The end of the "Shiite Axis" and the beginning of the "Sunni Alliance": The new danger threatening Israel

Against the backdrop of strikes attributed to Israel at the Abu al-Duhur military airfield in northern Syria, and the deepening of Turkish involvement in the country, the debate in Israel is growing over how far the friction between Jerusalem and Ankara might go. Three experts present a complex picture: on one hand, the strengthening of Turkey and the hostility demonstrated by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan toward Israel; on the other hand, a warning against a policy that would turn strategic rivalry into a direct military confrontation.

Meir Ben-Shabbat, former National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council, one of the architects of the Abraham Accords, and currently head of the Misgav Institute for Zionist Strategy and National Security, warned in an interview with "Maariv" against complacency in light of developments in Syria and Turkey's regional strengthening. According to him, Israel should continue to strive for peace agreements, but not at the cost of giving up security assets or relying on agreements that may prove reversible. "One should not give up the aspiration for peace," he says, "but one must not let it make us lose our minds."

"Turkey is exploiting the changes in the Middle East and the competition between the powers over shaping the world order to establish its status as a leading regional power," says Ben-Shabbat. According to him, "this process, along with Erdogan's ambitions and his hostility toward Israel, indeed increases the potential for friction and strategic collision with Israel. We see this in several focal points."

The first focal point is Syria. Following the collapse of the Assad regime and the forced withdrawal of the Iranian military presence, according to him, Turkey has become the dominant player in the country. "Ankara is deepening its grip through funding and training of a 'new Syrian army', establishing energy infrastructure, transport infrastructure, and more," he says.

Ben-Shabbat also points to what he defines as a broader process of forming regional alliances. According to him, the signing of the "Mecca Joint Defense Agreement" between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan reflects the rise of a central Sunni axis, intended to provide mutual protection and regional stability without full dependence on Washington, and places Turkey in a position of political and military leadership.

Another focal point is the maritime domain. Ben-Shabbat mentions Ankara's "Blue Homeland" doctrine and argues that Turkish ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean clash with Israel's interests and alliances with Greece and Cyprus, creating a constant arena of friction. To this, he adds Ankara's attitude toward Hamas. "Turkey continues to host senior Hamas leadership figures on its territory, some of whom are involved in directing terror cells in Judea and Samaria directly from Istanbul soil," he says.

According to him, alongside political and military moves, Turkey is also conducting a legal and awareness campaign against Israel: "Turkey is currently operating a comprehensive campaign to institutionalize accusations against Israel through a series of measures and legal proceedings. This is to position Israel as an international criminal whose actions deviate from basic norms and international law."

"Turkey is not Iran"

On the other hand, Danny Citrinowicz, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), warns that precisely the continuation of Israeli activity in Syria could bring Israel closer to a military confrontation with Turkey. According to him, Israel-Turkey relations have deteriorated dramatically since October 7. The Turkish government's support for Hamas and Erdogan's harsh criticism of Israel have deepened the crisis and made relations more hostile than they have been for years.

However, he seeks to distinguish between Ankara and Tehran. "Turkey is not Iran," he emphasizes. According to him, Ankara continues to allow the flow of Azeri oil to Israel, does not comprehensively block its airspace to Israeli flights, and maintains a diplomatic presence in Israel. Communication channels between the countries have also not disappeared. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin are well known to their counterparts in Israel, and relations — although they are in a deep crisis — are still not severed.

Therefore, according to him, Israel's strategic challenge is not to prevent Turkey from turning from a friend into a rival — a process that has already largely occurred — but to prevent the rivalry from turning into a military confrontation.

"A confrontation with Ankara would be a completely different level"

Citrinowicz mentions that Turkey is a NATO member, that Erdogan maintains a close relationship with US President Donald Trump, and that its military capabilities are significantly larger and more advanced than those of any state adversary Israel has faced in recent decades.

