The clause missing from the deal between the US and Saudi Arabia - and it should worry Israel
Globes presents a daily short review of interesting news from the global media about Israel. This time: Foreign Affairs claims that regime change in Tehran will only come through ending the fighting, a heated debate in Iran following a Ukrainian attack in the Caspian Sea, and will the US-Saudi nuclear deal ignite a regional arms race?
Against the backdrop of the constantly evolving security situation, the lens of the global media reveals unique perspectives on what is happening in the country. From analyses by international experts to interpretations from a different angle — every day we will provide you with a short daily review of what is written in the global media about Israel, to try and decipher how things from here look overseas.
The articles we present in the section are taken from major newspapers around the world and do not necessarily reflect the worldview of Globes.
1. The clause missing from the US-Saudi nuclear agreement
An opinion piece by Professor Mohammed Al-Masri from the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, argues in Middle East Eye that "the US-Israel war against Iran has pushed the countries of the region into a nuclear arms race — and that the civil nuclear deal between Washington and Riyadh could be the main catalyst for this."
News of the deal sparked outrage in Israel, with political figures fearing it would open a "fast track" to nuclear weapons for the Saudis. "A later post by Donald Trump on Truth Social, which claimed that the deal would prohibit uranium enrichment and require Saudi-Israeli normalization, partially calmed the concerns in Israel" — but Al-Masri doubts this. According to him, "it is more likely that Trump was retroactively trying to change the terms of a deal that had already been signed."
It was also written that "what is really important is what is missing from the deal: according to reports, it may allow Saudi Arabia in the future to enrich uranium locally, without the requirement of supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — a combination that raises concerns both in Tel Aviv and in Tehran."
Al-Masri warns that if Washington grants Riyadh flexibility on enrichment and supervision issues, Iran will demand similar treatment in future negotiations — and that Egypt, Turkey, and others may join the race. Thus, he argues, the war that was supposed to stop nuclear proliferation may actually accelerate it.
2. The Ukrainian attack that is dividing Tehran
"A Ukrainian attack on an Iranian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea, which killed one sailor and wounded three others, has actually sparked a heated debate in Tehran over the question of response — will a counter-attack restore deterrence, or drag Iran into a wider confrontation with Europe and NATO?", this is how an article opens in Iran International, an Iranian news channel that criticizes the regime and is located outside of Iran.
"In Tehran, they saw the attack as part of a coordinated Western-Israeli effort," it was written. "Some newspapers called the attack a 'strategic warning' intended to draw Iran into a new front, and warned that Ukraine's entry into the arena could ignite another world war." It was also claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would not have approved the action without European backing, and that Tehran knows "that Kyiv is just a branch of Europe and NATO."
Not everyone supports a military response. "A conservative activist close to Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf warned that Iran must avoid a response that would rally all of Europe to the side of the US against it," the article stated, and military experts interviewed in it also pointed to practical obstacles. Among other things, they said that an attack from the Caspian Sea would require Russian cooperation, and missiles from northwestern Iran could require penetration into Turkish airspace.
3. The hidden path to regime change in Iran
Tehran is still mourning the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, while the Middle East holds its breath following fears of a total renewal of the war against the US and Israel. A new article in Foreign Affairs, by Nader Hashemi, an associate professor of politics at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, makes an argument that sounds almost paradoxical: the path to regime change in Iran — if it exists at all — passes precisely through the end of the war, not through its continuation.
After the memorandum of understanding signed between Washington and Tehran on June 17, the escalation returned with full force. Both sides launched extensive attacks, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that Iran is again in a total war.
According to the article, Iran is not expected to soften its position in negotiations following the American attacks, and therefore "the US and its allies will probably not succeed in toppling the Islamic Republic by force," it was written.
Further on, the article deconstructs the Western assumption that military pressure leads to an uprising: "Promises by Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump of 'freedom soon' for Iranian citizens did not materialize in the last war — on the contrary, the bombings of civilian institutions ignited a wave of patriotism, not rebellion. Khamenei's funeral was attended by huge crowds of supporters — which strengthens the argument that military operations almost always fail."
So what might work? Hashemi presents a list of six conditions that researchers agree increase the chances of democratization in a country, or at the very least, a change of government: a high level of education, urbanization, a strong middle class, a functioning administrative state, an active civil society, and national unity without sharp ethnic divisions. "Iran already meets five of these six," it was written. "The only condition missing is a diversified economy — Iran is still highly dependent on oil — but even in this matter, it is gradually changing, because the sanctions have pushed it to develop exports of industrial metals, petrochemicals, and agricultural products."
Beyond internal conditions, Hashemi emphasizes another factor — international stability. Here he gives a concrete historical example — the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the West. "When the deal was signed, the threat of war was removed and some of the sanctions were lifted — which created for the first time in many years, a space where a real gap opened within the ruling elite itself, between those who wanted to get closer to the West and those who hold a militant line. But in 2018, Trump tore up the deal and renewed the heavy sanctions — and this not only hurt the reformists in Iran, but also effectively paved the way for the war that broke out later."
