Hezbollah's economy of fear within the Shiite community
It operates not through uniform and continuous use of force, but by creating a hierarchy of costs and instilling the knowledge that they may be applied. Its goal is not only to silence existing voices, but to prevent in advance the formation of political, religious, and social centers of authority that could compete with Hezbollah for the right to speak on behalf of the Shiite community.
One of the central components of Hezbollah's power within the Shiite community in Lebanon does not rely specifically on the direct use of force, but on the ability to generate, over time, a clear awareness of cost. Those who criticize the organization do not always know what response will be activated against them, but they know that criticism may have consequences: damage to public standing, professional exclusion, economic pressure, threats to family members, surveillance, interrogation, and sometimes even violence. In this sense, Hezbollah manages within its Shiite environment a kind of "economy of fear," where the very existence of a potential threat reduces the space for action even without the threat being realized each time anew.
The mechanism usually begins with delegitimization. Political criticism is presented not as a legitimate internal dispute, but as an expression of loyalty to foreign elements. The nickname "Shiites of the Embassy," which became common after the publication of WikiLeaks documents in 2011, is a clear example of this. Initially, it was directed at Shiite figures who met with American representatives, but later it was expanded to include those whose very criticism of Hezbollah was enough to place them outside the boundaries of the consensus. Thus, the equation is established whereby the very opposition to the organization is perceived as a deviation from loyalty to the community, the state, or the "resistance" itself.
However, the labeling does not stand on its own. Its power stems from the possibility that it will be translated into a real price. Over the years, independent candidates, journalists, clerics, and Shiite activists have described smear campaigns, threats, damage to workplaces, pressure on business owners, and surveillance of them and their family members. In other cases, state mechanisms were also used through summons for interrogation, arrests, or accusations of collaboration with Israel. In such a reality, the line between party power and institutional power becomes blurred, and the critic must take into account not only the reaction of Hezbollah itself, but also the political and social environment operating under its influence.
The effect of this system goes far beyond the people who were actually harmed. When one family is boycotted, one journalist is threatened, or one candidate is attacked, the message is received by others as well. Therefore, the power of the deterrence mechanism is measured not only by the number of violent incidents, but by its ability to generate self-censorship and turn the very decision to voice criticism into a cost-benefit calculation.
The case of Lokman Slim well illustrates the boundaries of this space. Slim did not settle for public criticism of Hezbollah, but worked to create an independent Shiite space outside the frameworks of Hezbollah and Amal, and explicitly criticized the organization's monopoly on representing the community. His murder in February 2021 became an event with much broader significance than the private case itself. For many Shiite critics, it illustrated the possible price of an attempt to turn scattered criticism into an organized alternative.
This is how the economy of fear works: not through uniform and continuous use of force, but by creating a hierarchy of costs and instilling the knowledge that they may be applied. Its goal is not only to silence existing voices, but to prevent in advance the formation of political, religious, and social centers of authority that could compete with Hezbollah for the right to speak on behalf of the Shiite community.
Dr. Noa Rivann is a researcher of Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Shiite theology. A research fellow at the Mecarc Institute and a lecturer at Ariel University.
