The deal with Greece reveals Israel's strategic asset — and also what it must not do
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have made protection against missiles and UAVs a global necessity. Greece, Finland, and Germany are turning to Israel thanks to its operational experience and proven capabilities in the field. Now we must decide how much of our advantage can be sold — and when to stop.
The war of Russia against Ukraine, which has been going on for more than four years, and the war of Israel and the USA against Iran in the last three years, have brought to consciousness the emergence and realization of the new aerial threat in modern warfare — long-range precision missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. These cross borders and continents, threaten the functional continuity of states, and could change the order of things, for example by damaging the energy sector or transportation.
Threats that it was convenient to attribute to local conflicts are now proving to be ones that cannot be ignored. Countries are developing industries of ballistic missiles and UAVs — available, cheap, and deterrent weapons, which are not necessarily inferior in their effectiveness to fighter jets, which are expensive to purchase, train, and maintain.
The threat reaches Europe
The arms competition and the procurement race are now reaching Europe as well, against the backdrop of two central security trends. On one hand, the Russian threat is leading countries in northern and eastern Europe, including Finland and Norway, to equip themselves with capabilities and in volumes not seen before. On the other hand, the growing tension in the eastern Mediterranean, and primarily the ongoing conflict between Greece and Turkey, is also pushing the countries of the region to prepare for new threats.
Within this reality, Greece is embarking on a significant procurement move in the amount of about four billion dollars, which includes the purchase of three air defense systems. The Israeli systems are supposed to provide an answer to threats from the east — from nearby Turkey to distant Iran, which proved in the last war that its missile and UAV capabilities are capable of reaching the eastern Mediterranean as well.
Choosing Israel
The supply of systems and capabilities existing in the world among defense industries is enormous. The large industries in the USA are developing air defense capabilities, and so are those in Europe. The competition is tough and has long since crossed the boundaries of economic or professional logic, and international diplomacy takes a central place in every decision.
Israel, more than thirty years ago, decided in consultation with the USA, during the period of President Reagan who announced the "Star Wars" project, to begin the development of the Arrow. Its initial version matured in 2000, and after it, Israel developed the multi-layered concept, which became, with the completion of all capabilities, an integrative concept, including Arrow 3, David's Sling, and Iron Dome.
No longer separate systems, and no longer layers separated from each other in the face of threats and capabilities, but a complete concept, in which they all share the same threats, the same complex sky picture, and the same operational data; they know how to take each other into account and know how to complement each other's weaknesses.
The choice of Israel is more than a choice of an industry or a weapon system. It is a choice of an understanding and a concept that have proven themselves. Proven operational experience has a distinct advantage, and sometimes it is worth it even when the price might be even higher. When the threat is tangible, decision-making is different, faster, and more decisive, and it also includes considerations that in other places cannot be bought with money.
The message and the challenge that Greece, and before it Finland and Germany, are conveying is a message that radiates to the whole world: first, a seal of approval and recognition of the Israeli advantage, capabilities, and concept.
Preserving the asset
The challenge for the State of Israel and the security establishment will be to preserve the asset, the secret, and the Israeli advantage. The race is not over, the threats have not been removed, and we have more challenges ahead in which we will need to use those same capabilities. We would not want to find ourselves in a position of inferiority against our enemies.
The challenge is in finding the right balance point between selling the capabilities and preserving the qualitative advantage, in attack as well as in defense.
The author is a Brigadier General (res.), former commander of the Air Defense Array.
