"I am the secret mediator": An exclusive interview with the senior Shin Bet official who conducted direct negotiations with Hamas

Exposure: Adi Rotem, former Shin Bet representative in the negotiation team for the release of the hostages, reveals for the first time that he conducted a direct and secret channel of communication with senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad – with the approval of Shin Bet head Ronen Bar and the political echelon. In an interview with the weekend news, Rotem explains that the direct approach was born following the murder of the six hostages and the frustration with the conduct of the mediators, led by Qatar, which he defines as a party that turned from a helper into an obstacle causing strategic damage to the State of Israel.

Rotem clarified that the mediators, led by Qatar, turned from the party supposed to assist in the contacts into an obstacle. "There is an identity of interests, certainly of Qatar with Hamas, and in this aspect you understand that it is not certain that it really has high motivation to bring about a deal," he said. "Qatar to some extent, at the end of the women and children deal, adopted Hamas's positions. This was also evidence that Qatar is less pressured to succeed in bringing about a deal."

So how was the idea born to approach Hamas directly? "The last straw was the story of the murder of the six, it was very traumatic for everyone, and also in the negotiation team everyone took it very hard. It was clear that something else needed to be done here, and I at this point also brought this proposal to Ronen Bar, so that he would approve it with the political echelon. In this aspect, Ronen does the work for approvals with the political echelon, everything with permission and authority of course, and even on a mission, I would say."

If Qatar was an interfering party and did not function as a mediator in the negotiations, why not turn to another mediator, Egypt or another country? "Qatar is ultimately a country that supports the 'Muslim Brotherhood'. I think that someone's expectation from a country whose identity is completely different is an expectation and false hope. I admit, I was often in the minority on this story, in the larger team. I believed and still believe today that Qatar is a country that produces strategic damage to the State of Israel."

Did you feel the Qatargate? "There were perhaps things in retrospect that I can say, that I can connect dots, but I prefer not to comment on this story."

Was there a directive from Netanyahu for the talks? "The political echelon constantly gives boundaries, in which the negotiation team, the small team, needs to formulate the strategy."

What is called the mandate? "Exactly. And the forward team, which actually manages the negotiations, needs to carry it out, that same negotiation strategy. That's how it worked throughout the war, and we were always subject to a directive, we acted according to it. When we thought we wanted or needed to perhaps loosen the reins on something, we would turn to the political echelon, even sometimes during rounds, and ask for such or another approval. Sometimes we get it, sometimes we don't get it, and with that we know we have to manage."

Let's talk a little about the nature of these talks. You recently wrote a book: Our Agents in Gaza (Al-Fajr), what do such talks look like? "One of the first things is to create trust, and that doesn't mean we aren't enemies. We knew and talked and said it: we are enemies during wartime."

What exactly did you tell him? "Literally these words: 'We are enemies during wartime and we will continue to fight', and alongside this we currently have a functional role, we are currently solving the negotiation problem, and also continue to be bitter enemies."

Where were the talks conducted? From where do you call him? "A lot from home, a lot into the nights. Talks that are really very emotional, difficult, complex."

Did he ask you not to assassinate him? "It was clear that this thing was hovering. I remind you, the talks are being conducted, and at a certain stage Yahya Sinwar is assassinated. My way was all the time to say: let's stay in what we are able to fence. We defined it from the beginning, we are enemies. I know it sounds like a very imaginary and complex situation, and it is indeed complex. These are very long talks."

Whose idea was it to approach Ghazi Hamad specifically? "The idea was mine. I understood that if there is an address, this is the right address."

Why were the talks conducted specifically with him? "Ghazi Hamad was a figure who was also known to us from the Shalit deal, where there were contacts that took place at the time on the axis through Gershon Baskin. He was senior enough, and accessible to all the top leadership. There was never anything naive in me, but there was something in him that says that with him one can conduct that same dialogue."

Did you talk only with Ghazi Hamad? "Yes, the talks were only with Ghazi Hamad."

Was there anyone else with you on the line in these talks? "No. The talks were conducted directly between us, we agreed that we would keep the talks in such a way."

This week Ben Caspit published that in 2014 the Prime Minister had a secret channel with Hamas, through his associate, businessman Shlomi Fogel. Do you see a correlation between the things? "It is clear to me that many things are happening here that are perhaps not all relevant. Certainly when things are published at one point in time or another."

Were you surprised that all your talks were suddenly published? "Yes, I was very surprised. But many surprising things happen in the State of Israel, not all of them positive."

Suddenly Ben Caspit publishes that an associate of Netanyahu conducted talks with a senior Hamas official, the same Ghazi Hamad in 2014, and now suddenly the censorship allows publishing that actually the Shin Bet conducted direct talks with the same Ghazi Hamad. In the exact same week. "Yes, there is no doubt that there is something strange here. And again, I am not naive. It is clear to me that there are also hidden motives, which serve one agenda or another. But I was in consciousness, I look in a very functional, professional and relevant way, that's how I was throughout the career, that's how I also tried in the negotiation team, and also I try very hard not to slide into places that are already really other realms, some of them really very dirty."

Ultimately, emphasizes Rotem, these talks were something that was right to do. "I look at it for a moment purely, cleanly and professionally. I think it was the right thing to do, and it is good that the political echelon approved it, because the fact that you talk to the enemy does not mean that you give him validation, does not mean that you give him legitimacy and does not mean that you are making an arrangement with him," he clarifies. "You will negotiate with that same terrorist, you will have to talk to him, with the enemy, in order to rescue someone."