an expansion of the war. Moreover, there is no certainty that even such a heavy price will bring Iran to surrender.
Strategic limbo
On the other hand, Washington cannot grant Tehran all its demands, certainly on strategic issues like freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian force buildup. The result is strategic limbo: the US is not willing to pay the price involved in applying unlimited pressure, and Iran does not believe that the pressure applied to it obligates it to give up its basic assets.
In an attempt to examine how the stalemate can be broken, this dilemma was fed into the simulator. In one of the scenarios, Iran reached a point where it is willing to retreat from a significant portion of its demands. However, this result was made possible only when several particularly difficult conditions were met simultaneously.
-
A broad and continuous campaign is required against infrastructure and strategic assets in Iran. This means American willingness to continue applying pressure even when Iran responds by damaging energy infrastructure and the interests of the US and the Gulf states. In other words, the ability to inflict damage is not enough; a willingness to absorb damage is also required.
-
The campaign cannot be conducted under a stopwatch. According to the logic that emerges from the simulation, Tehran needs to be convinced that the pressure is not a short episode that will end when the political or economic price in Washington rises. The strategic message must be that the campaign will continue as long as Iran does not change its conduct. This is perhaps the most important condition: Iran needs to believe that the US has more patience than it does.
-
Alongside the stick, a ladder must also appear. Pressure alone is not enough. To allow Tehran to retreat, a mechanism for an honorable exit is required, meaning a path that allows the regime to present the end of the confrontation as an arrangement and not as a total surrender. The scenario assumes American willingness to accept some of the Iranian demands, precisely to allow Tehran to give up other basic demands without admitting defeat.
-
The Gulf states must be part of the equation. If the Iranian counter-reaction includes damage to regional energy infrastructure, this price cannot be treated as an external variable. The US will be required to reach understandings with its partners in the region, or at the very least to accept in advance the possibility that they will pay a significant part of the campaign's price.
And this is exactly the point where the scenario turns from theoretically interesting to very problematic practically. The price might be too high. Are the US and the Gulf states really willing to absorb severe and continuous damage to energy infrastructure, a possible jump in oil prices, and regional turmoil, just to bring about a deep change in Iranian behavior? The simulator does not have a full answer to this question.
Variables that are hard to predict
There are also variables that are very hard to predict. Military pressure might bring surrender, but it might just as well arouse rallying around the flag. A severe blow to a country might weaken the regime, but also strengthen its legitimacy. A campaign intended to be limited might expand to additional arenas and give birth to reactions that none of the parties planned in advance.
Therefore, the results of the simulation should not be seen as a forecast, and certainly not as an operational recommendation. The simulator depends on the information it relies on, the assumptions fed into it, and the way it models human and state behavior, behavior that is never fully predictable. But precisely here lies its contribution.
The central lesson that emerges from the exercise is not that more force must necessarily be applied against Iran. It is deeper: the decisive question in negotiations under threat is not only how much damage each side is capable of causing, but who convinces their opponent that they are willing to pay a higher price over time.
As long as Tehran evaluates that Washington fears escalation more than it itself fears the continuation of pressure, it has no reason to rush and give up its strategic assets. According to the simulator, only when this assumption is reversed, when the Iranian leadership is convinced that the pressure will continue regardless of the price it is capable of exacting, does a real space open for significant concessions. And even then, it is required to offer it a way to retreat without appearing as someone who surrendered.
The conclusion is not that Iran will necessarily "wave a white flag." In fact, it is much more likely that even under extreme pressure it will try to frame any compromise as an achievement. But if one wants to bring it to the moment equivalent for it to "drinking the cup of poison," a military threat or another round of strikes is not enough. Tehran needs to be convinced that the alternative to an agreement is not a return to the status quo but a campaign that its opponents are willing to continue for longer than it is capable of bearing. And this is exactly the condition that it is doubtful whether the US and its allies are willing, or able, to fulfill.
Thanks to Avner Vilan for the opportunity to make use of the strategic simulator he developed.
