Trump's Trap: Iran is wearing down, China is waiting
Donald Trump's desire to reach an arrangement with Tehran stems not only from fears of high fuel prices or political pressure at home. It reflects a broader strategic dilemma: how long can the United States continue to invest forces, munitions, and attention in a war with Iran without harming its ability to deter the adversary it defines as the primary challenge — China.
60 days have passed since the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran was set, and instead of a permanent agreement, the situation is almost the opposite of what Donald Trump sought to create when he adopted the framework. Contacts are not progressing, the Strait of Hormuz is again at the center of the confrontation, and the possibility of further escalation remains real. The memorandum, intended to allow for understandings to be reached within 60 days on difficult issues, primarily the nuclear program and sanctions, did not achieve its goals. But it would be simplistic to see this as just another failure of Donald Trump or further evidence of zigzags in his conduct. The 60 days that have passed point to a deeper change: the American goal itself is shrinking.
In June, Donald Trump sought to turn the military achievements of the United States and Israel into a broad arrangement that would end the campaign, open the Strait of Hormuz, and pave the way for a settlement on the nuclear issue. Today, it seems that the immediate goal is much more modest — to restore freedom of navigation, stop the deterioration, and create conditions that will allow for a return to negotiations. The fact that the latest contacts focused again on the Strait of Hormuz, on an issue that was supposed to have been resolved within the framework of the memorandum, illustrates the retreat in ambitions.
The Paradox of Attrition
The gap between aspirations and reality is particularly prominent in the Strait of Hormuz. Despite months of military and economic pressure, Iran continues to hold the strait as a significant lever. Traffic in it is still very limited, and the fear of damage to energy supplies continues to affect oil prices. The paradox is clear: the United States is immeasurably stronger than Iran, but Iran does not have to defeat the United States. From Tehran's perspective, it is enough that it succeeds in preventing Donald Trump from achieving the quick end and the victory picture he sought.
As the campaign drags on, the costs that Washington is required to pay also rise — in energy prices, in the attrition of forces, in the consumption of munitions, and in the burden placed on the American military. Iran can choose a move that will return escalation to center stage, placing Donald Trump before a difficult dilemma: to refrain and risk the deterrence he sought to build, or to respond with force and deepen the very campaign from which he seeks to escape.
China as the Primary Challenge
The administration's defense strategy defines the deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific as a central task. However, the need to continue maintaining a significant military array in the Middle East makes it difficult for the Pentagon to realize the priorities it set for itself. The price of the war in Iran is no longer measured only in the Middle East; it also takes a toll on the United States' readiness against China.
The most prominent example is the aircraft carrier George Washington, which was sent west to replace the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East, leaving the Western Pacific, at least temporarily, without an American aircraft carrier. Furthermore, the campaign has consumed large quantities of missiles and interceptors, some of which are vital for a scenario of confrontation with China. American assessments warn that the attrition in stocks creates a risk to readiness in the event of a crisis in the Western Pacific and that replenishing some of the stocks will take years.
From Israel's perspective, the significance goes beyond the negotiations with Iran. As the administration seeks to stabilize the Gulf and reduce the burden on its forces, its sensitivity to escalation on other fronts is expected to increase. Israel may encounter increasing American pressure for restraint, as the administration examines every regional development through the prism of its impact on the effort to end the crisis with Iran. 60 days later, the lesson is clear: Donald Trump must find a way to prevent the confrontation from turning into an open and prolonged war, or risk failing to divert resources to his primary strategic challenge: China.
Colonel (Ret.) Eldad Shavit is a senior researcher at the US program at INSS, former head of the research division at the Mossad and assistant for assessment to the head of the research division at Aman.
