The Hamas Disarmament Deal is an Opportunity. Here is How to Use It

We have appeared together before the UN Security Council. Both of us, a Palestinian and an Israeli, presented a simple message: Hamas must be disarmed, an international stabilization force must be deployed in the Gaza Strip, and confidence-building measures must be promoted to distance both peoples from the ongoing cycle of war. Neither side can achieve true security as long as the other side lives in insecurity.

The announcement that Hamas has accepted a roadmap for its disarmament creates the most significant window of opportunity to date to test whether this concept can indeed be realized. This is a political achievement that deserves recognition. President Donald Trump's 20-point plan provided the framework, the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey led a complex mediation process, and the Peace Council managed to keep the negotiations alive despite long months of distrust. Now the real challenge lies ahead: will Israel also accept the roadmap, and will both sides fulfill their commitments? The success of the move will depend on the ability to turn commitments into verifiable actions, instead of allowing disagreements over schedules to paralyze the process.

Continuing the first mistake would be to treat disarmament as a one-time event that ends with a symbolic ceremony. In all historical examples of the disarmament of armed organizations, it was a long, complex, and multidimensional process — political, security, and economic — and not just an operation to collect weapons. In Northern Ireland, disarmament lasted for years and succeeded because an independent international commission created a reliable mechanism that allowed all parties to present the process as a success. In Colombia, the handover of weapons was carried out gradually, under UN supervision, alongside transitional arrangements and the reintegration of combatants into civilian and political life. In Kosovo, the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army were synchronized through an international security presence. The lesson is not that these models should be copied, but that every irreversible step requires coordination between all parties, reliable guarantees, and an effective monitoring and verification mechanism.

Safe surrender routes, security screening, rehabilitation, education, employment, and reintegration are not a reward for terror — they are a condition for preventing its return. Legitimate governing institutions must replace the sources of income, services, and protection that armed organizations have provided until now. Therefore, milestones are more important than dates. A serious verification mechanism must define what constitutes compliance with commitments, establish procedures for collecting and storing weapons, and also monitor the neutralization of tunnels, weapons production capabilities, illegal funding sources, and smuggling routes. At the same time, rapid mechanisms must be established to investigate incidents, resolve disputes, and address violations.

It would be a mistake to ignore the future of thousands of Hamas members after they lay down their arms. Commanders and those responsible for war crimes must be brought to justice. However, low-level operatives willing to abandon violence, as well as civilian workers forced to serve the Hamas regime, need an alternative. Any reintegration must be individual, controlled, and subject to unified civilian authority — and not become a new framework that effectively preserves the power of armed organizations. The National Committee for the Management of Gaza and the international stabilization force must be allowed to start operating quickly. Their legitimacy will not be determined by their name, their founders, or the mandate given to them, but by their ability to provide security, services, and results on the ground.

Civil reconstruction and Israeli security are not competing goals — each is a condition for the success of the other. The International Stabilization Force (ISF) must enjoy significant civilian, police, and military capabilities. It must operate under a clear mandate, within defined limits of authority, and be able to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian access, and monitor the implementation of security arrangements. This is a temporary mission. It must be based on clear goals and planned in advance so that responsibility is transferred as soon as possible to legitimate Palestinian institutions. As much international involvement as possible, as much Palestinian as possible. Any force perceived as a new occupation, even if well-equipped, is doomed to failure.

Regional involvement must move from statements to practical support. The United States and the mediating countries must continue to serve as active guarantors of the agreement. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the European Union, and other partners must integrate into permanent mechanisms for funding, border arrangements, preventing escalation, monitoring, and political backing. Permanent coordination channels between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, the NCAG, and the ISF will be essential to prevent local incidents from turning into strategic crises. At the same time, regional partners must assist in blocking weapons smuggling and funding routes and ensure that reconstruction is carried out through transparent mechanisms and Palestinian institutions.

Finally, it is impossible to stabilize Gaza in isolation from the West Bank. Reconstruction of the Strip, alongside the continued economic weakening of the West Bank, the expansion of settlements, and the increase in settler violence, will quickly lose Palestinian legitimacy — and ultimately also harm Israel's security. Palestinian tax funds that are being withheld must be released, the banking system's operations must be ensured, and the Palestinian Authority must be assisted in implementing reforms, refreshing its leadership, and restoring its ability to govern. This does not mean that one should wait with security until all political issues are resolved. On the contrary: stable security requires creating a new reality in which each side has a clear interest in maintaining the arrangements and not returning to war. Israelis need proof that Hamas's military capability is being dismantled and cannot be restored. Palestinians need proof that the process does not lead to permanent occupation or political erasure. Gaza residents need to experience reconstruction in their daily reality, not just as a promise for the future.

The roadmap may still fail. There will be those who try to sabotage it, internal politics may narrow the room for maneuver, and any delay will deepen distrust. But failure is not a foregone conclusion. This is an opportunity that is not a reason for romanticization, but one that must not be missed. Its success depends on consistent work, coordination, and determination. Throughout the way, we have called in the Palestinian-Israeli coalition 'Partnership for a Common Future' for the disarmament of Hamas and any armed organization not subject to the state, alongside the creation of a credible political horizon for Palestinians that connects Gaza to the West Bank. These are not concessions by one side to the other. This is a common interest of both Israelis and Palestinians, because none of us will be able to secure our future through the continued insecurity of our neighbors.

Hiba Qasas is a political strategist and international mediator, the founding CEO of the 'Principles for Peace' organization and leader of the 'United for a Common Future' coalition. Nadav Tamir is the CEO of J Street Israel and a former Israeli diplomat.