According to him, a direct confrontation with Ankara would be a "completely different strategic level." He believes that Israeli activity in Syria endangers the already shaky relationship, especially when there is currently no effective mechanism for managing tension and preventing military friction. Instead of settling for threats and strikes near areas where Turkish interests exist, he suggests that Israel establish a direct communication channel with Ankara and try to formulate understandings regarding the rules of the game in Syria.

Citrinowicz also warns against portraying Ahmad al-Shara as a Turkish proxy. According to him, al-Shara indeed relies heavily on Ankara's support, but there are also different interests and tension points between the parties.

"The Israeli fear could become a self-fulfilling prophecy"

According to his assessment, the continuation of threats and Israeli military activity could create a self-fulfilling prophecy: the Israeli fear of a hostile Turkish entrenchment could lead to actions that will cause Turkey itself to see Israel as a threat — and in response, deepen its military involvement in Syria.

This does not mean, he emphasizes, that Israel should ignore its security interests or "grovel before Ankara." The road to restoring relations is still long and depends to a large extent also on the future of Israeli policy in Gaza, but military activity without political dialogue could exacerbate the confrontation unnecessarily.

"When the choice is between attacking a number of planes that are barely able to take off and trying to reach understandings with Turkey regarding the nature of its involvement in Syria, relying exclusively on military force endangers Israeli interests," he wrote.

According to him, Turkey is not going to disappear from Syria. If Ankara decides to arm al-Shara, it will be able to do so even without Israeli consent. The central question is whether this will happen within the framework of understandings and rules of the game, or within a dynamic of escalation where each side interprets the other's actions as preparation for a confrontation.

Not necessarily a "Sunni axis" against Israel

Citrinowicz also disagrees with the perception that Turkey is necessarily building a "Sunni axis" intended to replace the Shiite axis led by Iran. According to him, Ankara has significant regional ambitions of its own, and some of them definitely clash with Israeli interests, but both countries also have a common strategic interest: neither of them is interested in the return of a strong Iranian regime with decisive influence in the Middle East.

Therefore, in his view, Israel should combine military deterrence, diplomacy, and mechanisms that will allow managing the friction. "The end of an action is in the thought beforehand," he concluded. "Precisely because Turkey is a significant regional power, Israel must combine military deterrence with diplomacy and mechanisms for managing friction. In Syria, the gap between a show of force and sliding into a confrontation that neither side really wants could be very small."

"Netanyahu seeks to clarify that nothing limits him in Syria"

Also, political commentator Mahmoud Alloush, operating from Turkey, sees the strikes in Abu al-Duhur as a turning point — but interprets them differently. "The Israeli airstrikes on the Abu al-Duhur military airfield open a new chapter of Israeli escalation against Syria," he claimed.

According to him, Israel has recently prepared the ground for escalation on three levels: political discourse presenting al-Shara as an enemy; intelligence publications about Israeli concern over the acceleration of Syrian military capability building — a concern that he claims is "artificial and exaggerated" and intended to justify the escalation — as well as the sharpening of rhetoric against Turkey and its role in Syria. Alloush claims that the relative calm in recent months created the impression that Trump's position limits Israeli freedom of action in Syria, and that Netanyahu is now seeking to clarify that he does not see himself limited in the arena.

According to him, the accelerating rapprochement between Turkey and Syria is also a central factor. Relations between the countries, according to him, are developing rapidly and benefiting from Trump's position, and Netanyahu is seeking to disrupt the process before it becomes established and becomes a reality that will be difficult to change in the future. Alloush even linked the move to the election campaign in Israel and claimed that electoral pressure influences Netanyahu's decisions: "The ballot box remains the factor that exerts the greatest pressure on Netanyahu today. And he is looking for another war."

Thus, while Ben-Shabbat points to Turkish strengthening that obligates Israel to maintain its security assets and not rely on agreements alone, Citrinowicz warns against a deterioration that will turn a regional rival into a military enemy, and Alloush sees the strikes as an Israeli attempt to stop the Turkish-Syrian entrenchment. All three agree on at least one thing: Syria is rapidly becoming the central arena where the interests of Israel and Turkey meet — and the margin for error is shrinking.